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Locations of survey respondents
They would not listen
They did not know how
Perhaps they’ll listen now
—DM
Listen and don’t interrupt.
Wait till the story ends up.
Half life of their exertion is forever.
The bells I hear aspiring for the better.
We are all shaped by dialogue.
These are just my thoughts.
—IJA
Foreword
If a democracy’s power lies in her people, then an economy’s true powerhouse lies
in the millions of households and individuals with the boldness to pave their own
futures as entrepreneurs. Thesemicro-, small andmedium enterprises (MSMEs) have
been the lifeblood of the Indonesian economy, acting as catalysts for innovation,
employment, and growth.
Yet, despite the large policy strides made by both the national and local govern-
ments to foster the development and prosperity of MSMEs, their welfare continues
to hang in the balance. Classical and prevalent challenges such as credit constraints,
supply chain frictions, and institutional barriers continue to hinder the sustainability
of MSMEs. Emerging challenges such as digitalization and globalization add further
pressure on MSMEs, with the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbating structural weak-
nesses and widening the gap that MSMEs must climb to continue surviving. These
converging threats foreshadow an alarming rise in inequality if policymakers do not
agilely respond.
With a commitment to build strong economic foundations for MSMEs to flourish
in, Bank Indonesia has established an arsenal of policies designed to provide guid-
ance, resources, and marketplaces as MSMEs grapple with old and new challenges.
Bank Indonesia’s 46 local representative offices have taken the task of facilitating
and nurturing over 1200 MSMEs across the islands of Indonesia in sectors ranging
from primary agriculture to traditional weaving.
Where pure policy has failed, Bank Indonesia’s strategies have relied on the abun-
dance of social and cultural capital unique to each locale, creating inclusive clus-
ters of MSMEs which encourage an agglomeration of skills, innovation, synergy,
and sustainability to bring MSMEs across the tipping point, swinging the scales of
opportunity in their favor and allowing them to become independent together. As
conventional policy and social capital interact with each other in distinct patterns
within each region, Indonesia provides a unique laboratory of cases to study how
governments can better design their policies around particular characteristics.
In this age of increasing complexity, technology, and information, a one-size-fits-
all policy is difficult to justify for the hundreds of millions of MSMEs in Indonesia
and, indeed, around the world. By leveraging the existing social and cultural capital
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of communities in the development of MSMEs, policymaking through a regional
rather than a national lens can become more strategic and effective in lifting up the
communities they are designed to serve.
Bank Indonesia therefore presents the book “Periphery and Small Ones Matter”
as an effort to highlight the regional fractures in the Indonesian economy, showcasing
how those fractures can bemendedwith policies that put the people on the forefront. It
is our hope that this book will be of benefit as a medium of learning for academicians
and policymakers and for the MSMEs themselves.
The open access publication of this book reflects Bank Indonesia’s intent to spark
a conversation as wide and inclusive as possible regarding the future of MSME
policy at the local, national, and international levels. By delving into the singular
perspectives of over 120 MSMEs spread throughout 7 islands and 27 representative
offices, this book offers conversations with MSMEs that urge readers to rethink
conventional economic approaches.
Amidst a pandemic,Bank Indonesiawas able to remotely gather research evidence
on behavioral policies rooted in the interactions between policy components and
various types of social capital. The remote nature of this book’s research and writing
also serves as a reminder of the changing, uncertain times that the world faces.
Hope remains in the undying spirit of the people. The resilience, creativity, and
talent of MSMEs are in great abundance, but success cannot be achieved alone.
Creating centers and communities of excellence requires relentless support, dedi-
cation, and assistance to allow MSMEs gradually grow independent. Governments
cannot fall complacent in their duty to deliver the wealth and health of nations.
As we navigate a world in the wake of the pandemic, MSMEs have become the
heart of the economic recovery.
So let us listen to their pulse.
Jakarta, Indonesia Perry Warjiyo
Governor of Bank Indonesia
Preface
The issues covered in this book make stopping points almost arbitrary. The book
could have been written several years or even decades earlier, with a few omissions
and shorter period of data and evidence. I could have also waited until next year,
the following years, or at a later point in time when some of the topics I leave will
perhaps be included, especially given the effect of the dreadful pandemic. The main
reasons being that the raised issues are perennial and likely to stay: inequality and
dualism.
The relationship between development and inequality is largely accounted for
by transitional development processes related to the dualism, including inequality
between core regions and periphery and between traditional small businesses and
modern large businesses. The phenomena are not new. Many studies typically
found a curvilinear relationship between development and inequality. What is rather
surprising is that the evidence in many countries shows that inequalities persisted,
lasting longer than expected, even until the post-structural change period and after
numerous countervailing policies had been promulgated. The dictum of comparative
advantage and free trade that predicts a convergence is far from being supported by
the evidence.
It was the combination of my desire to understand how regional inequalities
persisted in many countries and why the standard conventional economics failed to
explain such a trend that led me to explore the issue through a book on “Regional
Economics: Fundamental Concepts, Policies, and Institutions” (World Scientific,
2020). Frequent discussions with the late Walter Isard, my mentor and colleague,
who was genuinely concerned with the growing inequality around the world, also
gaveme a strongmotivation to write that conceptual book. As soon as it was released,
many asked how to apply the concepts discussed in the book to a particular country.
As people asking the same question grew in number, I became intrigued. While
visiting Jakarta, colleagues at the central bank, Bank Indonesia (BI), offered me to
conduct a study that would apply the book’s fundamental concept for Indonesia.
Long story short, that led to the writing of this book.
But there is more. Inequalities also exist in business activity, where modern and
large-scale enterprises typically located in core regions perform better and have a
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superior network of relations (social capital) than the small enterprises do. Exploring
ways to help improve the performance of micro-small and medium enterprises
(MSMEs) as part of mitigating inequalities is hence crucial from the development
policy perspective. This turns out to be also of interest to BI. Looking at the evidence
where many policies in the past were not fully effective, and having visited many
MSMEs throughout the countrymyself, I argued that if we are to go that pathwe need
to understand the underlying problems faced by MSMEs from their perspective, not
from the perspective of researchers or outside experts. Understanding their “mental
bandwidth” is far more crucial than conducting more analysis with another proposed
set of measures.
The challenge, however, is how to juxtapose the two different yet related prob-
lems of inequalities, i.e., between regions and between MSME and large enterprises.
Unarguably, it is a daunting challenge, one that is made all the more difficult by the
fact that a field survey is necessary for understanding MSMEs’ real problems and
challenges, yet is hard to conduct during the pandemic. Firmly convinced that over-
coming these problems is a central part of the exercise of development in a large and
heterogenous country like Indonesia, I accepted the challenge. This led to a research
project sponsored by BI in which I acted as an external research scholar. This book
is the product of that research project.
The starting point is a set of straight questions, where the answers are “yes” “no”
and “yes.” The questions are: “dowe have dualism and inequalities in our economy?”
“were policies in the past effective in reducing them?” and “do non-policy factors
have any effects on policy effectiveness?” The first two questions and answers are
addressed in Chap. 2, and the third is what the rest of the book deals with.
The basic principles of the analysis rest on the concepts of centripetal forces asso-
ciated with agglomeration economies. On regional inequalities (the core–periphery
problems), the tendency for activities to concentrate due to agglomeration forces
associated with external or agglomeration economies takes the center stage. The
implications are, policies directed toward a higher growth at the national level may
come with the price of amplifying the interregional inequalities, where measures to
countervail a concentration tendency without taking account agglomeration forces
bound to fail. Incongruously, MSMEs operating in a cluster can exert the same forces
that may help improve their operations and mitigate the performance gap between
them and large businesses. Seizing such forces by encouraging MSME to form a
cluster is hence desirable. How to reconcile the different effects of agglomeration on
two types of inequalities is the core of the analysis in the book.
The mechanisms how those principles work are complex, crucially influenced by
the existing institution and social capital. In governing the behavior and activities
of agents, social capital is inescapably constrained by the prevailing institution. On
the other hand, institution is shaped by social choice (aside from history), implying
that it is also influenced by social capital (aside from human capital); e.g., greater
trust makes cooperation and collective actions easier to achieve, and better educa-
tion generates higher participation. There is hence a deep complementarity between
institution and social capital. Compared to the purely economic factors, this nexus of
institution–social capital could transmit greater influence on inequalities anddualism.
Preface xiii
Centering on that message, the book is intended for public discussion, not just for
social panners, policy makers, or academics. The presentation, including results of
the survey, is made as nontechnical as possible. For those inclined to the technical
and formal aspects of the subject, the reference list provides relevant sources and the
appendix gives a brief technical explanation of the approach used in the survey.
Ithaca, NY, USA Iwan J. Azis
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“Iwan Azis’ new book has all the elegance of his deep understanding of institu-
tions and policies, the pursuit of which will strengthen widespread development
through MSMEs. He also uses baseline information to describe inequality and its
consequences. His book has widespread interest for those working on problems of
the populous countries of the Third World. As we coast through the pandemic Azis
shows the light at the end of the tunnel.”
—Yoginder. K. Alagh, Former Minister of Power, Planning & Science &
Technology of India
“As a vast archipelagic nation, Indonesia faces a daunting double challenge of social
and regional inequality. Hitherto both theory and policy have failed by ‘betting on the
strong’. This path-breaking book by one of Indonesia’s most experienced economists
focuses on howMSMEs can drive development and reduce both forms of inequality.
The key is bottom-up policies that allow for regional variation and draw on hitherto
neglected social capital. This sophisticated analysis integrates regional economics,
institutional economics and social capital theory with case study data and a keen eye
to policy. Essential reading.”
—Howard Dick, University of Melbourne
“The disconnect between policies and their implementationmust be solved if govern-
ments are to help MSMEs and their people achieve prosperity. This book reflects on
the role of social capital and participation in bridging that gap, delving into the
perspectives of MSMEs themselves to shine a light on areas where government poli-
cies have failed to reach. Bringing the regional disparities and the disconnect to
the forefront of the discussion, the analysis shifts the narrative towards the people
and the MSMEs that should be the focus of policies. It demonstrates how local and
national governments should look beyond political and economic elements towards
the social capital that promotes sustainable and collective development rather than
mere individual growth.”
—Emil Salim, Former Minister of Environment of the Republic of Indonesia
“Just listen to them. This is the striking conclusion of this excellent study of the inter-
face between policy and social capital in nurturing MSMEs, in their role of creating
economic vitality and equitable development. Conceptually elegant and quantita-
tively rigorous, with original data collection which will be of use to researchers
and policy makers for years to come, the central narrative of the volume is that the
answers are there to be discovered, simply by leaving aside top down perspectives
and taking a ground level approach to diagnosis and design. Just listen to them.”
—Ravi Kanbur T.H., Lee Professor of World Affairs, International Professor of
Applied Economics and Management, and Professor of Economics, Cornell
University.
“Given that inequality is expected to rise with the pandemic, this is a timely publi-
cation. Prof Azis is to be congratulated in adopting a novel approach by looking
at the nexus between policies, institutions and social capital in looking at regional
inequalities and issues faced by MSMEs. Its main conclusions are first, to address
dualism effectively, investments in the peripherymust account for interregional inter-
actions and institutional arrangements. Second strengthening MSMEs is not just
about financial assistance, but developing business clusters based on existing social
capital and local wisdom. These insights will be valuable for all development policy
practitioners.”
—Mari E Pangestu, Managing Director of Development Policy and Partnerships,
World Bank
“Developing countries are composed of nations with great diversity. Applying ‘one-
size fits all’ programs is destined for failure. Having consulted several international
organizations and governments, Professor Iwan Azis has a very firm grasp on various
development issues. Taking the fact that each province in Indonesia is facing different
problems, he personally visited various provinces to understand the problems and
explore ways to handle them appropriately. This book partly reflects those visits.
As is well known, visiting backward regions far from major cities is never an easy
task. It would be impossible without the self-motivated passion of the author. The
value of the book lies in the fact that the recommendations about policy are based on
real cases. I recommend this book not only to Indonesian readers and policymakers,
but also to those in many developing countries as well as development specialists in
international organizations.”
—Taeho Bark, Professor Emeritus of Seoul National University and Former Trade
Minister of Korea
Dr. Azis’ new book provides an excellent analysis of the factors behind wide regional
disparity as well as development disparity between MSMEs and large firms in
Indonesia, and makes numerous useful and insightful policy suggestions to deal
with the obstacles and challenges faced by MSMEs. The analysis makes a number
of important contributions to the studies of regional disparity and MSMEs, not only
from academic perspectives, but also from the perspectives of policy formulation, by
pointing out the importance of various inter-connected relations/factors, which have
been ignored or given little attention in the studies, including inter-firm linkages in
agglomeration/clusters, interactions between policies on the one hand and institu-
tions and social capital on the other hand, in order to understand and overcome the
problems facing MSMEs. What is remarkable about this study is to obtain actual
views and opinions of MSMEs by conducting a survey and use the information for
the analysis, ensuring validity of the analysis and discussions.
—Shujiro Urata, Professor Emeritus, Waseda University, Japan
“The role of MSMEs in sustainable economic development in far too many places
has been largely ignored in both theory and practice. The term entrepreneur is rarely
found in economic development theory, but a growing recognition is emerging of
the centrality of small businesses in economic growth and development. This book
provides highly relevant analysis and sage policy advise that centers small enterprises
across Indonesia as part of a sustainable solution for regional inequality and post-
pandemic recovery.Amajor contribution of this volume is in its call for policymakers
to better understand the importance of all forms of capital in the design, formulation,
and implementation of private strategies and public policies. While Azis recognizes
that financial and human capital are better understood and measured, he skillfully
advances our collective understanding of the essential role of social capital as applied
to sustainable development.”
—Ralph Christy, Director of the Emerging Markets Program, Cornell University
“This important new book promises to address two critical issues. First, it provides
strong empirical evidence that should convince macroeconomic policy analysts in
Indonesia that they need to address the problem of spatial heterogeneity in refor-
mulating their models and policy prescriptions. Secondly, it affirms the important
role that banking institutions can play in enhancing regional development since the
presence of local representative offices provides the opportunity for Bank Indonesia
to more successfully tailor policies to local needs and opportunities. Reducing the
spatial information asymmetry provides an innovation itself that can potentially
enhance the economic success of many more MSME.”
—Geoffrey J. D. Hewings, Director Emeritus, Regional Economics Applications
Laboratory, University of Illinois
“By highlighting the role of social capital in government policy, this book provides
a timely and critical analysis of the institution that shape the welfare of MSMEs and
society. A one-size-fits-all policy cannot succeed, and this book’s analysis through a
regional rather than a national lens draws contrasts and similarities in the challenges
faced byMSMEs across various islands of Indonesia. The emphasis on the ecosystem
of policy variables, social institution, and economic factors allows readers insight
into a breadth and depth of understanding on the wide diversity of conditions that
MSMEs must overcome to flourish in the wake of the pandemic, while offering a
solution of hope in the clusters of MSMEs that can lift each other up.”
—Chatib Basri, Former Minister of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia
“I am very excited as well as grateful that my Guru and mentor, Professor Iwan
Azis has taken up a research project on looking at regional economics and MSMEs,
culminating in this very important book. There has been plenty of work done on both
topics. However, this book and the research project behind this book are novel. They
tackle two big problems in one go: unequal development and the role of MSMEs in
mitigating inequalities in Indonesia, a large and dynamic economy, by bringing in
the role played by social capital in explaining the performance of MSMEs. The book
offers unique insights on how non-policy factors impact on policy effectiveness.
Coming at this point in time when Indonesia and the entire World are grappling
with the Covid-19 pandemic, the analysis in this book will help policy makers and
development finance institutions in many practical ways.”
—Ramesh Subramaniam, Director General, Southeast Asia Department, Asian
Development Bank
“With their pivotal role as the foundation of the economy and as wellsprings of
culture, MSMEs have become Bank Indonesia’s most crucial sector. Efforts to raise
the quality and quantity of guidance provided to MSMEs have been prioritized to
ensure effective outcomes that foster the persistence and sustainability of MSME
development. The diverse characteristics of MSMEs from each region of Indonesia
affects the creation of social capital and the formation of collective action. Thus,
centering this research around the components and interaction of government policy
and social capital, Bank Indonesia presents a holistic, multidimensional view of the
challenges faced by MSMEs, as well as the road forward where government policy
alone is no longer sufficient.”
—Destry Damayanti, Senior Deputy Governor of Bank Indonesia
“By looking at the role of institutional approach and social capital in the dualism
between center and periphery and between MSME and large businesses, the book
exposes the forces that lead to dualism and concentration phenomena. The important
implication is that, not only policies but also the designof those policiesmatter, partic-
ularly the extent of their compatibility with the prevailing institutional arrangement
unique to each society.”
—Willem Thorbecke, Senior Fellow at Japan’s Research Institute of Economy,
Trade and Industry (RIETI)
“As the pandemic puts pressure onMSMEs, governments must be innovative in their
policymaking to prevent the foundations of the economy from buckling under the
weight. MSMEs has long been the bedrock of the Indonesian economy. However,
rife inequality and turbulent growth have constrained their development. This book
offers an alternative perspective to designing policies for MSME development by
combining conventional government policy with the rich and diverse social capital
across Indonesia. Using field surveys to draw a comprehensive picture of the comple-
mentary roles of social capital and government policy, the research analysis presents
a valuable resource for policy makers, academicians, and MSMEs as they navigate
these uncertain times.”
—Dody Budi Waluyo, Deputy Governor of Bank Indonesia
“With his unique ability to go from a 30,000 feet view to the ground level with equal
ease, Dr. Azis has again produced an elegant and instructive book of great relevance
in these trying times, not only for Indonesia but for all developing countries. Based
on deeply analytical work, and yet presented for a wider, general audience, the book
recognizes the key role MSMEs can play in fostering local economic growth and
addressing inequality. The unique contribution of this book is that it goeswell beyond
the usual economic factors, and emphasizes the need to also recognize complex
human and social behavioral aspects at play. The advice then to eschew a top down
approach in favor of listening to the MSMEs themselves and their clients on the
ground facing the realities of their daily struggles and challenges is well taken.”
—Rajat M. Nag, National Council of Applied Economic Research, Delhi, India
“Indonesia has long been plagued by structural inequality, rooted in differences in
demographic and geographic endowments between Java and the Outer Islands, and
between the small-scale operations of the massive numbers of micro, small and
medium enterprises (MSMEs), and the handful of powerful big businesses which
dominate modern economic activity. This dualism, first described by J.H. Boeke in
1953, is rightly characterized by Azis as a result of differences in endowments, scale
of operations, institutions and social capital. Efforts to directly close regional gaps
through regional development investmentmay likewise backfire if this, paradoxically,
simplymakes it easier for advanced regions to extract resources fromweaker regions.
This book provides ample evidence that programs which are designed without taking
into account local customs and beliefs, and without considering whether MSMEs
could better solve their problems without external support, are likely to backfire.
Listening carefully to theMSMEs,whooperate in an enormous variety of cultural and
economic settings, and then designing policies that matches their perceptions of what
is needed to tackle binding constraints is critical to the design and implementation
of public policies aimed at tackling dualism.”
—Steven R. Tabor, Former Country Director of the Asian Development Bank,
Indonesia
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Abstract Dualism is closely linked with inequality. Any process of development
entails forces of dispersion (centrifugal) and forces of concentration or agglomeration
(centripetal). The tendency for activities to concentrate is driven by the external
economies that exceeds the negative externalities (higher prices, congestion, etc.)
caused by the concentration. On the other hand, external economies can helpmitigate
the inequality between MSMEs and large businesses by offering benefits to MSMEs
if they work through clusters for collective action.
Keywords Agglomeration · External economies · Spatial distribution · Policy
interplay · Institution
Defined as the state of being dual or consisting of two parts, dualism is reflected in
the co-existence of two systems, i.e., large modern sectors (core regions) and small
traditional sectors (periphery regions). It occurs everywhere, developed and devel-
oping countries alike. It only differs in characteristics and degree. Among several
indicators of economic dualism, the most widely applied is the productivity gap
or the relative labor productivity. The productivity gap between regions within a
country indicates regional dualism, and the productivity gap between small and large
businesses denotes business dualism.
The sources of productivity gap between regions are found to be not mutually
exclusive. They range from industry mix, capital intensity, investment in information
and communication technology (ICT), and the extent of product market regulation
and labor market flexibility (OECD, 2018). Location-specific factors including local
institutions matter too. Acemoglu and Dell (2010) argued that the availability of
local public goods and the security of property rights in developing countries signifi-
cantly explain the variation of relative productivity between regions within a country.
Although dualism between large and small firms, income and wage differentials are
sometime used as an alternative measure, productivity gap remains the most impor-
tant indicator. The relative productivity difference between large and small firms
fluctuates considerably across countries. Typically, the productivity of small firms is
in the range of 20–60% of that of larger firms, although the number varies between
sectors.
© BI Institute 2022




Dualism has a close link with inequality. By using the ratio of labor productivity
in agriculture to that in the rest of the economy as a measure of economic dualism,
Bourguignon and Morrisson (1998) showed that, given a set of control variables, the
relative labor productivity plays a major role in explaining the differences in income
distribution across developing countries. For Indonesia, the average relative labor
productivity during the last decade has been around 0.36 compared to 0.38 during
the 1990s decade.
But dualism goes beyond economics. In countries where interregional inequality
is high and productivity gap between small and large businesses is wide, the concept
of social dualism is highly significant. Incorporating it into economic dualism and
inequality, however, increases the complexity of the analysis. Yet, it is imperative
in our case and is precisely the approach we take in the book. By using the case
of Indonesia, the focus of the analysis is on the inequality between regions and the
challenges surrounding the efforts to improve the country’s micro small and medium
enterprises (MSMEs). The main intention is to understand the key factors and forces
behind the country’s interregional inequality, and the reasons behind difficulties to
boost MSME competitiveness. Note, however, that while the conceptual analysis
presented in the book can be applied to MSMEs in general, in Indonesia and other
countries alike, the survey results reported in Chap. 4 are based almost entirely on
micro and small enterprises (MSEs) in various regions throughout Indonesia.
The relevance of social dualism for Indonesia was first shown by a Dutch
economist cum lawyer, J. H Boeke, in his landmark study on the causes of the dual-
istic characteristics in underdeveloped countries (Boeke, 1953). In the context of our
book, one of the implications of Boeke’s study is the need to take into account the
characteristics of dualistic society if we intend to have a better understanding about
the persistence of interregional inequality and the reasons why a good majority of
MSMEs had difficulties to improve their performance. For that purpose, the role
of institution and social capital cannot be ignored. Insofar the prevailing institution
and social capital are shaped by the characteristics of the society, the interactions
between policies and those two may hold the key to the problem. Making policies
effective or be responded positively by the MSMEs requires a good comprehension
about such interactions.
The starting point of the analysis is the recognition that anyprocess of development
entails forces of dispersion (centrifugal) and forces of concentration or agglomeration
(centripetal). The interplay of those two forces determines the spatial configuration of
activities. Interregional inequality occurs when the agglomeration forces are stronger
than the dispersion forces. The inequality effect of it reflects the dualism of all sorts.
The tendency for activities to concentrate is driven by the external economies that
exceeds the negative externalities caused by the concentration (higher prices and
costs, congestion, etc.). On the other hand, the same external economies can help
mitigate the inequality between MSMEs and large businesses by offering benefits to
the MSMEs if they work through clusters or operate in close proximity to each other.
It has been long recognized that spatial concentration of activities can be the socio-
economic engines for competitiveness and growth (Azis, 2020a, 2020b; Krugman,
1991a; Porter, 1998). When activities concentrate in few regions within a country,
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national efficiency improves, but the gap between those regions and the rest of the
country tends to widen, that is, the interregional inequality increases. The resulting
equilibrium is therefore sub-optimal. When firms and other activities agglomerate
in few localities or areas within a region, either organically or lured by government-
provided incentives (e.g., industrial zone), both the region’s growth and the inequality
between localities tend to increase, which is another sub-optimal equilibrium. The
source of the sub-optimality is obviously the arising inequality or divergence between
the core and the periphery. Arguably, the precise conjecture linking spatial concen-
tration and inequality is conditional to where the concentration occurs. Rising
dualism and inequality emerge when increased agglomeration occurs in the devel-
oped regions/areas which typically are in a better position to attract new activities at
the first place.
Insofar dualism and inequality are multidimensional, they can occur on various
levels; e.g., between rich and poor households, between rural and urban, between
small and large businesses, and between traditional and modern sectors. If, for some
reasons, activities concentrate in the less-developed areas, or, in the case of busi-
ness activities small businesses operate in a cluster to benefit from agglomeration
economies, the outcome could be more optimal. Consider dualism and inequality
between large firms andMSMEs. By definition,MSMEs are very different than large
businesses not only in size but also in terms of legal structures, management style,
financing arrangements, technology, and market size and niches. MSMEs also have
limited networks for expansion (e.g., lobbying capacity, business contact, communi-
cation), and their location tends to scatter. These characteristics prevent them from
enjoying the benefits of input sharing, labormarket pooling, andknowledge spillovers
(sources of agglomeration economies). By operating in a cluster, they will have the
opportunity to reap those benefits. Thus, there is a great deal of similarity between
the concepts associated with forces leading towards spatial concentration applied
to regions and those applied to business sectors of different sizes. While the earlier
results in a stronger growth with more intense dualism, the latter has the potential to
foster growth and reduce dualism, if the agglomeration-related external economies
can be enjoyed by MSMEs operating in clusters.
From this perspective, the general direction of the policy should be to mitigate
the effects of agglomeration forces leading towards concentration of activities in
developed areas, and exploit the same forces by encouraging small businesses to
operate in a close proximity to enable them enjoy the external economies. If serious
efforts to foster inclusive growth are to be made, these two are among the important
tasks of social planners. The question is, how? The book addresses this question by
focusing on the role of interactions between policies and institution, of which social
capital is an important part.
The analysis in Chap. 3 delves into the nature of interactions between policy
and institution. The approach taken is to link the concept of agglomeration leading
towards dualism and inequality with the mechanisms of how the combined policies
and institution including social capital affects the outcome. The working hypothesis
is: observed dualism and inequality are not only the results of development policy
but also the consequence of agglomeration forces and the interplay of policies and
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Fig. 1.1 Development with agglomeration and intersectoral-interregional interactions
institution. Policy alone is likely to fail if social capital based on the prevailing
institution is ignored.Attempts to verify this hypothesis aremade inChap. 4, inwhich
alternative scenarios of redirecting spending towards different regions are compared,
and the results of MSE survey are discussed. Since institution and social capital are
at the center of the hypothesis, the discussion about their role and mechanisms of
interactions with policies takes up most part of Chaps. 3 and 4.
Putting all together, Fig. 1.1 depicts the line of reasoning behind the analysis
throughout the book. It epitomizes a typical development process involving agglom-
eration forces and interactions between regions. Within each of the three regions,
r1-circle, r2-square, and r3-square, there are three sectors each is represented by the
small circles; for example, C1r1 denotes sector 1 in region r1-circle, C
3
r3 denotes
sectors 3 in region r3-square, etc. The clear arrows pointing towards two direc-
tions indicate the interactions, both between sectors and between regions, and the
grey arrows pointing towards one direction represent the forces of agglomeration.
r1-circle is assumed to be the developed (core) region—hence the circle has the
largest area–and region r2-square and r3-square are less developed regions, of which
r3-square is the least developed one (smaller size of the square).
The three activities in each region are interacting via both, the intraregional multi-
pliers (measurable by the intersectoral input–output relations) and the interregional
multipliers (measurable by the interregional input–output relations). Based on those
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two multipliers, all three regions will grow, and this is depicted by expanded r1-
circle, r2-square, and r3-square. But there is another source of regional growth, i.e.,
external economies driven by agglomeration or concentration of activities in C1r1,
C2r2 and C
3
r3 (to which the one-direction arrows point towards). This is depicted in




r3. Obviously, the precise extent
of expansion depends on how much external economies can be reaped by the sector,
which could be influenced by the type and effectiveness of policy measures designed
to exploit those external economies.
Nonetheless, three things happen: first, all regions grow, albeit at different rates,
implying that the national economy grows; second, the distribution between regions
is altered, implying a change in interregional inequality; and third, the spatial distribu-
tion of activities in each region is altered, implying that the intraregional inequality is
changed as well.What is the outcome of it? A growing national economy is a forgone
conclusion, but the resulting inequality–between and within regions–is uncertain.
This is where our proposition becomes relevant, i.e., to mitigate the effects of
agglomeration forces that lead to concentration, and exploit those forces by encour-
aging small businesses to operate in close proximity in order to enjoy the external
economies. Failure to do the first results in growing interregional inequality, failure
to do the second widens the gap between small and large activities. To avoid those
failures, the book argues that one needs to delve into the dynamics of interactions
between policies and institution. In the first case, the role of regional and interregional
structure that reflects the existing institutional arrangements ought to be considered
in designing policies to reduce the gap between core (r1) and periphery (r3). In the
second case, the direction of policy should be to encourage small businesses to coop-
erate and act collectively through clusters, and provide measures that are compatible
with the prevailing social capital.
All the discussions and analysis up to Chap. 4 demonstrate how the model frame-
work is used to explain the role of agglomeration forces and the interactions between
policies and institution-cum-social capital in shaping dualism and inequality. On
the role of social capital, the use of a model framework and the survey reflects our
attempt to generalize the results by using data and people perceptions as a piece
of evidence. Yet, the actual relationship between policy making, institution, and
outcome is more complex than what is conceptualized, and to some extent such a
relationship is unforeseeable. In reality, how do the institutional arrangements and
social capital actually work in affecting small businesses operations? Do cases on
the ground corroborate what has been conceptualized and concluded in the anal-
ysis? To answer these questions, a number of case-based evidence is discussed in
Chap. 5. In particular, the presented narratives involve real people doing small busi-
ness in different regions throughout Indonesia. They obviously operate within the
prevailing institutional arrangement. The discussions show how they cope with chal-
lenges and possible disputes by using the prevailing social capital, and how the role
of local customs and customary laws affect their business operations.
The book is structured as follows. The first part of Chap. 2 discusses the historical
‘source’ of dualism in Indonesia, with a particular emphasis on the relevance of
Boeke’s concept of ‘dualism,’ and the second part presents the evidence of inequality
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in a dualistic system in Indonesia despite the fact that various policies to address
inequality have been implemented. The methodologies and the main concepts to
explain why such inequality happened are discussed in Chap. 3. Insofar they describe
the sources of agglomeration, and conceptualize the interactions between policies and
social capital through collective actions, they are subsequently used to develop the
questionnaire for the survey on MSEs, the results of which are discussed in Chap. 4.
The first part of that chapter discusses how the intra and inter regional economic
structure as part of the prevailing institution influences the effectiveness of policy to
reduce interregional inequality. The second part, which is the bulk of the chapter, is
devoted to the analysis of MSE survey on the interplay between policies and social
capital in affecting the type of MSE cluster. Overall, Chap. 4 exposes the importance
of mitigating the inequality caused by the agglomeration forces and exploiting the
elements of those forces through MSME clusters. To complement the analysis on
the effect of interactions among policies, institution, and social capital on MSME
performance, Chap. 5 presents some examples of evidence from cases throughout
different regions in Indonesia. Chapter 6 summarizes the overall finding.
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Abstract Historical ‘source’ of dualism in Indonesia is first discussed, with a partic-
ular emphasis on the relevance of Boeke’s concept of dualism. Despite the presence
of various policies to address the issue, the inequality between regions in the country
is large by international standard. The productivity gap of micro-small enterprises
and large businesses are also stark. As policy goals tend to be ambiguous, some
proposed measures are not well received by the MSMEs.
Keywords Interregional inequality · Poverty · Productivity ·Wealth distribution ·
Policies
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10 2 Dualism and Development
Conversation
A: “We LAUD the achievements in macro indicators.”
B: “But the aggregate picture conceals inequalities that plague the DUAL
system.”
A: “To reduce interregional inequalities, we have allocated more funds and built
infrastructure in periphery REGIONS.”
B: “That is an incomplete conjecture as it IGNORES the role of agglomeration
forces and the prevailing institutional arrangement.”
A: “Although inequalities remain and dualism persists, we certainly do STRUT
our policies when it comes to bringing higher growth and lower poverty.”
B: “The effectiveness of policies and how they are received by the public is also
determined by the level of TRUST as part of social capital.”
A: “The STATE has been actively engaged in programs to support small businesses
during a crisis.”
B: “In helping the small businesses we need to understand and have a TASTE of
what we miss about the complex relationships between policies and institutions
and the behavioral insights of the programs.”
A Historical Source
By choosing the appropriate assumptions of the institutional framework in under-
developed countries, Boeke (1953) provided a systematic analysis of development
through his ‘dualistic theory,’ also known as the ‘social dualism.’ He elaborated the
concept by using numerous examples of cases in Indonesia based on detailed descrip-
tions of the colonial society during the Dutch East Indies period between 1910 and
1929.1 Boeke’s investigations were stimulated by the problems of declining welfare
of the Indonesian population. He lamented that, “social dualism is the clashing of
an imported social system with an indigenous social system of another style. Most
frequently the imported social system is high capitalism. But it may be socialism
or communism just as well, or a blending or them” (Boeke, 1953, p. 4). He saw a
co-existence of such two systems in Indonesia—and also India—and argued that the
resulting dualistic economywould be a permanent feature of the countries’ economic
structure (Boeke, 1961).
1 In 1914, when he became an advisor to the Dutch institution as part of the imperialistic policies
designer, he was assigned to improve the education, health care, and rural credit cooperatives for
the indigenous population. Upon returning to the Netherlands, he was appointed as the chair of
tropical-colonial political economy and professor of Eastern Economics at Leiden University to
lecture “Dualistic Economy.” What he observed and learned during his stay in Indonesia made
him critical to the Dutch’s policies. Some of those critiques were put in writing, for which he was
interned in the concentration camp for several years, after which he returned to Indonesia and stayed
there until 1955.
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Boeke analysis essentially implies a culture-related backward-bending supply
curve for labor, driven by ‘limitedwants’ as well as inelastic demand behavior among
the indigenous social system. Bearing in mind that institution differs across cultures,
he argued that it cannot be easily implemented elsewhere in a top-down manner.
Hence, a distinct economic approach is needed for the Dutch-Indonesian colonies
where the indigenous population responded otherwise than expected to the economic
incentives set by the western colonial institution. The implication is, if a specific
policy or institutional framework is imposed onto another culture, it will only be
partially adopted by the respective population.
Boeke’s work along with his concept of economic dualismwas among the earliest
attempts to diagnose the causes underlying the dualistic characteristics and their
implications for the developmental process in underdeveloped countries. It is this
dualism that served as one of the necessary reasons for the persistence of informal
economy in many developing countries. It is also one that led to the marginalization
and exclusion of social groups from formal economic activities (Clement, 2015).
Boeke’s theory laid the foundations for a series of concepts and other theories on
socio-economic duality that came later, e.g., the work of Lewis (1955), Hirschman
(1957), andGeertz (1963), the labor surplusmodel of Fei andRanis (1964), including
the relevant comments by Eckaus (1965) and Dixit (1970).
Not all scholars, however, agreed with Boeke. Among several issues causing
disagreements concerns the static nature of his theory. Boeke clearly believed that the
dual society in Indonesia is “permanent at leastwithin ameasurable distance of time.“
He also wrote “that a precapitalistic society is driven further and further away into an
exchange economy for which it is not fitted and which it cannot master.” In his view,
the static feature of his theory could be used in the context of pre-capitalistic sector.
Higgins (1966) countered that if they are static in the sense that per-capita incomes
are not rising and capital accumulation proceeds at slow rates, not only the description
bears little resemblance to the theoretical abstraction of static economy but it also
ignores the fact that a non-growing economy is actually a special case of economic
dynamics. Itagaki (1960) made further arguments that since no transitional process is
considered, the static nature of Boeke’s theory undermines the dynamic aspects of the
problem of structural changes. In his view, what should be important to analyze—yet
missing in Boeke’s analysis—is the critical role of ‘colonial capitalism’ that caused
the ‘unequalizing factors’ suggested by Myint (1964), and the ‘backwash effect’
expounded by Myrdal (1957), both of which could either preserve or reinforce the
initial dualism by hindering further development of the indigenous economic sectors.
But other than highlighting the important role of state and economic nationalism to
eliminate those forces, Itagaki did not offer specific solutions. Nonetheless, Boeke’s
failure to recognize the dynamic elements in Indonesian life has been one of the
sources of criticisms against his theory.
Boeke’s concept was used not only by the colonial authority but also by the
Indonesian government in a post-independence period to serve as the basis of a
protectionist policy. The goals were to prevent social disintegration and preserve
social coherence. Sadli (1957) concurred with Boeke’s assessment: “It cannot be
denied that Boeke’s descriptions of the Eastern (or perhaps only the Javanese) village
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are in many instances true. Boeke knows a lot about the Javanese village life in the
colonial period.” On the other hand, he was also critical about Boeke’s idea being
thought as a new theory. In his words “Boeke explainedmuch about the social impact
of a high capitalistic systemupon a precapitalistic society but this can hardly be called
a separate economic theory.”
The concept of dualism continues to be relevant in today’s environment, as it is
closely associated with inequality.2 Not that Boeke was entirely right. He was not.
It was Lewis (1955) who provided a thorough analysis and showed that the move-
ment of labor from traditional agriculture to modern industrial activities is what
makes growth and development possible. Hence, dualism is not static. The intersec-
toral labor migration is the source or engine of economic development. However,
the notion that the gap between economic and social organizations, that is, the gap
between a relatively modern economy performed by large businesses and the tradi-
tional indigenous economy of small businesses continues to persist, is hard to deny.
So is the development gap between core regions and periphery. The coexistence of
such contrasting economic and social organizations is a fundamental aspect of today’s
growth process in many countries. The trend of income and wealth inequality has
not been too encouraging in almost everywhere around the world.
Globally, over the course of twentieth century, income inequality within countries
followed a more-or-less U-shape pattern, but the trend in most countries have been
worsening. Unlike what was assumed in Boeke’s theory, this occurred even with the
traditional sectors experiencing a process of transition. On the other hand, Boeke’s
prediction that dualism will be “permanent at least within a measurable distance of
time” does not seem to be off target. The overall picture of within-country dualism
continues to exist, albeit with certain fluctuations. Income inequality persists and
continues to be high in some countries, and the performance gap between large and
small businesses (where the latter are generally traditional) remains large.
For a country like Indonesia, given the size and its archipelagic nature, inequality
between regions including between rural and urban area is particularly important.
Discussed in the next section, the country’s interregional inequality is indeed large
by international standard.
Another reason why it is important to address the issue of dualism and inequality
is because of its intricate relations with growth. The classical economic thinking
(Kaldor, 1956) posited that the rich have a higher marginal propensity to save
than the poor so that a higher degree of initial income inequality tends to result in
higher savings and investment, hence higher growth. But the modern view asserted
that greater inequality causes a lower growth through the following mechanisms
(Nissanke & Thorbecke, 2007): less secured property due to unproductive rent-
seeking activities, uncertainty due to diffusion of political and social instability, disin-
centives among the rich to invest due to redistributive policies to address inequality,
underinvestment by the poor caused by imperfect credit markets, and higher fertility
2 Of several accounts on the reasons behind the transitional aspects of temporal evolution of income
inequality (the famous Kuznets’ inverted-U shape curve), the one focusing on the dualism-based
inequality is among the most credible explanations.
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associated with smaller income share of the middle class. The United Nations
summed up its recent report with the followingmessage: “High or growing inequality
not only harms people living in poverty and other disadvantaged groups. It affects
the well-being of society at large. Highly unequal societies grow more slowly than
those with low inequality and are less successful at reducing poverty. Without appro-
priate policies and institution, inequalities in outcomes create or preserve unequal
opportunities and perpetuate social divisions. Rising inequality has created discon-
tent, deepened political divides and can lead to violent conflict” (United Nations,
2020). Whichever forces at work, high inequality and greater dualism tend to worsen
the growth prospect.
Having recognized the importance of addressing the issue of dualism and
inequality, it is imperative to understand the mechanisms of how they emerge and
affected by policies. Many of the sources behind dualism are institutional, not
direct economic in nature. Local characteristics, culture, tradition, and social capital
are parts of the institution that shape the backward-bending supply curve and the
inelastic demandbehavior of the traditional sectors. The incompatibility of the indige-
nous (receiving) culture and the colonial (giving) culture reflects the clash between
imported social system with indigenous social system. To the extent that economic
development must be understood as larger socioeconomic processes, not only as
economic processes, recognizing the importance of local characteristics and culture
is imperative. When imposed policies are designed to be compatible with the local
culture and characteristics, they have a chance to work and be adopted by the local
population.
From this perspective, the consequence of Boeke’s conjecture about the perma-
nence of dualism does not have to be far-reaching in the sense that it excludes the
possibilities of development and rejects any policy measures. We do not have to be
defeatist. As long as the plan and policies are carefully designed by considering the
prevailing institutional arrangements, we do not need to acceptwhat Boeke lamented,
“I will expose no plans, except to stress the need for a village restoration.” Yet, his
position on how to conduct the restoration/policy is hard to disagree with. He specifi-
cally emphasized the need to conduct the restoration democratically and to have local
leaders with strong sense of social responsibility. In his words: “This restoration will
not take place through a revival of the rural gentry, but must follow more democratic
ways. New leaders must spring from the small folks themselves, and must be accom-
panied by a strong feeling of social responsibility in the people themselves.” Thus,
between Boeke’s position on the stagnancy of dualism—where no policy will work
except village restoration—and the view that external interventions are needed to
modernize the traditional sectors, there is a middle position. This book takes such a
position.
Although dualism and inequality emphasized in concern with spatial dimension
and the gap between small and large businesses, other forms of inequality are no
less important. The bulk of discussions in the following chapter is on the evidence
of inequality in Indonesia. To the extent various policies intended to reduce dualism
have been promulgated, the observed high inequality implies that there is indeed a
14 2 Dualism and Development
gap between policy and outcome. On the other hand, given the heterogeneity and size
of the country, some degree of dualism and inequality should have been expected.
Evidence of Dualism
Being the world’s fourthmost populous and diverse archipelago with 300-plus ethnic
groups andmore than 700 spoken languages, Indonesia is one of the highly heteroge-
nous countries in the world. It is ranked 175th (out of 218 countries) in language
fractionalization and 161st in ethnic fractionalization (Alesina et al., 2002). Although
much of Indonesia’s diversity is explained by its peoples’ differing histories rather
than their isolated development (Geertz, 1963), the inherent dualism is likely high in
a country with such an attribute. Nomatter what the aggregate trends based onmacro
data show, features of dualism will always be part of them. It is only the degree that
may be different from one episode (or one region) to another. Any analysis ignoring
the implications of such inherent dualism is likely distorted, incomplete at best.
Most aggregate and macro data show that Indonesia has made a tremendous
progress in raising people’s living standard. The relative per-capita income compared
to that of the United States increased significantly albeit not steadily due to the severe
crisis in 1997 (Fig. 2.1), and the poverty rate declined persistently from a double digit
to a single digit rate until the Covid-19 pandemic strike in 2020 (Fig. 2.2). Reasons
behind the impressive performance range from the country’s strategy and policies,
richness of natural resources, strategic location, and evolving external conditions












































































Indonesia's Relative GNI/Cap 
Compared to the US
Fig. 2.1 Source CEIC data













































































Fig. 2.2 Source World Bank and CBS data
Going deeper, however, reveals the inherent dualism. First is on income inequality.
Figure 2.3a shows that the trend of inequality, measured by the Gini index, has not
been too encouraging. In particular, since 2005 the index has been persistently higher
than during the decade of 1990s, and the trend up to the first half of 2000s was
worsening, only slightly improved since then. The worsening trend of inequality is
further confirmed if we look at the recent Gini index by region as compared to the
same index in 1996. As displayed in Fig. 2.3b, virtually in all regions the Gini index
moved up above the 45° line over the two decade period. In 1996, only 3 provinces
had a Gini index greater than 0.3 (DI Yogyakarta, Sulawesi Tengah, and Papua),
and more-than 2 decades later only 1 province (Bangka Belitung) registered a Gini
index of less-than 0.3, and 6 provinces had a Gini index greater than 0.4. All these
trends occurred before the pandemic hit. If experts’ prediction is to be believed, the
post-pandemic recovery is likely to be K-shape, implying that the inequality will get
even worse since the hardship has fallen disproportionately on flexible, low income
workers and young people. On the other hand, unable to go out, eat out, shop or travel
during the pandemic, the middle and upper income group build up their savings.
Inequality between regions displays another dimension of dualism. Figure 2.4
shows that the coefficient of variations (CoV) of per-capita gross regional product
(GRP/cap) was high and failed to register a meaningful decline over the last two
decades. Marked improvements occurred only during the 1980s; but even that trend
was due primarily to a high CoV at the base point. Compared to the interregional
inequality in other countries that also have a large population, such as India, China,
and Brazil, Figure 2.5 clearly shows that Indonesia is at the lower edge of the list as
it has the most unequal distribution between regions. A study shows that the contri-
bution of inequality across urban-rural and across regions or districts in Indonesia’s
overall inequality is ranked the second, only surpassed by the inequitable access to
education (Chongvilaivan & Kim, 2016).


























































Fig. 2.3 a Source World Bank data, b Gini Index By Regions: 2017 compared to 1996. Source
Processed from CBS
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Fig. 2.4 Coefficient of variations of Gros Regional Product/Capita (current price). Source
Calculated from CBS data
Notes: Indonesia (2016), Colombia & Mexico (2015), Brazil (2014), China & India (2013)
Fig. 2.5 Interregional inequality in selected countries. Notes Indonesia (2016), Colombia and
Mexico (2015), Brazil (2014), China and India (2013). Source Statistik Indonesia and OECD
Regional Database
Part of the reasons behind the inequality can be linked to what happened with the
country’s wealth distribution. Wealth as a stock concept generates flows of income.
Given the rate of returns, wealth inequality generates income inequality. The impli-
cation and evidence of the relation between the two has been shown bymany authors,
including Piketty (2017) who used the data since the 18th century in Europe and the
United States. Although using the cases of two countries, his evidence-first approach
helped set off a global debate on income inequality and no longer makes one be able
to assert that rising inequality is a necessary byproduct of growth and prosperity, or
that capital deserves protected status because it brings growth.
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During the last few years alone, the wealth share of the top wealthiest 10 percent
in Indonesia had increased from 36.4% in 2014 to a whopping 74.1% in 2019. Those
numbers imply that the wealthiest 1% of population owned 45% of total wealth,
making the country’s wealth inequality among the worst in the world (Credit Suisse,
2019). It is not surprising that in 2019 the wealth Gini index in Indonesia (83.3) was
higher than in other large countries such as China (70.2), India (83.2), and Mexico
(77.7). As predicted, the fastest growth occurred in the financial asset. When we
look at the ratio of the growth of market capitalization (a proxy for financial asset)
over the growth of housing price (a proxy for non-financial asset) during the last 10
years before the pandemic, the number has reached 345.5%, much higher than the
world average. In 2000, the share of financial wealth in the total wealth was 21.8%,
and by 2019 the share had already reached 42.3% (Fig. 2.6). Hence, a considerable
portion of wealth inequality in Indonesia—which eventually translates into income
inequality—has been largely caused by a rapid expansion of the financial wealth
which is predominantly owned and controlled by the urban-based middle to upper
level income group.
Growing financial assets cannot be separated from financial liberalization.
Although the worsening impact of liberalization on inequality has been confirmed
by many studies, those using the case of Indonesia have been rare. To the extent
‘financialization’ is easier to detect and measure than financial liberalization, some
studies looked instead at the impact of ‘financialization’ by using a standard indictor
such as the size of financial assets on inequality. Using stock market capitalization
Fig. 2.6 Financial and non-financial assets/gross household wealth (%). Source Processed from
Credit Suisse (2019), Global Wealth Databook 2019. October
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and returns on asset (ROA) as indicators of financialization, Buhaerah (2017) used
panel data of ASEAN countries including Indonesia and found a negative effect of
financialization on inequality. Greater capitalization and higher ROA tend to worsen
inequality. Measuring financial liberalization, let alone its impact on inequality, is far
more difficult due to the diverse type of financial liberalization and the complex chan-
nels of transmissions to reach household income or consumption. By using a financial
computable general equilibrium (FCGE) model with the Flow-of-Fund data to eval-
uate the impact of financial liberalization-driven inflows of portfolio capital, Azis
and Shin (2015) confirmed that financial liberalization in Indonesia tends to worsen
inequality.By exploring counterfactual experiments and tracing the channels of trans-
mission, it was further revealed that the relatively lower growth of the non-financial
sector (more employment-generating activities) and the increase of financial returns
(mostly owned by and accrued to high income households) contribute significantly
to the country’s growing inequality.
Behind the impressive reduction of Indonesia’s poverty shown in Fig. 2.2, two
important observations need to be highlighted: the dynamic trend of the link between
growth and poverty, and the regional dimension of poverty including non-income or
non-consumption poverty.
Numerous factors affecting consumption poverty in Indonesia have been identi-
fied by different authors; some are macro in nature, including sectoral composition
of employment, others are more of micro-social type. On the macro side, the posi-
tive link between national growth and poverty reduction has become a standard
hypothesis. By focusing primarily on trends in measurable poverty and inequality
indicators, Hill (2021) made it clear that the link applies for all episodes. During the
mid-1970s, when the government promoted rice and other food crop production, and
during the 1980s when the labor intensive along with exports program was empha-
sized, higher growth led to a sharp decline in poverty. Since the 1980s, by using the
growth incidence curves (GICs), the link remained intact. Although the last chart of
Fig. 2.7 shows that for the whole period (1980–2017) the consumption growth of
all households were positive, supporting the trend of declining poverty, variations
occurred during different periods. Comparing two political eras, i.e.,Orde Baru up to
1996 and post-Orde Baru after 1997, the outcomes differed significantly: growth was
faster and inequality was stable in the first, and growth was slower with segmented
labor market and growing inequality in the second. But so was the poverty rate: it
fell sharply in the first and much slower in the second, confirming the established
link between national growth and poverty reduction. Variations in the inequality
outcomes are clearly detected during the four periods shown in Fig. 2.7. In the early
years up to 2000, a relatively egalitarian growth occurred except during the financial
liberalization period (1990–1996) where higher income households benefited the
fruits of growth at a much faster rate, consistent with what was discussed earlier.
In the subsequent 2000–2017 period, inequality has clearly become worse. Overall,
for the whole period since 1980 Indonesia’s higher income households have been
benefiting the fruit of growth at an unmistakably faster rate than the lower income
households.
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Fig. 2.7 Growth incidence curves-spatial plus temporal, 1980–2017. Source Hill (2021)
On regional dimension of poverty, the headcount index in Papua and Maluku
was 1.5 times higher than the national average, while the index in Sulawesi failed
to improve. If poverty is measured based on factors other than income, particularly
health and education, the spatial gap of non-income poverty is fairly big. A study by
Hanandita and Tampubolon (2016) showed that based on the health-related depri-
vation, including having illness for more-than 3 days and a disease for more-than
4 days (morbidity), the difference between rural and urban throughout the country
was markedly large. Although it followed an inverted U-shape trajectory, the urban–
rural health inequality during 2003–2013 did not show an improvement. Across
regions, the gap between Nusa Tenggara and the rest of the country was particularly
high, i.e., up to 2.13 times greater than the national average for illness deprivation,
and up to 3.70 times greater for morbidity.
In terms of education-related poverty (having primary education and ability to read
andwrite latin characters), variations across regionswere also high. Rural deprivation
was over twice of that in urban area, and the gap did not seem to narrowover the years.
While the contribution of income poverty in Indonesia’s multidimensional poverty
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is higher than that of non-income poverty, the contribution of the latter has been
increasing steadily. It is also important to note that poverty reduction in rural area was
driven by improvement in both, the income and non-income components, whereas
the reduction in urban area was driven mainly by improvements in the non-income
(deprivations) component. As a result, nearly a quarter of Indonesian adults living
in rural areas failed to complete primary school. This occurred despite a substantial
reduction in poverty and the constitutional mandate for the provision of universal
primary schooling and for the allocation of 20 percent government expenditure to
education (the 20% rule).
But duality is particularly stark at the district level. Based on themultidimensional
poverty measure (taking into account the simultaneous deprivation), a large variation
is found between districts across regions. The divide between Western and Eastern
Indonesia cannot be more obvious. From 346 districts, 5 out of 10 of the poorest
are in Papua. Dualism also occurs within each region; for example, in East Jawa
province, the multidimensional poverty in Kabupaten Bangkalan is 7 times higher
than in the city of Surabaya.
The multidimensional poverty has been always higher in rural than urban areas.
Most of the least-deprived districts are in urban areas including municipalities.
Hence, by looking deeper at the data to include the non-income poverty across
regions and rural-urban, the impressive poverty reduction over the last decade has
not been complemented by strong improvements in the non-income dimensions.
Consistentwith the results of a study using income or consumption poverty (Sumarto,
Vothknecht, & Wijaya, 2014), the spatial inequality of non-income poverty is fairly
high, with a large variation between districts. Suryahadi, Rishanty, and Sparrow
(2020) argued that the trust among people across different ethnic groups, being
the most important social capital, plays an important role in poverty reduction. At
any rate, a regional disparity of high poverty unarguably continues to characterize
Indonesia’s journey to prosperity.
One of the most important institutional changes that has affected Indonesia’s intra
and inter regional development was the decentralization policy implemented in early
2000s followed subsequently by direct elections at the local level (pemilihan kepala
daerah, PILKADA).At the beginning, PILKADAwas conducted in only few regions.
By 2005, a full scale implementation began. Since then, data on socio-economic
performance show that some regions experienced improvements but others did not.
On the basis of per-capita gross regional product (GRP/cap), more than 60% of
Indonesia’s provinces experienced a reduction in annual growth after PILKADA, and
in terms of human development index (HDI) more-than 90% provinces experienced
a decline in annual growth (Fig. 2.8).
Dualism in regional performance is also detected when we consider institutional
factors of decentralization. By applying the ‘institutional model of decentralization’
(IMD), the detailed of which is discussed in the next chapter, a survey conducted
in seven regions/districts throughout Indonesia after a full swing PILKADA—over
the period of 2008–2009—reveals that the importance of peoples’ participation in
determining local welfare is overwhelming. Yet, the quality and intensity of partici-
pation have been highly diverse among regions. From all seven regions combined, the
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Fig. 2.8 Annual growth of GRP/cap and HDI before and after decentralization. Source Based on
CBS data
results show that participation is the most critical factor followed by the size of local
budget, and subsequently by the initial conditions (Table 2.1). The test of robustness
of the results through a dynamic sensitivity analysis corroborates the finding.
While the importance of local budget is obvious (poor regions with low budget
have more difficulties to improve welfare), the role of initial conditions cannot be
overlooked. Evaluating the breakdown of the survey results, in some least devel-
oped regions the initial socio-economic conditions matter more than the size of local
budget, indicating the presence of path dependence, i.e., regions that were poorer
than others some decades ago remain poorer now. On the other hand, more devel-
oped regions tend to grow faster. The welfare effect of decentralization is greater
when local people are more politically aware and actively participate in various
local development programs. What this suggests is, the gap between less-developed
and more-developed regions (duality) after decentralization tends to persist or even
widen, consistent with the finding using the secondary data discussed earlier.
Similar to the development gap between regions, dualism in business activities
is equally stark. While the number of business establishment and business unit is
dominated byMSME, i.e., more-than 99% and over 96%, respectively, their produc-
tivity has been way below the large businesses. Before delineating this productivity
gap, let’s first look at the trend of Indonesia’s productivity at both the national and
regional level where another type of dualism exists.
Why productivity matters? Many arguments and rationales can be put forth.
Krugman (1994) summarizes it well: “Productivity isn’t everything, but, in the long
run, it is almost everything. A country’s ability to improve its standard of living over
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Table 2.1 Results of IMD-based field survey: group, individuals, and combined hierarchy
Hierarchy
Name Rank Ideals Normals Raw
Group Survey
Summarized result of the group survey in 7 regions based on Hierarchy model based on
‘Super Decision’
1. People’s participation 1 0.9361 0.4361 0.7660
2. Initial condition 3 0.4167 0.1941 0.3410
3. Available budget 2 0.7069 0.3293 0.5784
Individual survey
Summarized result of the individual survey in 4 regions based on Hierarchy model (Using
Super Decision software)
1. People’s participation 1 0.7342 0.3776 0.6914
2. Initial condition 3 0.4046 0.2081 0.3810
3. Available budget 2 0.6191 0.3184 0.5830
Combination of group and individual surveys
Summarized result of the group and individual survey based on Hierarchy model (using
Super Decision)
1. People’s participation 1 0.8290 0.4058 0.7277
2. Initial condition 3 0.4106 0.2010 0.3604
3. Available budget 2 0.6615 0.3238 0.5807
Sources Taken from Azis (2010, 2013)
time depends almost entirely on its ability to raise its output per worker.” Fig. 2.9a
shows the productivity growth at the national level, and a set of charts in Fig. 2.9b at
the regional level. In both, the productivity growth is decomposed into “within” and
“structural” components.3 At the national level, a deceleration of productivity growth
is clearly observed. Across regions, the deceleration is also evident, albeit varies. It is
obvious that the changes in productivity have occurred predominantly in the “within”
category, implying that improvements in one sector tend to confine to that same
sector, hardly diffusing to the rest of the region’s economy. The absence of spillover
has not only dragged down the region’s productivity growth but also widened the
gap between sectors. The trend of productivity growth since 1990 varied between
regions—some show an acceleration, others display a deceleration. But since 2011,
the trend became more obvious, i.e., virtually all regions suffered from a declining
3 The “within” part captures the productivity improvement at individual unit (firmor sector),whereas
the “structural” component captures the productivity change as a result of sectoral shifts in conjunc-
tionwith the structural change in the national economy, keeping productivity growth unchanged. The
two components do not always move in the same direction, especially when a sector’s productivity
improvement does not spillover to other sectors (Azis, 2018;McMillan, Rodrik andVerduzco-Gallo,
2014).
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a
b
Fig. 2.9 a Decomposition of Labor productivity growth: “within” and “structural” components.
SourceCalculated fromAPO and Conference Board, bDecomposition of labor productivity growth
by regions. Source Calculated from APO, CBS, and various sources
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Fig. 2.9 (continued)
26 2 Dualism and Development
productivity growth. Looking at the data more closely, the sharp fall of productivity
occurred mostly in provinces of Eastern Indonesia.
Dualism in terms of interregional inequality and the level of productivity was
stark. During the last decade, measured by the relative productivity of the agriculture
and the total average, the ratio in provinces with the highest degree of economic
dualism reached 3.6 times than the ratio in provinces with lowest degree of dualism.
Inequality in productivity level was even starker: the highest productivity in regions
like Jakarta and East Kalimantan reached 13 and 11 times more, respectively, than
the productivity in East Nusa Tenggara. Since 1990, the divergence between regions
also increased, where the standard deviation rose from 17.1 in 1990–2000 to 19.2
and 21.1 in 2000–2010 and 2010–2018, respectively (Fig. 2.10).
What about the trend ofMSMEproductivity? Based on theWorldBankEnterprise
Survey, the productivity per worker of micro enterprises in Indonesia was only 3
percent of that in large enterprises, and for small and medium firms the percentage
was 16% and 31%, respectively. To put into perspective, these levels are equivalent
to roughly only one-quarter of the OECD median value. Consequently, based on
the direct and indirect exports (MSMEs supplying products to exporters) Indonesian
MSMEs are less integrated into global markets compared to their counterparts in
some ASEAN countries, particularly Cambodia, Malaysia and Vietnam. Despite the
increasing use of internet and e-commerce, and that various measures had been taken
to encourage small business internationalization, very few Indonesia’s MSME were
able to penetrate the export market.4 Their already low contribution in total exports
excluding oil and gas continued to decline (OECD, 2018). TheWorldBankEnterprise
Survey (WBES)Database indicates that in 2016 the share in total exports formedium-
size firms was 11.5%, and for small firms and micro enterprises were only 2.8% and
1.4%, respectively. Having fewer resources to meet the high costs associated with
engaging in international markets, facing greater challenges than larger firms in
navigating foreign markets, and having less capacity to address complex regulatory
requirements, are all binding constraints.
The proliferation of free trade agreements (FTA) in which Indonesia has been
actively seeking to be part of, did not seem to contribute significantly to MSME’s
participation in global and regional trade. Even for those who have been actively
exporting, a large portion of them did not utilize FTA facilities. Part of the reasons
is a lack of knowledge regarding their use (Anas, Mangunsong, & Panjaitan, 2017).
More generally, the complexity of rules and agreements, and the low margin-of-
preference are among the top reasons why the utilization of FTA facilities has been
low (Azis, 2019). Trade has grown due to the unilateral trade liberalization, not
because of the FTA proliferation. Nonetheless, MSMEs tend to be underrepresented
in international trade.
4 Efforts to encourage business internationalization include export financing services (i.e. credit,
guarantees and insurance), non-financial services, such asmarket information, product development,
export information and export training, and innovative program managed by The Ministry of State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and Business Aggregator Program in which SOEs act as trading houses
for small enterprises which plan to export but find it difficult to deal with export regulations and
documentation (OECD, 2018).
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Fig. 2.10 Interregional inequality in productivity. Source Calculated from APO, CBS, and various
sources
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There are multiple reasons behind the dismal productivity performance of
MSMEs. They range from a lack of innovation, limited quality of entrepreneur-
ship, asymmetric information, and problems in financing, including access to trade
financing, opening LC, and securing scheduled payment from importers. In terms of
innovation, the dualism is reflected in the R&D spending. While in average only 2%
of all firms in Indonesia invest in R&D, the share in large companies is about 10%,
implying a very tiny portion ofMSME’s investment inR&D.Not surprisingly, having
a lack of innovation, the number of small and medium enterprises that managed to
introduce a new product and/or service during the last three years prior to the survey
was only 5% and 9.7%, respectively.
Across regions, the inability of MSME to enhance productivity was also due in
part to the limited programs designed to boost productivity growth at the firm level.
Differences in regulations and licensing between regions, as shown by large vari-
ations in the ease of doing business, also contribute to the diverse performance of
MSME productivity across regions. So do variations in local government capacity,
which plays a significant role in a paternalistic society like in Indonesia. Note that
the decentralization-related Law 23/2014 on the role of local governments assigns
the responsibility to different tiers of government: national governments are assigned
to support co-operatives and medium-sized enterprises, provincial governments to
support small enterprises; and cities and regencies are mandated to support micro-
enterprises.While useful on paper, such a distinction exacerbates the alreadywidened
interregional disparity, and its implementation tends to confuse regulators andMSME
operators. For variety of reasons, bureaucracy at the local level and the attitudes of
some local officials are not sufficiently conducive for productivity improvements.
Often, they behave as if they deserve respect from local residents, and MSME oper-
ators ought to obey and listen to them rather than the other way round. Their conduct
tends to serve their own interest rather than the interest of the residents they are
supposed to serve. Expressed by MSMEs participating in our survey, the role of
local government in assisting MSME has been thus far weak. Some also complained
about the practice of nepotism among local officials. Many MSMEs operating in the
agricultural sector indicated that the impact of government-initiated social programs
were either very little or none at all.
On the financing front, interregional variations are no less obvious. Unlike in
Jawa, many MSME in remote regions of Eastern Indonesia received loans from
cooperatives. In regions like Papua, many MSME receive loans from banks. Across
all regions, however, middlemen remain the most active lenders, and in recent years
the so-called fintech lenders have also been proliferating. According to someMSMEs
with whom we had discussion, both of these financing sources imposed too-high
interest rates.Another challenge is getting the payment promptly from foreignbuyers.
Some MSMEs in outside Jawa reported that after putting much efforts and energy to
penetrate the foreign market, they were finally able to find foreign buyers. But they
complained that after delivering the products they could not get the full payment
promptly despite the agreed transactions. Payments were made only after a long
delay, putting pressures on the business cash flow. At the end, they had no choice
but abandoning the contract all together, at the cost of no more exports and sales.
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Having limited network and connection, those exporting MSMEs need help from
the government. Assisting them should be neither difficult nor costly, yet absolutely
necessary given the weak domestic demand especially during the pandemic, and the
government’s repeated assertion to encourage MSMEs to reach beyond the domestic
market.
Looking at the experience of other countries, aside from the continuous efforts to
improve the various schemes of credits for small business and rural activities, new
initiatives of financing should be continually explored.5 For example, a cash-flow
based (instead of collateral-based) system of lending has been adopted in some coun-
tries. In others, third-party insurers are actively involved to lower lenders (banks)’
disincentive-to-lend by guaranteeing a sufficient portion of loan repayment. For
MSMEs that are able to find and secure foreign buyers, some sort of guarantee per
purchase-order (PO) can be explored, for example by allocating a guarantee based on
the MSME’s business track record. Still another potential scheme that takes advan-
tage of the mobile system is the so-called pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) which requires
a nominal down payment to take possession of an asset electronically, followed by
frequent small payments made via a mobile payment system. For the lenders, such
a system is relatively cheap and easy to disable the flow of services, insuring them
against default, and for the borrowers (MSMEs) who are unable to make a payment,
they do not lose the asset, rather they are simply unable to consume the flow of
services from the asset until they start paying again. They may lose something of
value but that provides incentive to repay, or they can decline the loan offer all
together. Many other options could be explored, and ideally they should involve the
MSMEs as potential borrowers right from the planning, the policy design, all the
way to the implementation stage.
Policy Measures
Given the trends discussed above, onemaywonder if the numerous policies takenover
the years had any meaningful effects on the SME performance. Early in the devel-
opment plan of the New Order government, efforts were made to provide financial
and technical assistance to help improve the operations of SMEs; some implemented
through cooperative units, others through regular business operations. Attempts were
alsomade to promote the SMEs through regulation and coercion, including to enforce
subcontracting schemes (mainly in the automotive and electronic industries), and to
5 Numerous documents and studies have analyzed the progress and lack of progress of microcredits
in Indonesia, the defining moments for which were the 1983 financial deregulation and the 1988
banking reform known as PAKTO. Equally numerous are studies on the role of the lending institu-
tions such asBank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) andBank Perkreditan Rakyat (BPR) infinancingMSMEs
since PAKTO until now. Given the results thus far, however, a conventional way of microcredits and
lending through those institutions may need to be complemented with alternative schemes by taking
advantage of the new development in technology and various initiatives implemented in different
countries.
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use a foster father or ‘Bapak Angkat’ system where state enterprises or large firms
were required to sponsor the local SMEs. In addition, the government also imposed
preferential procurement programs and issued regulations allowing only firms of
a certain size that can produce certain goods. Table 2.2 tabulates the key policies,
programs and organizations relevant to the promotion of SMEs in Indonesia during
the three decades since the first five-year plan (REPELITA) began in 1969.
Although a comprehensive analysis to evaluate their effectiveness has never been
made, several studies deduced thatmost of these supply-side programswere not effec-
tive, having low participation rate, and often beset by problems of corruption (Berry,
Rodriguez, & Sandee, 2001; Musa & Priatna, 1998; Hill, 2001; Sandee et al., 1994;
Tambunan, 2007). Part of the reasons is because most of them were not designed
with a clear and unambiguous framework.Where SMEs succeeded tomake improve-
ments, they did so in spite of, not because of, government programs. The growth of
MSME over the years have been found to be influenced by factors other than govern-
ment assistance, and the probability of receiving assistance is positively related to
the firm size (Berry et al., 2001).
Since the early 2000s, the government continued to use various measures to
promote micro enterprises and SMEs, hereafter MSMEs. The list of detailed
measures is too long to show here, but they cover the financial, technical, and regu-
latory assistance. For example, in the financing front the measures taken include
subsidized small credits such as those allocated through the Koperasi Unit Desa
(KUD) for small farmers and village cooperatives; Kredit Investasi Kecil (KIK),
Kredit Modal Kerja Permanen (KMKP), Kredit Usaha Kecil (KUK) for general
purposes, Kredit Umum Pedesaan (KUPEDES) for village units, Badan Kredit Desa
(BKD) for small rural development banks, and Kredit Umum Rakyat (KUR) for
MSME (launched in 2007). For technical assistance, a wide range of measures have
also been taken, from training and improving product design, marketing, promotion,
accounting and book-keeping, and using digital technology such as e-commerce,
fintech, and other internet-based activities. In the regulatory front, the government
continues to require banks to allocate 20% of credits to MSME, assigns lower tax
rates or grants tax exemptions for someMSMEs, streamlines the procedure to obtain
license and other documents/permits, creates linkages between MSMEs and large
enterprises and other related activities (subcontracting), as well as linkages among
the MSMEs themselves, etc. Policy makers have also made frequent and numerous
statements supporting the MSME operations especially during the pandemic.
Some of the measures taken before 2020 continued and some were expanded
during the pandemic, such as providing unconditional cash transfer program or
bantuan langsung tunai (BLT) for ultra-micro andmicro enterprises through banking
and finance company, restructuring credit and interest subsidy for micro enterprises,
restructuring coop credit trough revolving fund agency known as the Lembaga
Pengelola Dana Bergulir Koperasi dan Usaha Mikro, Kecil, dan Menengah (LPDB-
KUMKM), subsidizing credit interest to cooperatives, and providing liquidity assis-
tance to cooperatives with low interest rates and easy mechanisms. Attempts have
also been made to entice MSMEs to take training programs by providing stimulant
fund to the participants through a Pre-Employment Card Program (program kartu
pra-pekerja).
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Table 2.2 Policies, programs and organizations for the development of SMEs in Indonesia
1. Technology 1969 MIDC (Metal Industry Development Center or Institute for R&D of
Metal and Machinery Industries) was established
1974 BIPIK (Small Industries Development) Program was formulated as a
technical support program for small industry
1979 Under BIPIK program, LIK and PIK (Small Industrial Estates) were
constructed and technical assistance was extended to small industry in
or near LIK/PIK mainly through UPT (Technical Service Units) staffed
by TPL (Extension Field Officers)
1994 BIPIK program was finished and PIKM (Small-scale Enterprises
Development Project) was launched
2. Marketing 1979 Reservation Scheme was introduced as protection measures of markets
for small industry
1999 Anti Monopoly Law was enacted
3. Financing 1971 PT. ASKRINDO was established as a state-owned credit insurance
company
1973 KIK (Credit for Small Investment) and KMKP (Credit for Working
Capital) were introduced as government subsidized credit programs for
small-scale industry
1973 PT. BAHANA was founded as a state-owned venture capital company
1974 KK (Small Credit) administered by BRI (Indonesian People’s Bank)
was launched and later (1984) changed to KUPEDES scheme (General
Rural Savings Program) aimed at promoting small business
1989 SME Loans from state-owned enterprises (1 to 5% benefits) were
introduced
1990 Government subsidized credit programs for small industry (KIK and
KMKP) were abolished and unsubsidized KUK (Credit for Small
Businesses) scheme was introduced
1999 The function of directed credit programs was transferred from Bank
Indonesia (the central bank) to PT. PNM (State-owned Corporation for
SMEs) and Bank Export Indonesia
2000 Government credit programs for SMEs including KUK are abolished
4. General 1973 Ministry of Light Industry and Ministry of Heavy Industry merged into
Ministry of Industry
1976 Deletion (Localization) Programs for the commercial vehicles were
introduced (motorcycle in 1977 and some other products such as diesel
engine and tractors later on)
1978 Directorate General for Small-scale Industry was established (in
Ministry of Industry)
1984 Foster Father (Bapak Angkat) Program was introduced to support small
industry
1991 Foster Father-Business Partner Linkage was extended to a national
movement
(continued)
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Table 2.2 (continued)
1991 SENTRAs (Groups of small-scale industry) in industrial clusters were
organized as KOPINKRA (Small-scale Handicraft Cooperatives)
1993 Deletion Programs for the commercial vehicles were finished and
Incentive Systems were adopted
1993 Ministry of Cooperatives started handling small business development
1995 Basic Law for Promoting Small-scale Enterprises was enacted
1997 Foster Father (Bapak Angkat) Program was changed into Partnership
Program
1998 Ministry of Cooperatives and Small Business added medium business
development
1998 SME promotion was emphasized in People’s Economy as a national
slogan
1999 New Automobile Policy was announced and Incentive Systems were
finished
Source Hayashi (2000)
Some demand-side measures have been also taken to maintain and enhance the
purchasing power of consumers to buy MSME/cooperative products, for example
by allocating funds for a discount to purchase MSME goods (offline and online),
distributing discount voucher, utilizing stall/shop (warung) data connected to e-
commerce, establishing partnerships with nine state-owned enterprises (e.g., in food
cluster), and utilizing young influencers to encourage people to shopMSMEproducts
around their neighborhood. Measures are also taken to boost SME exports through
virtual business match-making events.
While remains to be seenwhether these programs are effective to help improve the
MSME performance, a clear and important lesson from the past is that, addressing
MSME problems caused by genuine market failures should not be mixed-up with
other objectives. Even if the latter are important, they should be addressed by different
policies designed specifically to meet them, not by policies for MSME. For example,
programs to help MSME are often confused with targeting employment creation
because MSMEs are seen to be more labor intensive than large firms. Yet, evidence
suggests that enterprise scale is not a reliable guide to labor intensity: many MSMEs
are in fact more capital-intensive than larger firms in the same industry. Policies to
boost employment should instead focus on altering the pattern of demands in favor
of labor-intensive industries rather than on supply-side efforts to change the size
distribution of firms. Another important lesson is that, if the goals are not specific
enough or too ambiguous, there is a risk that facilities provided by the policieswill not
be well received or even avoided all together by the MSMEs. It is hence imperative
to understand the internal problems faced by MSMEs and why such a case occur.
The remaining chapters of the book discuss the above issues by way of estab-
lishing a framework of analysis capturing the interplay of policies and institutions to
explain the phenomena of interregional inequality and challenges faced by MSMEs
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to improve their performance. The latter is validated by a micro and small enterprise
(MSE) survey conducted in different regions and sectors throughout Indonesia.
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Chapter 3
Agglomeration, Institution, and Social
Capital: Main Concepts
and Methodologies
Abstract The concepts and methodologies used to develop the survey question-
naires are discussed here. The dualism and inequality are not merely the results
of policies but also the consequence of agglomeration forces and the interplay of
policies and prevailing institution. On the other hand, potential benefits of the same
forces could provide incentives forMSMEs to operate in clusters for collective action,
the effectiveness of which depends crucially on the interplay of policies and social
capital.
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Conversation
A: “Dualism decreases when ABLEST firms and regions generate technological
spillovers.”
B: “Without incentives and resource mobility, no such spillovers will occur. As a
result, the STABLE outcome would be a catastrophic agglomeration.”
A: “To avoid that, and to improve the overall welfare, direct and open elections
of local LEADERS during decentralization will help because local people know
best about local conditions.”
B: “But with widespread local capture and money politics, numerous REDEALS
made by elected officials tend to worsen the overall welfare.”
A: “In that case, we need to redouble the existing programs and policies RELATED
to small businesses and periphery regions.”
B: “The approach of relying on policies alone needs to be ALTERED. We need to
use a set of design principles in formulating programs that capture the interplay
of policy, institution, and social capital.”
Duality from Different Lenses
An upshot of the analysis throughout the book is that, dualism and inequality in a
large and diverse country like Indonesia are not merely the results of policies but also
the consequence of agglomeration forces and the interplay between policies and the
prevailing institution, in which social capital is an important part of. The concepts
andmethodologies based on relevant theories presented in this chapter provide a back
up to such a conjecture. After discussing the process of agglomeration and external
economies, the role of institution in shaping the duality in regional performance is
explicated by using the institutional model of decentralization (IMD). The last part
of the chapter presents a framework and the mechanisms how policies, institution
and social capital work to affect the MSME performance. Before taking up those
tasks, let us first interpret the observed inequality discussed in the preceding chapter
from various lenses.
From the Game Theory perspective, inequality is an equilibrium solution similar
to that in a ‘prisoners dilemma’ case, which is the most well-known social dilemma
in which rational individuals in pursuit of their optimal outcome may end up not
cooperating, resulting in a negative outcome, i.e., greater dualism. Think of MSMEs
that need external assistance but for some reasons are neitherwilling nor able to utilize
it even after considering the short and long term impact of it.1 As demonstrated in
Beckenkamp (2006), prisoner’s dilemma can become social dilemma even without
1 Social dilemma refers to a setting in which individuals choose actions in an interdependent situ-
ation. When at least one outcome yields higher returns for all participants but participants making
independent choices are not predicted to achieve such an outcome, individuals will take actions
that generate lower joint outcomes than could have been achieved although these actions maximize
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a conflict between short-and long-term decisions. In Game Theory, social dilemmas
aremulti-persons decision-making problems in which individual interests are at odds
with collective interests (Colman, 1995; Poppitz, 2011). In some cases, however,
when individuals are given the capacity to recognize trustworthiness in others and
able to withdraw from the program, the possibility of cooperation increases over time
and it can reach relatively high levels when the number of participants also increases
(Janssen, 2008).
From the Mechanism Design theory (Hurwicz, 1973), inequality is an outcome
based on equilibrium decision that is best according to the information/messages that
social planners use. In this case, the mechanism specifies the set of those messages.
Once such a mechanism is in place, social planners “play a game” where they send
the messages (e.g., providing low interest credit, lowering tax, introducing digital
technology to MSMEs) as a function of their information. Hence, unlike the conven-
tional assumption that policy makers “know everything,” here conditional to a set of
received messages (the ‘mechanism’) any transmitted information and decision that
leads to dualism is optimal. The main task is to find that mechanism. In the context
of dualism, that task translates into modeling social institutions that will produce
an equilibrium decision compatible with the individual’s or society’s incentives that
maximize social welfare.
Viewed from the perspective of Institutional Economics (North, 1990), observed
inequality can be the results of interactions between the ‘right’ kind of policies and
the ‘wrong’ kind of formal and informal institutions. While according to the stan-
dard economic theory a particular policy will produce an equilibrium outcome with
minimum dualism, the implicit assumptions about enabling institutional arrange-
ments may not hold. This is likely to occur when the assumed institutional arrange-
ments are not compatible with the prevailing formal institution (e.g., rules, regu-
lations) and informal institution (traditions, habits, enforcement). In the case of
dualism, the prevailing institutionmaywork tomeet certain goals (say, higher growth
and macro stability) but fail to avert a growing inequality or to make any compen-
sating policies work effectively. While most literature on institution use property
right as an example, as it can improve business environment, in cases when power
asymmetry is strong to protect such a property right can worsen dualism (work only
for the rich and the powerful).
Dualism and inequality can also be viewed from the perspectives of sociology,
particularly in relation to the role of social capital in conferring information, influ-
ence, control, and sense of solidarity.Different people define social capital differently.
Generally speaking, social capital is referred to as features of social organization, such
as trust, networks, and norms, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual
benefit (Six et al., 2015). While the relation between social capital and inequality
is complex, a major and most relevant dimension of inequality concerns the access
to social capital, e.g., direct and indirect access to resources and network. Social
capital can add long-term value by providing opportunities or network to increase
short-term material benefits to self (similar to a game where the Nash equilibrium for a single
iteration of the game yields less than the socially optimal outcome).
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individuals’ human capital (health, education, prestige), improve the ability of less-
developed regions to innovate and attract businesses, or increase MSMEs’ capacity
to enhance productivity and competitiveness. In many less-developed regions with
limited resources and human capital, a lack of access to networks and linkages as
part of social capital worsens the dualism. Insofar the survey in our study puts the
emphasis on the role of social capital and its interaction with policy, the concept and
components of social capital are discussed in greater details in the next chapter.
It is from the lens of regional economics that dualism and inequality are explained
through the forces of agglomeration, a subject we discuss next.
Agglomeration and External Economies
As part of external economies of scale, agglomeration economies are closely associ-
ated with market structure. In addressing external economies to formulate heterodox
challenges to standard economic doctrine, economists often use a multiple equi-
libria concept (Krugman, 1987; Murphy, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1989; Romer, 1986).
One of the contentious questions is, which equilibrium actually gets established?
UnlikeMarshall (1920)who contended that the outcome depends on the initial condi-
tions (thus history), as well as tastes, technology, and factor endowments, Krugman
(1991b) argued that expectations also matter, and both are in turn determined by
the underlying structure of the economy. A long-established theory suggests that
monopolistic competition in, say, intermediate goods, may lead to de facto external
economies in the production of final goods (Graham, 1927). In a smaller configu-
ration area (e.g., province versus nation, district vs province, etc.) with a smaller
number of producers, market structure tends to be of the imperfect competition
type along with increasing-returns-to-scale. Such a structure generates agglomera-
tion forces that shape a country’s spatial configuration.More specifically, they induce
a concentration of activities in certain locations (Azis, 2020a; Fujita & Thisse, 2002;
Krugman, 1991a). A similar line of argument is applicable when one tries to explain
the emergence of cities and urban centers.
In a dynamic context, the presence of technology spillovers and innovation in
developed regions (DR) could reinforce the agglomeration forces. The endogenous
growth theory popularized by Romer (1986, 1990, 1994) emphasizes the role of
monopolistic competition, externalities, and increasing returns to scale to explain
why research & development (R&D) activities and innovation tend to persist in DR.
Under imperfect competition, the incentive to spend on R&D in DR does not fall,
while new technologies brought by new entrants and the presence of knowledge
spillovers reduce the R&D costs. As a result, new ideas generate economic rents that
attract capital accumulation, and this causes market to expand with higher profit,
attractingmore labor pools to cause market to expand further (cumulative causation).
As more activities tend to locate in DR, a scenario of extreme inequality arises.
Take the case of infrastructure development. Increased capital accumulation due
to lower transport costs and trade costs can be further boosted by the technology
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Fig. 3.1 Catastrophic and Non-Catastrophic Agglomeration. Source Azis (2020a)
spillover in DR that will reduce innovation costs. Such a spillover is reinforced by
the agglomeration forces where activities continue to gain some external economies.
As the process continues and becomes cumulative, DR capacity to boost national
growth is strengthened. On the other hand, LDR remains stagnant if the interregional
multipliers from DR to LR are not strong enough to counter the attractiveness of DR
to pull more activities in. Hence, growth in DR accelerates while LDR economy
remains stagnant. If capital and labor move from LR to DR, or resources in LR
are exploited for activities in DR to process for export market, inequality between
DR and LDR becomes worse. The mechanism of this ‘catastrophic agglomeration’
scenario is shown in the upper part of Fig. 3.1. Tomitigate the effects, some protective
policies are called for.2
2 The terms ‘catastrophic agglomeration’ was first used by Baldwin et.al (2004), the property of
which is called the ‘super-critical bifurcation.’
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An alternative mechanism is associated with the postulate of spatial equilibrium
theory. As the costs of staying in DR escalate and reach an exorbitant level (e.g., costs
of living, density, pollution, and congestion), resources and activities begin to move
away from DR. The incentives to move are higher for footloose activities and those
relying less on physical contact. As the process continues, a new spatial equilibrium
is reached where the gap between DR and LDR becomes narrower.
Note, however, that this postulate is sensitive to the price flexibility of factors
and their mobility. In most developing countries, price rigidity and mobility frictions
prevent utility in DR and LDR from being equalized.3 More importantly, even if
some factors are mobile, the likely scenario implies an asymmetry, i.e., labor and
capital may flow from LDR to DR but not the other way round. If, on the other
hand, factors and resources move from DR to LDR (enabled by improved infras-
tructure), some degree of capital accumulation may occur in LDR. Together with
the continued growth in DR due to sustained monopolistic competition and innova-
tion, this will boost the national growth in a more inclusive way (‘non-catastrophic
agglomeration’). The mechanism of this scenario is captured in the lower part of
Fig. 3.1.
At any rate, acknowledging agglomeration forces and incorporating them in the
policy design can help us understand better why infrastructure development per-
se could paradoxically exacerbate the unequal development between regions. A
similar framework is used in the context of inter-country in the New Economic
Geography and the New Trade Theory to explain the emergence of intraindustry
trade, in which trade of similar products occur between similar countries irrespec-
tive of factor proportions or initial endowments. Unless factors are symmetrically
mobile, and protective policies are properly designed, the analysis of the theory
implies that the effect of infrastructure development could be the opposite of what
was originally intended (see again the discussions on interregional multipliers in the
preceding chapter).
Granted that external economies are associated with monopolistic competition,
there are three sources of external economies of scale (Marshall, 1920): input sharing,
labor market pooling, and knowledge spillovers. The interplay of these three allows
for intra-industry linkages to serve as key components of locational benefits. The
knowledge spillover, often labeled the Marshall–Arrow–Romer (MAR) spillover or
externality, is driven by the proximity of firmswithin a common industry. It is consid-
ered among the most powerful sources of growth and productivity improvements.
Also emphasizing the role of intra-industry linkages, Porter (1990) highlighted the
advantage of intensified local competition. According to his concept of competi-
tive advantage, failure to improve productivity growth as evidenced in Indonesia
can be viewed from a broader and more dynamic perspective, in which location
or spatial dimension matters a lot. Spatial concentration improves the competi-
tive advantage through its influence on firm’s innovation-related productivity as the
3 Using data from 20 African countries, Gollin, Kirchberger, and Lagakos (2017) found that most
metrics in all countries are not related to population density, and that rural-to-urban mobility are far
more common than the reverse mobility, defying the postulate of spatial equilibrium theory.
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concentrated industry acts as catalyst for the exchangeof tacit knowledge, experience,
and information.
There are two types of agglomeration economies: localization economies and
urbanization economies, where both are the results of increased productivity due to
factors outside of an individual firm. Localization economies occur when a particular
activity in a certain location enjoys productivity gains due to increased size of an
industry where that activity belongs to, whereas urbanization economies are asso-
ciated with a variety of benefits in terms of complementarity due to the diversified
economy of urban areas. The latter implies that urban growth leads to productivity
improvements (Isard, 1956; Jacobs, 1969). Hence, while localization economies are
linked to own industry scale, urbanization economies are linked to urban scale. Both,
however, concern with the role of spatial concentration and highlight the importance
of knowledge and information spillovers for innovation. But in practice other sources
ofMarshallian channels of economies may also at work. At any rate, it is the agglom-
eration economies that acts as a pull factor and it is the reason why activities grow
and develop in certain locations (regions) that could widen the gap between regions.
In a large and diverse country with a high degree of initial inequality like Indonesia,
agglomeration forces tend to work more forcefully.
What is the connection between spatial concentration and firm’s competitiveness?
The link between the two is at the center of Porter’s ‘Diamond Theory of National
Advantage’ (Porter, 1990). Unlike the classical comparative advantage model that
focuses on the role of factor inputs, three additional factors determine the compara-
tive economic advantage of a country, region, or firm: first, the strategy, the structure
and the rivalry; second, the related supporting industries; and third, the demand
conditions. It is the interrelation of all four—the four points of a diamond shape–that
will eventually determine the competitiveness of a location. Therefore, locational
concentration matters for competitiveness. In particular, clustering of firms in a
certain geographical location tends to boost firms’ competitiveness, the source of
which goes beyond what runs inside firms. Evidence indeed suggests that firms in
a concentrated location tend to be more competitive than those in scattered loca-
tions. Unarguably, Porter’s Diamond Theory can be used to guide firms to strategize
when operating in different markets. The same arguments can be applied to MSMEs
operating in a cluster.
Hence, on one hand regional economics exposes the mechanism and forces of
agglomeration by systematically taking ‘space’ factor explicitly (individual opera-
tions take up space, not in a spaceless dimension), and treating location of activities
endogenously (transport cost is binding). Without such specifications, it would have
been utterly impossible to rationalize the emergence of inequality and other spatial
phenomena. Another implication of the arguments is that, as long as trade across
space occurs no competitive equilibrium is possible. This conjecture, known as the
‘Spatial Impossibility Theorem,’ defies one of the main tenets of general equilib-
rium theory in economics. On the other hand, the concept of competitive advantage
emphasizes the role of interrelated influences of—and the interactions among—the
four factors beyond cost minimization cited earlier. It is worth to note that somework
have been done to look at the evolutionary process of agglomeration which combines
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the spatial agglomeration with the industry life cycle concept and show that while at
the early stage agglomeration economies generate a better regional or cluster perfor-
mancewith increasing returns, during the later stages they could produce diminishing
returns and decreasing performance (see Potter & Watts, 2011).
What is crucial is, both concepts defy the myth that the importance of location
in an increasingly globalized world is diminishing because countries, regions or
firms can source inputs and technology from anywhere, and that government inter-
vention loses its influence over competition to global forces. On the contrary, post-
globalization has shown that location matters even more as activities gain external
economies by agglomerating in certain locations. Of course, politics, policies, insti-
tution, geography, history, and heterogeneity also explain the extent of a country’s
dualism.
In the context of business operation, the benefits of agglomerations translate into
gains from operating in a cluster, which is a system of interconnected firms whose
value as a whole is greater than the sum of its parts. In addition to the earlier stated
benefits, for many MSMEs operating within a cluster can also provide opportunities
for distinctive competitive positions and diversified products, operational effective-
ness, choosing differentiate products, and adopting strategies that are different from
those commonly adopted by competitors. Even if the latter are also members of the
same cluster, a concentration of visible rivals can motivate individual MSMEs to
search for ways of competing indirectly. In a dynamic setting, clusters offer an envi-
ronment for increasing the productivity and the capacity for innovation, as well as
establishing new businesses to expand and support further innovation.
Juxtaposing cluster and regional development-cum-inequality is another approach
that has attracted many scholars, particularly in looking at the impact of cluster
operations on regional growth and productivity. Most of the early work, however,
used the case of developed countries.
A ground-breaking study by Piore and Sabel (1984), for example, used the expe-
rience of American small and medium enterprises. Comparing the high volume
manufacture of standardized goods using special-purpose machines and the craft
production of general-purpose tools capable of small-batch and flexible production,
they argued that had the latter been dominant the resulting institutional structure of
the US industrial development would be community-based, more local and regional
development oriented, and smaller in size. Unlike in a mass-production system,
the smaller unit could foster a labor relation based on collaboration and paternalism,
where artisan workers are the key operatives. This implies that activities with smaller
unit operations contribute positively to regional prosperity.
Many studies searching for explanations of the regional clustering of MSME
have been influenced by the above study. Some put it in the context of growing
interregional inequality, others analyzed the issue by looking at the role of the insti-
tutional arrangements. Another strand of research has been focusing on the impacts
of cluster operations on regional growth and productivity, where most confirm favor-
able impacts and some show that those impacts are independent of other locational
qualities (see for example, Ketels & Protsiv, 2021). Since productivity growth at the
macroeconomic level occurs only if capabilities at the microeconomic level improve,
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the trend of productivity discussed in Chap. 2 could have been also analyzed by
examining the way in which productivity increases at a firm and a cluster level.
At any rate, the above discussions substantiate one of the main messages of this
book, that dualism and inequality should not be viewed merely as the effect of devel-
opment policies but are also the outcome of endogenous forces of agglomeration and
interactions among four factors identified in the competitive advantage concept. The
advantage of operating in a cluster is practically the same with the benefits accrued
from agglomeration and concentration. This brings up the intriguing questions: if
dualism and inequality are caused by endogenous forces, will any major institutional
change such as a big-bang decentralization in early 2000s be effective to reduce
it? With respect to the gap between MSMEs and large businesses, what kind of
intervention and policy design, if any, can help lower such a gap?
Institutional Change: Decentralization and Transaction
Costs
Defined as formal and informal rules and norms that organize social, political and
economic relations, institution has a normative content as they carry sanctions
for non-compliance. There are formal and informal types of institution. Written
laws, policies, and regulations are examples of formal institution. Informal insti-
tution includes intangible components such as social customs or traditions, spirit
of comradery, sense of community, goodwill, etc. Both types shape the thought,
behavior, as well as broader social capital of community. They can either enable or
constrain individuals to act and behave, and hence play a critical role in shaping the
results of development. Right policies with wrong institution can generate disap-
pointing outcomes. Worse, they can produce the opposite results. It is not seldom to
find cases in developing countries where the role of institution in affecting outcomes
is more prevalent than that of policies.
The role of institution in regional development is widely acknowledged and has
been extensively studied. To understand its theoretical foundation and in addressing
the effect of institutional change on dualism and inequality, in this section we use the
‘Institutional Model of Decentralization’ (IMD) designed to delineate the process of
interaction between institutional change–in the form of decentralization with direct
local election–and economic conditions, and how such an interaction can influence
the regional welfare (Azis, 2008). The model enables us to understand why the same
institutional change can generate different outcome in different regions.
The model framework laid out in Fig. 3.2 illustrates the process starting from
the beginning of decentralization policy denoted by “D.” Evidence shows that direct
elections (PILKADA) in Indonesia has been beset by problems of ‘local capture’
denoted by “L.” Defined as a condition whereby elected local officials and elites
use public funds, originally intended for either political campaign or provision of
goods and services, for the benefit of a few individuals or groups in detriment to the
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D = Decentralization
L = Local capture
W = Welfare effect of decentralization
S = Initial welfare condition
P = People’s participation
Q = Quality of leader
F = Size of local budget
Fig. 3.2 Framework of institutional model of decentralization (IMD). Notes Different e in the
framework denotes different relations. Source Azis (2010, 2013, 2020a, 2020b)
welfare of the larger population. The motivation is obvious: during the campaign,
recipients of the fund helped the local officials win the election. Since it causes rent-
seeking behavior and misallocation of resources, “L” can make certain segments of
population experience reduced access to the process and outcome of development,
resulting in increased inequality (Azis, 2020b). Different aspects of local capture
in Indonesia and its implications have been discussed by several authors, among
others, Dasgupta andBeard (2007), Azis (2013), Lucas (2016); Aspinall andMas’udi
(2017), Muhtadi (2019); and Azis & Pratama (2020). The effect of “L” on local
welfare denoted by “W” can be positive (positive local capture) or negative (negative
local capture), depending on the interplay between several factors, each of which is
described below.4
Literature on institutional perspectives stresses the importance of participatory
process, and the degree of political participation, which differs between countries
and regions, is influenced by the initial welfare condition reflected in, among others,
4 The extent and severity of accountability problems and local capture (“L”) depend on the following
factors: (1) Pre-existingdistributionof power at the local level, e.g., allocationof social and economic
power within communities; (2) Lobby and campaign contributions by wealthier or more influential
groups; (3) Fairness and regularity of elections; and (4) Transparency in local decision-making
processes. Establishing these conditions may require institutional and bureaucratic reform, yet it
is precisely this type of reform that is most difficult to conduct. Overcoming institutional factors
is always more difficult than choosing which policy to take, as it is complex, involving a strong
path-dependence. Absence of this reform, a higher local capture will almost certainly produce lower
benefits of decentralization (Azis, 2020b).
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the human development index (HDI) and the level of poverty and income inequality.
A larger share of poor people implies a smaller fraction of informed voters or lower
political awareness, i.e., upward mobility, where those at the upper end tend to
raise political awareness more significantly than those at the lower end (concavity
hypothesis). The quality of public services and “W” can be constrained by low
awareness, lack of critical voices, and absence of check-and-balance. Hence, of
several factors determining the effect of “L” on “W,” three stand out: the initial
welfare condition (“S”), people’s participation (“P”), and the size of local budget
(“F”).5 The implied mechanisms could result in either a persistent/wider gap, or a
smaller/narrowing gap between rich and poor regions. The interplay of all the above
factors will determine the welfare outcome (Azis, 2020b).
As discussed in the preceding chapter, applying the IMD framework in several
districts throughout Indonesia confirms the importance of participation (“P”) in deter-
mining the way the local capture affects welfare. In some LDR, the initial condition
matters more than the availability of local budget, highlighting the persistence of low
(high) welfare influenced by poor (good) initial condition. It also confirms the pres-
ence of “negative local capture” and “positive local capture” in a path dependence
fashion. When the dynamics of influences are taken into account, the importance of
available fund in some regions is higher than that of the initial condition. Hence,
the IMD helps explain why some LDR or backward regions remain less-developed
or backward even after numerous efforts were made to make improvements, while
other LDR or backward regions could thrive. The fact that people’s participation
“P” and the size of local budget “F” vary across regions suggests that interactions
between institutional change (decentralization) and economic factors indeed explain
the widening welfare gap (dualism) between regions. The nature and extent of those
interactions reflect the prevailing institution.
Insofar the ‘quality’ factor (participation) and the ‘quantity’ factor (local budget)
are key to welfare progress, the quality of local leaders (denoted by “Q” in Fig. 3.2)
determines the achievement of welfare. Obviously, better local leaders enable greater
welfare achievement. Translating this into types of local leaders, Fig. 3.3 displays the
typology based on the ‘quantity’ (column) and ‘quality’ (row) components of IMD.
In the context of promoting efforts to improve MSME competitiveness, the typology
suggests that even if we assume there is no corruption among local leaders and
officials, their ability and capacity to motivate people’s participation could determine
thewelfare outcome. From thediscussionswithMSMEs in some regions, caseswhere
local authorities (perceived as ‘local leaders’) fail to motivate participation of local
residents and MSME are numerous. As shown in Fig. 3.3, in such circumstances
even with no corruption the outcome will be of the ‘incomplete progress.’
5 The initial level of a region’s overall conditions “S” is supposed to capture both the traditional
‘quantity’ measures (income, education, poverty, employment, etc.), and ‘quality’ or institutional
measures (social capital such as trust, collective actions, tradition, habit, enforcement, etc.). The
resulting “W” will determine the subsequent level of initial condition “S,” that is, the steady-state
level of initial welfare is influenced by any perturbations in the system that lead to changes in “W,”
from which “S” in the subsequent period is in turn affected.
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Notes: “L” denotes local capture, “F” is local budget, and “H” represents the quality component that includes local   
capture, initial conditions (“S”), and people’s participation (“P”) 
Source: Azis (2010), Azis (2013), and Azis (2020a).
Fig. 3.3 Typology of local leaders based on IMD framework. Notes “L” denotes local capture,
“F” is local budget, and “H” represents the quality component that includes local capture, initial
conditions (“S”), and people’s participation (“P”). Source Azis (2010, 2013, 2020a)
Returning to the distinction between formal and informal institution, we often
put more emphasis on formal institution when formulating policies and undermine
the enforcement of those policies as part of informal institution. In some cases,
when a policy with good intent is not sufficiently enforced, local communities may
impose social control through neighborhood trust to ensure that the good intent
can be materialized. On the other hand, they may not be able to overcome obsta-
cles sanctioned by a higher authority. Since the quality and capacity differ between
communities, the net-result and performance also differ. In poorer regions, the infor-
mality of social arrangement may put them in a more difficult position to counter
the weak enforcement of a policy. This could prolong, if not worsen, the existing
dualism.
In addressing dualism between small and large businesses, high transaction costs
are at the center of the institutional problems faced by many MSMEs. Transaction
costs could range fromexpenses incurred in business activities such as advertisement,
management, finance, and public relations, to the costs of getting permits which is
time-consuming and often involving payment or transfer of bribes and kickbacks.6
In some cases, personalized transactions are the rule rather than the exception. All
these costs tend to be more burdensome for small businesses that have small and
unsecured assets and lack of formal documents, making them to remain informal
and small as they cannot afford to pay those costs. The persistence of informality
6 Thewell-knownCoase theoremsuggests that only at zero transaction costs an efficient outcomecan
prevail (Coase, 1960). However, Coase’s solution to lower such costs by establishing clear property
rights to facilitate the smooth functioning of markets is less related to the problems commonly faced
by MSMEs in most developing countries.
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contribute to their productivity and competitiveness, which diminishes the chance
for MSMEs to get credits and/or weaken their incentives to expand.
Other than transactions costs, problems associated with institution entail another
intangible factor which by no means less important. To the extent institution define
the incentive structure of societies, given a certain incentive structure a system will
be in equilibrium if the implied regularity of behaviors of individuals or society to
follow the rules are best-responses to the beliefs and internalized norms formed by
the implied regularity of behaviors (North, 1993,2005). One of the consequences is,
policies can fail to achieve their objectives if the institution in which those policies
are elements of is not in equilibrium (Grief, 2006). To a large extent, the behaviors
of individuals or society reflect their social capital, and institution has a strategic
role in influencing and shaping that social capital. It is this social capital that jointly
determine the effectiveness of policies to improve MSME performance. The survey
reported in the next chapter is based on a framework specifically designed by posi-
tioning social capital and its interactions with policies at the center of the analysis.
That framework is discussed below.
Social Capital
While methodologies about MSME development and promotion have not been well
developed, and received a lack of consensus, there is a widespread agreement that
‘survival’ and ‘self-realization’ are among the important aspects of small busi-
ness activities. Self-realization makes them capable of stimulating entrepreneurship,
innovation, and productivity (Parrilli, 2007). More importantly, self-realization can
strengthen social bonds and enlarge the circle of social relationships, which is an
important feature of social capital. From this perspective, social capital can enhance
the opportunity of self-realization and allow MSMEs to gain the benefits of it.
Insofar the networks of relationships among individuals in a society are formed
based on the prevailing institution, they constitute social capital which maintains
the relationships.7 Thus, institution and social capital can influence the behaviors of
thosewhomake the policy (or are responsible to enforce it), as well as the community
affected by it. In this sense, enforcement is part of institution, and so is the response
guided by the social capital of the affected communities. Any policy intended to
foster regional growth and reduce interregional inequality could suffer from weak
enforcement due to poor design, as well as from unexpected public response if the
policy is not in line with the need, characteristics, and networks of relationships exist
in the region. The disconnect makes policy ineffective. Similarly, policy measures to
help MSMEs can fail due to irreconcilable response if the design of those measures
does not make them compatible with the real needs, local values, and characteristics
of MSMEs. For small businesses in particular, the goal achievement often critically
depends on the prevailing institution and social capital.
7 Although social capital is not the same with institution, it can contribute to their development.
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Putnam’s description of social capital is loaded with important implications. He
referred social capital to “features of social organization, such as networks, norms,
and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam,
1993). Three terms are particularly relevant for our analysis: cooperation, coordina-
tion, and trust. The degree of trust is positively related to the probability of coopera-
tion and coordination. For our purpose, we add another element of cooperation, that
is, participation, and treat the whole as a system of collective action.
Collective action and participation in social activities are significantly lower in
regions and localities that suffer from high inequality (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000).
The propensity of individuals, regions, or small businesses to join groups, associ-
ations, or cluster, to cooperate in various collective actions is negatively related to
inequality. Higher dualism tends to lead to lower social capital, and in turn lower
cooperation and collective actions. To the extent collective actions generate exter-
nalities, both positive (e.g., public goods) and negative (e.g., commons), observed
dualism is the net result of such externalities.
Since cooperation and collective action are critical for the success of almost all
organizations, large and small, it is important to understand how they are formed.
Figure 3.4 displays the general framework of how different factors interact and lead
to cooperation and collective action, and in turn influence MSME competitiveness.
While the basic mechanism is applicable to most cases, the intensity and ranking of
importance of the relevant factors as well as the potential benefits from cooperation
Fig. 3.4 Cooperation, collective action core relationship, and policies. Source Author’s own
creation
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may vary according to a set of “structural variables,” the types of which depend
on the context and issues at hand (Ostrom, 2010).8 In our survey, we use fourteen
categories but not all of themcanbe classified as structural variables. Those categories
essentially represent different characteristics of the respondents (the left side of
Fig. 3.4).
For cooperation to happen, trust is an important prerequisite. As a central compo-
nent of social capital, trust can determine the strength of social ties and hence coop-
eration too. An MSME may cooperate in a cluster because it has come to embrace a
norm (a worldview) of being prepared to trust other MSMEs. This exhibits a courage
to cooperate, because one player trusts that others are also going to cooperate. In
most cases, however, the process of formation of social capital is sensitive to the
political and social forces as a result of the prevailing institutional arrangement.
If social capital associated with a set of largely informal relationships can lead to
cooperation for collective action, then trust and reliance may become both, a condi-
tion and an outcome of it. The question is, how social capital—or more specifically
trust—is formed?Under general circumstances, trust arises from received reputation,
the process of which is influenced by existing institution. Given an individual’s repu-
tation, different institutional arrangement results in different length of time required
for others to trust (reciprocity), and different intensity of the trust (upper part of
Fig. 3.4). Also, current reputation may be influenced by past reputation (another
type of reciprocity). Unlike many studies on corporate reputation, here the pursuit of
a better reputation is not an end in itself, rather a precondition that could eventually
aid individuals to earn trust from others.9 Nonetheless, in cases related to cooperation
amongMSMEs, reputation factor can contribute to trust building, although the influ-
ence may evolve in different directions; in some cases it causes trust to disappear, in
others it makes individual trust advance into a stronger mutual trust. In short, there
are complex linkages among variables at multiple levels that could affect individual
reputations, trust and reciprocity, and that may lead to cooperation.
What is the essence of cooperation? Strictly defined, cooperation is a situation
whereby a group of individuals act together to a common end. Although it is often
connotated as a good thing, cooperation is not always socially optimal. Collusion
amongfirms that generate private benefits at a huge social cost (negative externalities)
is a noted example. But in the efforts to improve MSME performance, cooperation
is a positive thing to have, although the nature and size of the benefits depend on
the type of cooperation, e.g., voluntary or compulsory. Individuals who decide to
cooperate may do so either voluntarily, or forced and mandated by others (through
government regulation). In general, there are usually positive externalities to volun-
tary cooperation and negative externalities to coerced cooperation. At any rate, it
8 Many formal game-theoretic models generated a list of “structural variables” that often affect the
likelihood participants will be able to achieve outcomes greater than the deficient Nash equilibrium.
9 In the business strategy and marketing literature, the relation between trust and reputation is
anything but consensual. Some argued that reputation is a consequence of trust (Walsh et al., 2009)
and others suggested that reputation is an antecedent of trust (Doney & Cannon, 1997; Keh and
Xie, 2009).
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is important to distinguish these two features when discussing key components of
cooperation.
Similar to the case of prisoner’s dilemma, rational individuals in a social dilemma
problemwill take actions that maximize short-term benefits to self but generate lower
joint outcomes than could have been achieved. Although in such a situation a better
optimal outcome could be achieved if individuals cooperate by selecting strategies
other than those prescribed by theNash equilibrium, in pursuit of an optimal outcome
they may end up not cooperating even if it is in their interest to do so (Ostrom, 2007).
Hence, cooperation is not guaranteed. It requires an enabling institution that can be
furnished by some policies.
Closely related to cooperation is the concept of collective action. It occurs when
a group of individuals is required to contribute to an effort in order to achieve an
outcome. The central difference—and the relation—between a strictly-defined coop-
eration and collective action lies in the words ‘required to contribute.’ In a cooper-
ation, participants act together because they believe by doing so the outcome will
be to their benefit, or that it will be better than if the work is done individually.
But there is no stated guarantee that such an outcome will materialize; the emphasis
is on ‘acting together.’ Collective action adds a condition that the outcome will
be attained if everyone contributes, hence no free-ride. Consider a situation where
MSMEsdecide to join a cluster.While itmay imply cooperation, only if everyMSME
operators contributes it qualifies as collective actions. This highlights the importance
of distinguishing voluntary and forced cooperation. Most studies show that owner-
ship of collective action through voluntary participation makes cooperation more
effective.10
It is known in game theory that self-centered individuals can be better-off by
being free-riders, i.e., letting others contribute to the collective action while they
do not. This is a classical problem of public goods and common resources raised
by Olson (1965), where the distinction between excludable goods (benefits can be
excluded from individuals who do not contribute) and nonexcludable goods (bene-
fits can be reaped by all, irrespective of contributing or not) is fundamental. Because
of free-ride, collective action can run into a problem, especially when it is diffi-
cult to exclude non-participants from benefiting the outcome of collective action of
others. For cooperation and collective action in MSME, the risk of free-riding is also
there. It is therefore necessary to safeguard the virtues of cooperation and collec-
tive action by exposing the components that could either eliminate or minimize the
possibility of free-ride. Two of such components are ‘participation’ and ‘coordina-
tion.’ Whether cooperation will effectively improve MSME performance depends
on the quality of cooperation, for which active participation and coordination matter
(see again Fig. 3.4). Expressing the willingness to cooperate without actually partic-
ipating in collective action opens up the possibility of free-ride, and cooperation
10 Using the case of cooperative water projects in least developed countries, Grootaert (2001)
showed that returns to voluntary projects are greater than returns to similar projects implemented
by governments.
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without coordination may result in a sub-optimal outcome. Thus, both participation
and coordination can potentially remove or minimize the possibility of free-ride.
While trust can initiate participation through cooperation, the reverse may also be
true: trust in others is created through regular participation in voluntary associations
(Newton, 1999). The implication is, when a norm to trust is absent, participation may
help to develop trust; hence the two-way arrow between participation and trust in
Fig. 3.4. The type of participation—imposed or voluntary—will determine the nature
of that two-way relation. Coordination amongmembers of a cluster can improve indi-
vidual capacity and potentials through cooperation with other MSMEs, for example
in production technique, digital use, and networking. The gained benefits range from
monetary (joint purchase of inputs, joint sales) to non-monetary (knowledge, infor-
mation, experience) category, and the effectiveness to reap those gains depend on the
type of coordination, e.g., strictly for business purposes or for other social consider-
ations (e.g., sense of camaraderie, pity, shamefulness) and the nature of coordination
(e.g., voluntarily versus imposed). Nonetheless, the resulting benefits are likely larger
than if they are obtained without coordination.
What is then the role of policies? Human actors are able to solve—lbeit not all—
collective action problems on their own without external rules and outside interven-
tion. But for that to happen, institutional arrangements and policies furnishing the
enabling environment are necessary. To the extent the ability to cooperate in collec-
tive action problems is key for improving MSME performance, it is important to
identify which policies and institution discourage opportunistic behavior (free-ride)
and which promote cooperation in collective action. Providing the latter should be
the emphasis of policy. On the other hand, policy intervention can also be problem-
atic if the basis for reliability falls short; for example, when state-owned enterprise
is involved directly with commercial activities that could compete with MSME’s
activities. Coercion through instructions is another institutional approach that may
not be well-received and is likely to create opportunistic behaviors or free-riders.
In the current research, we classify policies to furnish the necessary institutional
arrangements into three categories: First, linkages policies aimed at supporting the
interactions and cooperation among MSMEs as well as between MSMEs and other
relevant parties (large firms, financing institutions, supporting industries); second,
structural policies to promote and improveMSME performance, many of which have
been tried by the government but may require improvements and better prioritization
(e.g., training, promotion, financing); and third, policies aimed at providing MSMEs
with a greater access to digital or other technology (green technology).
The framework in Fig. 3.4 and the discussions above suggest that cooperation and
collective action have an important role in improving MSME performance, and the
interplay between policies and a set of social capital can determine the nature and
size of the improvement. Insofar establishing clusters of MSME has been common
throughout Indonesia, these clusters serve as some sort of ‘vehicle’ for cooperation
and collective action. However, since the types of cooperation and collective action
can influence the outcome, distinguishing the types of cluster is also necessary.
Note that the term “cluster” here is close to the standard and formal definition
according to The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO),
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which is “geographical concentrations of inter-connected enterprises and associated
institutions that face common challenges and opportunities.” A similar definition
by Porter (2000) is “a geographically proximate group of interconnected companies
and associated institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalities and comple-
mentarities.” In our case, the relevant emphasis from those two definitions are the
terms ‘geographical concentration/proximity’ and ‘common challenges and opportu-
nities/commonalities.’ More specifically, MSME clusters refer to the agglomeration
of the inter-relatedMSMEs and the related institutions. Members of a cluster usually
produce and sell a range of related or complementary goods and services, and expe-
rience the same challenges as well as opportunities. If the ensuing network results in
new ideas, initiatives, and innovations, it is said that the clusters are robust (Ceglie &
Dini, 1999). It is important and highly relevant to highlight the role of local-own
initiatives in problem solving, especially giving the decision-making power to the
MSME themselves. Otherwise, the external parties tend to see the situation and prob-
lems faced by MSMEs through the lens of their own biases, and not recognizes the
real or hidden needs of the clustermembers based on their experience. The behavioral
biases can range from overoptimism, confirmation bias, and fixation on first solu-
tions, without considering what will or will not work. As demonstrated in Chap. 5,
the local community tend to find their own solutions to problems and challenges they
are facing. External parties can help facilitate the implementation of such solutions.
The relevant parameters to reflect different perceptions of cluster members are
the “structural variables” discussed earlier, such as location (rural–urban, and across
regions), size (number of employees), status (success or not, length of operation
and BI assistance), technology (digital and green), and market (local, non-local, or
exports).
To verify the relevance of the above concept and capture the perceptions of
MSEs, we conducted a survey during the period of September–November 2020.
The survey involves 121 + MSE as the respondents. The goal is to get the percep-
tions directly from them over the role of a set of policies, social capital, and the
interactions between the two, based upon which the type of cluster deemed most
relevant for competitiveness is determined. The trust-based cooperation, in which
the key components are participation and coordination, is subsequently analyzed
based on the responses/perceptions of respondents.
To set the stage, Fig. 3.5 summarizes the outline of the framework used in the
survey. Although in the survey we applied it largely to MSEs, the framework in
Fig. 3.4 and the outline in Fig. 3.5 is fairly general and applicable to medium enter-
prises as well (hence the MSMEs). As discussed earlier, the government policy to
establish an enabling institutional arrangement and a set of social capital to induce
cooperation for collection action will jointly determine MSME performance, which,
in this survey is defined as improved competitiveness. For cooperation and collective
action to work more effectively, participation and coordination as the components
of social capital are required. The three sets of policy expected able to improve the
institutional arrangements are: those intended to strengthen the interactions among
MSMEs as well as between MSMEs and other relevant parties, structural policies to
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Fig. 3.5 Summarized framework of the survey. Source Author’s own creation
improve MSME operations, and policies to enable MSMEs to use better technology
(digital and green technology).
The interplay of policies and social capital components works through MSME
clusters, someofwhich are imposedormandatedby thegovernment, someare formed
for purely business purposes, and others are used for social and other purposes.
Practically speaking, for those who are member of a cluster, the joint-effects of
the interplay between policies and social capital are constantly felt and experienced
during their day-to-day operation. For those who are not members of any cluster, the
choice of cluster type should only reflect what they aspire. It is in this context the
perceptions directly obtained from MSME operators are expected to capture both,
their true and real conditions and their aspirations.
The technique we are adopting in the survey emphasizes the power of human
perceptions acquired by asking the respondents to compare relevant attributes or
factors in a pairwise fashion, from which we then derive the corresponding ratio
scales.11 Unlike in a standard way of ranking which uses either a simple ordering
as in indifference curve (ordinal scales), or absolute physical measure as in most
economic indicators (cardinal scales), using ratio scales allows us to evaluate human
perceptions in a more balance way. First of all, insofar there is no absolute valuation
on every attributes—or on everything in life for that matter—especially when those
11 Perceptions are the ultimate lens through which human beings view reality and operate with
versions of that reality. Hence, there is no such thing like “right” or “wrong.” What matters is what
they perceive and express. In order to understand the real situation and problems faced by MSMEs,
we need to know what they actually think and perceive, not the “reality” that others see or want
MSMEs to see.
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attributes are intangible, each of them has to be evaluated in comparison with other
attributes; hence, running a pairwise comparison on relevant attributes is imperative.
Secondly, since any ranking of attributes conveys human judgement after considering
(“calculating”) the pluses and the minuses of those attributes, the revealed choices
reflect not only the preference toward one attribute over another but also the weight
of that preference. Thirdly, once the preference and the weight of attributes are made,
depending on howwe structure the framework, wemay need to compare the resulting
scale of selected attributes that represent the plusses with the scale of attributes that
reflect the minuses; that is, the upside (the benefit) needs to be compared with the
downside (the cost). When intangible attributes are involved, as in our case, such a
comparison cannot be made unless ratio scales are used.
The approach of using ratio scales is fundamental in the Analytic Hierarchy
Process (AHP) and Analytic Network Process (ANP), a brief description of which is
given in Appendices A.1 and A.2. In cases where there is no feedback effect, using
a hierarchy approach to structure the problem is appropriate, and we can apply a
method using the eigen-vector based on principal eigen-value of the relevant pair-
wise comparison matrix. This is basically how the AHP works. But when feedback
effects are present as in our second set of survey, in which elements in each level
of a hierarchy are interrelated with elements in other levels or other elements in
the same level, we need another approach capable of dealing with a system where
each pairwise comparison matrix is directly or indirectly linked to other pairwise
comparison matrices. This is where the use of the ANP is necessary, for which the
so-called ‘super matrix’ needs to be constructed (see Appendix A.2 for more details).
The results from using the ANP has been known to be more stable and robust than
those from using the AHP.
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Abstract The centripetal forces of agglomeration, reflected among others in the
structure of the economy and the nature of interrelations among regions (interregional
multipliers), limit the effectiveness of spatial policies. Meanwhile, the importance
of social capital is revealed from the MSE survey. Social planners could improve
the design of policies by understanding the perceptions and aspirations of MSEs to
make any measures more compatible with the prevailing social capital.
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Conversation
A: “We need to ENLIST local leaders and small businesses to support national
policies to reduce inequalities and dualism.”
B: “Far more importantly, we need to LISTEN to those affected by the policies
and the SILENT groups whose silence must not be mistaken for their absence.”
A: “If a small business operator RELUCTS to use green technology, e-commerce,
and e-finance, there is nothing we can do to help.”
B: “Understanding their behavioral insights and encouraging them to work
together in a CLUSTER will raise their propensity to adopt new technology by
way of increased communication and interactions.”
A: “That is why mandating small businesses to form a cluster is not just for
DECORATION, but it is meant to facilitate interactions among them.”
B: “While interactions in a cluster are necessary, active participation and
COORDINATION are essential for the collective actions to work effectively.”
A: “We also used examples of success stories so that small businesses are
motivated to replicate because THEY SEE the evidence directly.”
B: “People do not respond to what THE EYES and ears tell them but what the
brain makes them see and hear.”
It is clear from the discussions in the preceding chapter that forces of agglom-
eration could risk a worsening dualism and inequality. On the other hand, potential
benefits of the same forces offer incentives forMSMEs to operate in clusters, inwhich
the effectiveness depends crucially on the interplay of policies and social capital.
One may argue that although Chap. 2 provides a clear evidence of interregional
inequality in Indonesia, several factors and events unrelated to agglomeration may
have caused the inequality. Disentangling sources of inequality, let alone isolating the
effect of agglomeration, may not be empirically feasible. But the centripetal forces
of agglomeration are undeniably at work. Other factors influencing the effect of such
forces are the structure of the economy and the nature and scale of interrelations
among regions, both of which are reflected in the intraregional and interregional
multipliers. The first part of this chapter discusses the effect of these factors on
growth and inequality between regions in Indonesia, and the second part is devoted
to the analysis of survey results based on the framework discussed in the preceding
chapter.
Interregional Multipliers
In conjunction with the earlier question about the role of institutional change, a
more general question is what kind of policy intervention can effectively counter
the forces of agglomeration? The question of interest here is whether redirecting
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spending towards LDR can be effective to reduce the gap between DR (core) and
LDR (periphery). To answer this question, we utilize the information associated with
the structure of the regional and interregional economic relations from a series of
Indonesia’s multiregional input–output (MRIO) tables consisting of five regions:
Sumatera, Jawa-Bali, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Nusa Tenggara-Maluku-Papua.
The theoretical basis of interregional multiplier rests on the idea that there is
some sort of relationship between the national economic activity and the regional
economy.1 While standard I-O multipliers capture the direct, indirect, and induced
effects of any changes in one sector of an economyupon other sectors, they are uncon-
cerned with the location of the sectors. If the issue of interest is how to reduce the
gap between core and periphery, location obviously matters. The location of sectors
where the initial changes occur as well as the location of activities affected by those
changes determine the net results of interregional inequality. To the extent increased
spending in a sector located in a region will obviously boost the growth of that region
but not necessarily lower the inequality between regions, in addressing the question
whether redirecting investment towards periphery will reduce the gap between core
and periphery cannot ignore the mechanisms of interregional multipliers.
Suppose a major infrastructure is to be built. We know that the project will boost
growth of the region where the project is implemented as well as the national growth.
But what about its impact on the gap between DR (core) and LDR (periphery)?
Ignoring this question leaves us with criteria only about the costs and benefits of the
project including the overall multiplier effects. Since DR is typically in a better posi-
tion in terms of existing facilities or infrastructure (logistics, financial services, etc.)
and the purchasing power that reflect market conditions, in most cases the decision
ends up with DR as the preferred location of the project. The impact on inequality
is addressed by the argument that infrastructure project in DR will not only boost
national growth but also generate a positive impact on LDR growth, similar to the
trickle-down effect mechanism. This argument, however, essentially puts growth
above inequality, and it completely ignores the relative size of interregional multi-
pliers when it is compared with a scenario whereby the project is built in different
locations. That is, what about if the infrastructure is built in LDR?
One way to find out is by comparing two types of multipliers in both locations, the
intraregional multipliers and the interregional multipliers in DR (µDR andµDR→LDR)
and in LDR (µLDR and µLDR→DR). Even if the infrastructure project is built in LDR,
the cross-regional direct and indirect effects of it could be larger in DR than the
cross-regional effects in LDR if the infrastructure is built in DR, that is µLDR→DR >
µDR→LDR.
1 One of the issues of interest in regional growth theory concerns with the activities in a region
that could be the source of regional growth. Focusing on the size of demand as key determinant,
the “economic base” theory distinguishes internal and external demand (exports). The postulate is,
export is the main driver of regional growth. Hence, the expansion of a sector whose products are
largely exported (the “basic sector”) will stimulate production of the non-exporting or “non-basic”
sector through some sort of multiplier. Another theoretical basis rests on the idea that any dynamic
sector located in a certain region, called the “growth pole,” will create an impact on local and broader
regional economies also through a multiplier.
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We can think of a scenario whereby increased demand and production in LDR
leads to a larger increase of demand and production in DR. The same applies to
the effect of increased income and consumption (part of the final demand) in LDR
on DR. It is not uncommon to find that residents in LDR prefer to spend their
increased income for products and services produced in DR. At any rate, comparing
interregional multipliers is an important step for addressing the question whether a
policy to redirect spending towards LDR be effective to reduce the gap between core
and periphery. To do so, we essentially conduct two different scenarios of regional
investment allocation policy and compare their results. This is different from the
“before-and-after” approach used in the discussions of Chap. 2.
Measuring the interrelationships between regions based on the coefficient of inter-
dependence (COI) from Indonesia’sMRIO in 2005, 2010, and 2015, without looking
at the detailed print the interactions within each region and between regions have
generally increased, although by using different measure Anglingkusumo et al.
(2014) found that regions throughout the country is far from being integrated.
However, looking at the trend by pairs, the economic interactions between Jawa
and non-Jawa except Sumatera have declined over the years, and so have the interac-
tions between Sumatera and other non-Jawa regions. Increased interactions are most
notable between Sulawesi and other regions.
A different trend is detected between interregional backward linkages and forward
linkages; the two have not been moving in the same direction. On the one hand, the
benefits from backward linkages received by regions outside Jawa from increased
final demand in Jawa have been on the rise; that is, more activities in Jawa demand
more inputs from outside Jawa. The opposite trend holds when the increase of final
demand is reversed. The demand for inputs from Jawa mostly declines, with notable
exceptions if the increase of final demandoccurs inmanufacturing and “other” sectors
in Sumatera, as well as in mining sectors in Bali-NT and Maluku-Papua (Table
4.1). On the other hand, the interregional forward linkages show an opposite trend
(growing activities in Sumatera generate greater consumers-oriented activities in
Jawa).
Given the above trends, the overall net outcome shows that the benefits accrued
to non-Jawa from increased activities in Jawa remains much smaller than the bene-
fits received by Jawa from increased activities in regions outside Jawa. From the
perspective of regional investment allocation, this can be interpreted as follows.
Since the interregional multipliers received by regions outside Jawa from adding
investment in Jawa are much smaller than the interregional multipliers received by
Jawa if the augmented investment is made in outside Jawa (compare the bar charts
on the right with those on the left in Fig. 4.1), the cross-region gains enjoyed by
Jawa from investing in outside Jawa are greater than the cross-region gains reaped
by regions outside Jawa if the location of investment is reversed. As shown in the
figure, although fluctuating the gap stood out persistently from 2005 to 2015.2 This
2 By 2015, the largest gains enjoyed by Jawa is when the new investment is made in Sulawesi
followed by Sumatera, whereas the largest gains from adding investment in Jawa are enjoyed by
Sumatera.
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Table 4.1 Percentage of inputs demanded by non-java sectors from Java 2010 and 2015
2010 2015
Non-java sector Agric Mining Manuf Others Agric Mining Manuf Others
Sumatra
% of total input from Java 2.40 3.38 6.82 3.57 2.01 1.47 4.32 3.68
% of inter. input from Java 7.89 12.06 12.03 10.64 5.40 6.45 7.85 8.75
Kalimantan
% of total input from Java 8.72 8.30 8.56 6.31 1.70 2.68 4.03 3.07
% of inter. input from Java 25.93 27.15 13.00 17.36 5.00 14.47 6.39 9.51
Sulawesi
% of total input from Java 5.23 10.26 5.85 6.88 2.39 2.93 3.19 2.79
% of inter. input from Java 22.40 43.83 8.48 22.52 10.86 19.29 4.95 7.63
Bali–NT
% of total input from Java 5.47 0.17 19.76 11.60 3.00 1.24 13.96 5.71
% of inter. input from Java 17.67 3.23 27.86 29.25 10.16 10.10 21.70 16.32
Maluku–Papua
% of total input from Java 11.47 0.02 5.55 7.43 1.99 2.07 2.57 4.25
% of inter. input from Java 38.36 0.06 9.15 18.90 6.62 5.73 5.22 12.68
Notes The value for a sector-region is calculated by dividing the sum of intermediate inputs from
Jawa for that sector-region, divided by either total inputs or total intermediate inputs for that sector-
region. Higher value means higher % of inputs demanded by non-Jawa from Jawa. Bold cells in
2015 columns indicate that the value increases from 2010
Source Calculated from Indonesia’s MRIO tables, 2010, 2015
Fig. 4.1 Interregional multipliers: Jawa and regions outside Jawa. Source Calculated from
Indonesia’s MRIO tables, 2005, 2010, 2015
62 4 Mitigating Dualism and Exploiting the Interplay of Policy-Social Capital
may come to a surprise for those who think that investing in outside Jawa at once
will automatically reduce the gap between non-Jawa (LDR) and Jawa (DR).
As explained earlier, the main problem lies in the structure of the prevailing
economic interrelationships between Jawa and non-Jawa. Depending on the size of
the within-region effect (intraregional multiplier), simply reallocating more invest-
ment to non-Jawa without altering that structure will not guarantee a reduced gap
between the two regions. The difference in the interregional structure combined with
the forces of agglomeration are too strong for the policy to counter the divergence.
Altering the structure of a region’s economy and the economic interrelationships
among different regions is not an easy task. It involves changes in the institutional
arrangement that go beyond strictly economic matters. Since the effectiveness of
any policy intervention is influenced by how communities respond to the policy,
social capital is playing an important role. To be effective, therefore, a policy ought
to be designed such that it will be compatible with the prevailing institutional
arrangements. Undermining the role such institutional arrangements can leave a
well-intentioned policy ineffective, or it can even make the policy backfire.
Survey Results and Analysis
As described through the framework in Chap. 3, understanding the interactions
between institutional arrangements and policies could be key for the efforts to
improve MSME performance. By emphasizing the need for ‘cooperation’ and
‘collective actions’ among MSEs, the main focus of the survey is to delineate the
mechanisms by using the perceptions and opinions ofMSEs on how such interactions
determine the type of cluster deemed suitable for making cooperation and collective
actions effective to improve the competitiveness.3
To capture perceptions, we utilize both the AHP and the ANP. The starting point
is to distill MSEs’ current conditions and their experience and aspirations for coop-
eration in a cluster. In particular, given the prevailing conditions we wish to capture
the respondents’ preference towards different types of cluster deemed most relevant
for improving their business performance. Three types of cluster are considered:
clusters mandated by either local or central government, cluster formed for purely
business purposes, and cluster for social and other purposes not directly related to
business operations. To adopt a balance approach, two sets of hierarchy are built: one
for the upside (benefit) another for the downside (cost). The prevailing conditions are
exemplified by a set of factors or elements in each hierarchy: those leaning towards
3 Note that all samples used in the survey are obtained from, and suggested by, the SMEs Devel-
opment and Consumer Protection of Bank Indonesia. According to the definition adopted by the
‘Statistics Indonesia,’ which is the country’s Central Agency on Statistics (known as BPS or Badan
Pusat Statistik), based on assets (outside land and building) and the size of sales, only 1 of all
samples we used in the survey meets the BPS definition of ‘medium’ enterprise, i.e., > 500 million
rupiah and > 2.5 billion rupiah, respectively. Hence, the survey analysis reported in this chapter
applies more appropriately to the case of micro and small enterprises (MSEs).
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the benefits of a cluster type (Fig. 4.2) and those towards the cost of such a cluster
(Fig. 4.3).
Prior to the survey, during the process of structuring the hierarchies we conducted
informal interviews with some MSMEs, from which we learned among others that
during the Covid-19 crisis some MSMEs began to produce masks to compensate for
the substantial decline in sales of their main products. As many MSMEs are hit hard
Fig. 4.2 Benefit hierarchy. Source Author’s own creation
Fig. 4.3 Cost hierarchy. Source Author’s own creation
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and struggling to survive, diversifying products is one of the changes they feel they
have to make. Even among MSMEs who are not much impacted by the pandemic,
some decide to do product diversification. But not all MSMEs are in a position
to do so, depending on the nature of their business and other binding constraints.
Nonetheless, we decided to include ‘diversification’ as another alternative option
along with the three cluster types shown at the bottom level of hierarchies in Figs. 4.2
and 4.3.
Note that the options of cluster type and ‘diversification’ are intended to represent
respondents’ preferences which may or may not reflect the current conditions. For
example, it is possible that some MSEs who prefer a business-oriented cluster may
currently belong to a government-mandated cluster, or not a member of any cluster.
Similarly, some who express to prefer diversifying their products may have not done
so currently.
In the benefit hierarchy,webeginwith the spatial dimensionofMSEby identifying
their location of operation, whether they are closer to the market, closer to the inputs
and other raw materials, or neither (footloose). The benefits are distinguished into
two types, monetary and non-monetary. Under the monetary benefits, given their
location the size of sales and the gains accrued from being concentrating in adjacent
location (agglomeration economies) are ranked. Under the non-monetary benefits,
three advantages are identified, ease to acquire information and knowledge, getting
a good standing or status from being involved in the business, and receiving non-
monetary supports from the community and family. By ranking the importance of the
above elements in a pairwise fashion, and considering the relations between elements
in one level of the hierarchy and other elements in the level below it, the preference
of the respondents towards different types of cluster including the most beneficial
type is determined (Fig. 4.2).
In the cost hierarchy (Fig. 4.3), we begin by identifying whether transaction costs
are less or more burdensome than operating costs. There are three types of transac-
tion costs to be considered, transport costs, costs associated with bureaucracy (e.g.,
to get license or permit, and to receive government supports and assistance), and
social costs (e.g., community dissatisfaction due to pollution of all sorts and other
negative externalities). Operating costs consist of cost of inputs and raw materials,
cost of capital in terms of difficulty to access and interest rates, labor costs in terms
of quality and wages, and utility costs including rent. Their locational preference is
subsequently ranked. However, unlike in the benefit hierarchy, this time the respon-
dents will make the ranking based on the prevailing cost structure, implying that
they may feel it would have been less costly if they move either to a closer-to-market
location or to a closer-to-inputs location, or they may feel that the current location is
more preferable. Given such a preference, the ranking of cluster type is subsequently
made.
By comparing the ranking of the type of cluster including ‘diversification’ from
the benefit hierarchy and that from the cost hierarchy, we can deduce the true (net)
preference of the respondents. This is done by taking the ratio of the resultingweights
assigned to each option from the benefit hierarchy and those from the cost hierarchy.
The most preferred choice is the one with the highest ratio.
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The following are the summarized results from the survey based on the benefit/cost
framework above. Given their current location, most urban-based MSEs are of the
opinion that monetary benefits are greater than non-monetary benefits, where sales
increase is considered the most important of all. The exceptions are for MSEs in
Kalimantan who rank agglomeration economies to be more important than sales. A
relatively high concentration of MSEs in low-density yet large area of Kalimantan
may have been the reason why the gains from agglomeration are perceived greater
than the gains from sales.
Unlike their counterparts in urban areas, majority of rural-based MSEs feel they
obtain non-monetary benefits more than monetary benefits. The most important non-
monetary benefits is the ability to acquire information. It is likely that in terms of
making profits most rural-basedMSEs have been doing less well compared to urban-
based MSEs, but their persistence to improve, including through learning from new
information, make themmore resilient. There are quite a large number of rural-based
MSE (62%) who consider that monetary benefits are smaller than non-monetary
benefits. The spectrum ranges frommale-owned, with education lower than average,
household size is smaller than average, not yet successful, having a large number of
employees, operate longer than the average period, using digital technology, not yet
a member of any cluster, located in Jawa, Sulawesi, and operate in trade and services.
Given the above prevailing conditions, the type of cluster that aII categories of MSEs
feel most beneficial is the business-oriented one (as an example, see the testimony
from woven fabric MSM in Tidore in Appendix A.6).
On the cost side, all MSEs express that operating costs are more burdensome than
transaction costs, andmajority (30 out of 41 categories) believe that the costs of inputs
and raw materials are most burdensome. The categories that consider costs of capital
are more taxing consist of rural-based, age lower than average, education lower than
average, household size is smaller than average, not yet successful, operate longer
than the average, received supports fromBI for a longer period than average, member
of larger cluster, located in Sulawesi, Sumatera, and operate in the agriculture sector.
Only MSEs in Kalimantan feel that the cost of labor is most burdensome. Again,
this is likely due to the region’s low population density that makes the cost of labor
relative higher than in other regions (see the testimony of MSME rendang in West
Sumatera and MSME red chili in Lhokseumawe in Appendix A.6).
Given the above, majority of MSEs perceive that the type of clusters not strictly
intended for business purposes would be costly, especially if they are meant to serve
only for social function. On the option of diversification, MSEs in Jawa, rural-based
MSEs, and those operating in the agriculturaI sector feel that diversification is not
a viable option. They even consider it as the costliest of all options. In the eyes of
MSEs that have already used digital technology and those that operate in trade and
services sector, the costliest option is to have a government-mandated cluster. There
seems to be a strong perception among MSE in this category that such a cluster
allows government controls and intervention that could hinder their business.
It is interesting to note that if we consider only the results from the benefit hier-
archy, a government-mandated cluster is actually ranked second from the top (by
more than half, or 26 out of 41 categories). Hence, it is also highly preferred by
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the majority. However, given the potential costs of the option, a number of MSE
categories (as mentioned above, the digital technology users and trade sector MSEs)
feel at the same time that it is too costly. These both categories rank government-
mandated cluster as the costliest option. This example demonstrates crucially the
reason why we always need to consider the upside and the downside of perceptions
when trying to acquire human preferences. At any rate, after considering the overall
results from the benefit and the cost hierarchies, the benefit/cost ratio show that the
majority of respondents pick business-oriented clusters as their top preference. Note
again that this choice is irrespective of the clusters they are currently member–or not
member–of.4
The reason why diversification does not seem to be preferred by most MSEs
despite the difficulties caused by the Covid-19 crisis is because the nature of their
business does not make such an option feasible. Rural-based MSEs, Jawa-based
MSEs, and MSEs operating in the agricultural sector are particularly not in favor of
diversification. For them, the possibility to do so is second to none.
Having revealedMSE’s preference towards the type of cluster given the prevailing
conditions, we now investigate the role of policies and social capital by unravelling
their perceptions towards the relevant components, aswell as the feedbacks or internal
and external interrelations (the inner dependence and outer dependence) of these
components. The previous approach cannot be used when feedbacks or interrelations
are present. Therefore, we use a network system to allow for the feedback effects to
operate (using ANP instead of AHP). As mentioned earlier, the ranking derived from
using the ANP is more stable and robust than using the AHP. Figure 4.4 depicts the
framework of the network.
To the extent both policies and social capital influence the effectiveness of a cluster
for engaging cooperation and collective action, respondents are first asked to rank
and weigh the importance of a set of policies and components of social capital. The
framework of the network is structured such that the resulting ranking is eventually
linked to the type of cluster. The results may or may not be different from the earlier
ranking derived from using a hierarchy approach.
As described before, three categories of policies are selected based on their poten-
tial in providing–jointly with social capital—an enabling institutional arrangement.
In the first category (linkages/interactions), there are four components deemed rele-
vant to support cooperation and collective actions: policies to facilitate and enhance
interactions among MSEs and between MSEs and larger firms/industries, policies to
link MSEs with financial institutions, and policies to enable MSEs to access and use
the product and services of supporting industries (e.g., packaging, logistics).5 Interac-
tions among these policies are also considered, because in practice the effects of one
4 Twominor exceptions are:MSEswho generate highest benefit/cost ratio for diversification (urban-
based, located in Kalimantan, Papua, and Sumatera), and MSEs whose benefit/cost ratio is highest
for the government-mandated cluster (those operated by older people).
5 A survey on 1000MSMEs across 9major cities in Indonesia conducted in 2018 shows thatMSMEs
that joined a multi-service tech platform providing access to transport, payments, food delivery, and
logistics find their partnership useful in raising their transaction volume and revenue. Moreover,
majority MSME also viewed that the merchant management technology of the tech platform played
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Fig. 4.4 Interplay of policies and social capital: A Network of feedback and interrelations. Source
Author’s own creation
policy can influence–and be influenced by–the effects of other policies. For example,
larger firms may help provide the financing facility and cooperation between several
MSEs, and the presence of supporting industries allows several MSEs to jointly
utilize the industries’ products and services. Such internal effects are denoted by
circling arrows at the top of each policy box in Fig. 4.4.
Similar effects, albeit with a different degree of completeness that may also
include feedback influences, are applied to the structural category of policy consisting
of measures to strengthen the administrative and accounting capacity, policies to
promote MSE, to assist MSE to improve the production process and product design,
and to increase MSE’s access for low-cost financing. The feedback effects occur, for
example, between promotion and product designwhere the preparation for promoting
events may lead MSEs to come up with a new or modified design (e.g., matching
an important role in accelerating and improving MSME growth and competitiveness in the digital
era (Lembaga Demografi FEB-UI, 2018).
68 4 Mitigating Dualism and Exploiting the Interplay of Policy-Social Capital
with the taste of consumers), on the other hand the new designmay change or refocus
the type and content of the promotion.
In the category of technology policy, no feedback links are expected. There are
four components in the category: digital payment, e-commerce including the use
of social media, e-finance, and green technology. It is important to note that policy
categories can be interrelated in one way or another. In the case of technology policy,
for example, it is both affecting and affected by some components in the linkage
policy, but is only affected by some components in the structural policy category.
More crucially, they are all interrelated with the social capital components. These
particular interrelations capture the core structure of systemic framework in our
survey. The working of the interplay between policies and social capital determines
the type of cluster where cooperation for collective action is expected to improve
MSE performance.
As has been discussed earlier, there are two categories of social capital influ-
encing the nature and quality of cooperation for collective action: participation and
coordination. Under the participation category, there are four types to be ranked:
participationmandated by regulation, participation for strictly business affairs, partic-
ipation for acquiring information, and participation for social interactions. Related
to this classification is the categorization under coordination, which also consists
of four components similar to those under participation: coordination mandated by
regulation, coordination for purely business purposes, coordination for transparency
(where the role of information and communication is key), and coordination for
social interactions purpose.
Similar to the policy categories, there are interactions among–and feedbacks
between–all these components (see circling arrows above the participation and coor-
dination boxes in Fig. 4.4). However, those interactions should be interpreted differ-
ently from the earlier case. For example, if individuals have chosen to participate in
a cooperation for strictly business purposes, they may also wish to participate—or
already participated–in different cooperation (through a different cluster) for other
purposes, say, acquiring information or having social interactions. Which between
the two is most preferred reflects how the business-oriented participation “influ-
ences” their preference towards participating for other purposes. On the other hand,
if individuals have participated in a cooperation for, say, a social interaction purpose,
they may wish to participate—or already participated–in another cooperation that
is strictly business oriented. This example represents the interactions and feedback
effects in the relations between participation for business purpose and participation
for social interaction purpose.
Due to this distinctive nature of relations, and the possibility thatMSEs participate
in more-than one cooperation, we structure the internal feedbacks within the social
capital categories in way that is depicted in Fig. 4.5. Similar explanations can also
be used for the coordination category (Fig. 4.6).
Using the frameworks in Figs. 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6, results of the systemic survey
are as follows. The first stage is to determine the respondents’ views towards the
importance of policies viz social capital. This stage is used to test the hypothesis that
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Fig. 4.5 Interactions within ‘participation:’ feedback in near completeness. Source Author’s own
creation
Fig. 4.6 Interactions within ‘coordination:’ feedback in near completeness. Source Author’s own
creation
‘policy’ dominant scenario (policy is more important than ‘social capital’) does not
suffice to ensure MSE improvement.
Results of the survey reveal that a slightly less-than half of the respondents in our
sample consider ‘policy’ matters the most–more so than ‘social capital’–in affecting
MSEs’ efforts to improve competitiveness. Among the other half who do think that
it is not ‘policy’ that matters the most, about one-third are of the opinion that both
‘policy’ and ‘social capital’ are equally important (equally weighted), and one-sixth
(17%) consider ‘social capital’ is more important than ‘policy.’ Two things influence
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these results: the structural variables discussed earlier (see again Fig. 3.6), and the
spatial dimension (regions).
Different characteristics of respondents (structural variables) give different results
of judgement. For example, shown in Table 4.2, among MSEs operating in the agri-
cultural sector, a considerably large share (64%) believe that social capital and its
interplay with policy play amuchmore important role than policy-dominant scenario
in influencing MSE performance. Another characteristic showing a large portion of
MSE who believe that relying on policy more than social capital does not suffice to
improve performance is the size or number of employee.More than 60%MSEswith a
relative large number of employee hold such a view. Two other characteristics having
high shares are related to the use of digital technology and the number of children in
the family. MSEs that do not use digital technology and those whose operators have
a relative large number of children are also of the opinion that policy-dominance
cannot be effective to improve MSE performance; the corresponding shares are 57%
and 56%, respectively.
Most MSEs (64%) that have been receiving assistance from BI for a longer-than-
average period also believe that policy dominance is not sufficient. Looking into
more details, the share of those having such a view who are both members of a
cluster and receiving BI assistance is over 70%. To the extent most MSE assisted
by BI-KPWs have performed well (in most cases better than those not assisted by
BI-KPWs), we find this result particularly interesting. The criteria and procedure
adopted by BI-KPWs to select MSE, and the comprehensive approach they use in
assisting them have clearly contributed to the improved performance of those MSEs,
making them understand better about the importance of social capital.
Among policy categories, majority MSE prefer linkage policy to help create and
strengthen the interactions between MSEs and other relevant parties. Within social
capital, coordination is considered most important partly because the majority of
respondents are already actively participating in a cluster but still lack of coordination
required to make the cooperation effective. ForMSEs who strictly rank policy higher
than social capital, the linkage policy is ranked the highest, with the exceptions of
thosewhose owners have a large number of children, have a long relationshipwithBI,
exporting, and those operating in the agricultural sector. According to these MSEs,
policies related to technology is most important.
Among MSEs who strictly prefer social capital, the results are split equally,
i.e., half prefer participation and another half prefer coordination. Only MSEs not
using digital technology, exporting, member of a cluster, and operating in trade
and services sector consider participation more important than coordination. Hence,
while in average coordination is viewedmore important than participation, forMSEs
whose opinion is strictly leaning towards social capital the importance of participa-
tion exceeds that of coordination. A complete list of the ranking of policy and social
capital categories broken down by “structural variables” (different characteristics of
respondents) is displayed by spider charts in Fig. 4.7a–n.
The spatial/regional dimension is equally important. In contrast with urban-based
MSE, the number of those in rural area who believe that policy dominance will not
suffice far exceeds the number of those who believe otherwise (56% vs. 44%). By
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Table 4.2 Distribution of perceptions towards the importance of policies and social capital
Categories Urban–rural Gender Age Education










0.44 0.55 0.55 0.45 0.55 0.45 0.55 0.47
Social capital
and interplay
0.56 0.45 0.45 0.55 0.45 0.55 0.45 0.53
Total 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1



















0.55 0.47 0.53 0.44 0.53 0.47 0.53 0.39
Social capital
and interplay
0.45 0.53 0.47 0.56 0.47 0.53 0.47 0.61
Total 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Categories Years in business Years with BI Digital use Export
Below mean Above mean Below mean Above mean Yes No Yes No
Government
policy
0.47 0.53 0.56 0.36 0.51 0.43 0.47 0.51
Social capital
and interplay
0.53 0.47 0.44 0.64 0.49 0.57 0.53 0.49
Total 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Categories Cluster Cluster size Zoom Intransitive








0.56 0.41 0.49 0.55 0.52 0.36 0.44 0.56
Total 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Categories Jawa Kalimantan Papua, Maluku, NTT Sulawesi Sumatera
Government policy 0.44 0.75 0.48 0.44 0.58
Social capital and interplay 0.56 0.25 0.52 0.56 0.42
Total 1 1 1 1 1
Categories Various industries Consumption Trade and services Agriculture
Government policy 0.54 0.50 0.63 0.36
Social capital and interplay 0.46 0.50 0.38 0.64
Total 1 1 1 1
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Fig. 4.7 Ranking of policy and social capital components: MSE characteristics. Source Compiled
Survey results
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Fig. 4.7 (continued)
regions, MSEs with higher share that hold such a view are in Jawa, Sulawesi, Papua,
Maluku andNTT. Figure 4.8a, b display the spatial/regional dimension of the ranking
of policy and social capital categories.
Among different policies, both urban-based and rural-based MSEs prefer linkage
policy, followed by technology policy. Between the two categories of social capital,
the need for coordination is ranked slightly higher than for participation. By regions,
MSEs in all provinces except Sumatera unanimously put the policy to strengthen
linkages at the top and technology policy at the second. In the case of MSEs in
Sumatera, the prioritization is reversed: technology policy at the top, followed by
policy for linkages.
Next is the ranking of components. Within policy for linkages, majority MSE
prefer measures to improve interactions between MSEs and larger firms. However,
almost one third of all categories put policies to develop and strengthen supporting
industries at the highest priority, followed by policies of linkages with larger firms.
The need for supporting industries like packaging and logistics to helpMSEcannot be
overstated.During informal discussionswith surveyparticipants, this issuewas raised
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Fig. 4.8 Ranking of policy and social capital components: spatial/regional dimension. Source
Compiled Survey results
repeatedly by them with some concrete examples. They emphasized the importance
of such industries to secure and improve the supply chains, especially for MSEs
operating in outside Jawawhere transportation costs are expensive (see the testimony
ofMSE red chili in Lhokseumawe andMSE rendang inWest Sumatera, in Appendix
A.6).
Within structural policy, most MSEs clearly view promotion policy as the most
important. Even those who do not rank it at the top, put it as the second priority.
Among them are MSEs in rural areas, member of any cluster, located in Jawa, oper-
ating in the agricultural sector, and not using digital technology. For them, policies
that are aimed at improving the product, process and design are more important than
promotion; that is, improving quality is better than increasing quantity (sales).
In terms of technology policy, majority MSEs prefer measures to enable MSEs
to use e-commerce for sales and improving access to inputs. Note that many of the
respondents in our survey do not have/use digital technology. Lack of a reliable
internet connection is one of the reasons. If utilization of digital technology is to be
encouraged, someMSEs prefer to use it for payment purposes (e-payment). Even for
that to happen, having a reliable internet connection is necessary. This was expressed
particularly by MSEs with limited access to technology (no digital), those operating
in trade and agricultural sector, and MSMEs located in Kalimantan and Sulawesi. A
complete list of ranking of the components in each policy category forMSEs grouped
according to the “structural variables” is displayed in Appendices A.3 and A.4.
Within the coordination category of social capital, the perceptions of majority
MSEs lean towards transparent coordination in order tomake cooperation and collec-
tive action effective. This is due to the fact that exchange of information among
members are highly valued, which is also consistent with the results from the ranking
of components within the participation category, where majority put searching for
information at the top. For the second choice, the results vary between coordination
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for business purposes and for social interactions (informal coordination), although
most lean towards the latter.However, by regional dimension the difference of percep-
tions is quite stark. Urban-based MSEs believe that the most important kind of coor-
dination is the business-oriented one, whereas their counterparts in rural area are of
the opinion that the main purpose of coordination is to get information, hence trans-
parency is valued the highest. Again, this is consistent with the ranking under the
component of participation where searching for information is put at the top priority.
By regions, the only MSEs that value business-oriented coordination as the most
important are those in Kalimantan. Other MSEs in the rest of the country choose
coordination for transparency and for social interactions. What is also very obvious
is that, virtually all MSEs do not favor coordination mandated or conducted through
government regulation.
The strong perceptions of most respondents towards transparency in coordination
and searching for information are also expressed during the informal discussions
after the survey. Many participants even made a request for BI to help organize zoom
sessions like the one we had during the survey, in which MSEs operating in various
sectors in different regions can communicate and interact with each other so that
they are able to acquire information useful for their operations.
Having revealed their perceptions regarding the degree of importance of all
components under policy and social capital, as well as the interplay between the
two, respondents are eventually asked to rank the types of cluster deemed most rele-
vant for cooperation and collective action to improve their performance. It turns out
the preferred choice of most MSE remains the same as in the previous benefit/cost
framework, i.e., a cluster for strictly business purposes. The exceptions are MSEs
run by younger individuals, having relatively large number of employee, currently
not a member of any cluster, and operating in handicrafts, handbags, woven fabric
or tenun, furniture, perfumes, etc. These MSEs put government-mandated cluster
at a highest rank. All in all, most MSEs under study are of the opinion that given
the pre-conditions and interplay of policies and social capital, joining a cluster for a
strictly business interest would be most fitting for improving competitiveness.
Sensitivity Analysis
The robustness of the survey results described above is tested by a series of sensitivity
analysis discussed in this section. The way we conduct the analysis is by changing
(mostly raising) the weight of each element in the component in every level of the
hierarchy and check whether or not the final ranking of the elements in the final
component at the bottom of the hierarchy change. The charts showing the full results
are displayed in Appendix A.5.
In the benefits hierarchy, the ranking of the results is not sensitive to the existing
location ofMSE (thefirst level of the hierarchy inFig. 4.2).On the other hand, the type
of benefits, monetary or non-monetary, matters. If we focus only on the monetary
benefits, the final ranking of perceptions shows the government-mandated cluster
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being the most preferred choice. As the weight of monetary benefits gets bigger,
however, the new ranking replaces the government-mandated with business-oriented
cluster at the top. This is somehow expected; when the focus of MSEs strictly on
monetary revenues or profits, they also tend to emphasize only the business side of
joining a cluster. The reverse outcome, however, applies to non-monetary benefits.
Themore theMSEs feel that such benefits aremore important thanmonetary benefits,
the more they prefer to join the government-mandated than business-oriented cluster
since such a cluster is expected to offer other benefits through government-assisted
programs beyond just pure business benefits. What about the sensitivity of each
element under those two types of benefits? Checking the final ranking of all scenarios
after assigning greater weights to all elements (one at a time), we found no change
in the ranking whatsoever, implying that the results from the benefits hierarchy are
robust.
On the cost side, the sensitivity of operational costs and transaction costs is
extremely small. Raising the weight of each does not alter the outcome that a cluster
for social purposes is viewed by theMSEs to be the costliest. Even if we augment the
weight of every single element under those costs, and also under the location compo-
nent at the third level of the hierarchy, such a conclusion remains intact. The only
exception is when the weight of closer to inputs location (“what if” type, rather than
the actual location) is raised to maximum, in which case a diversification of product
becomes the costliest for them, presumably due to market uncertainty surrounding
the diversified products.
The robust results under the benefits and costs hierarchies above make the final
ranking of the benefits/costs ratio remains the same as in the survey results, i.e.,
joining a business-oriented cluster being the most preferred choice.
Next is the sensitivity analysis for the survey results based on the systemic frame-
work that involves a network. Note that since a network is designed to capture the
feedback effects, there is no such thing as the “bottom level” as in a hierarchy; it
essentially reflects a system where “everything depends on everything,” and hence
the ultimate target to look at in conducting the sensitivity analysis depends on the
specific goal that we are interested in. The analysis presented in the preceding section
hasmade it clear that the specific goal being adopted is the type of cluster (the top part
of Fig. 4.4). Looking at all the runs from augmenting the weight of each component
in every category, there is no single case showing that the ranking of cluster type is
altered; the business-oriented cluster remains the most preferred choice. The results
of the systemic survey are therefore very robust.
Yet, more information can be acquired from the sensitivity analysis of a network
system. Take the case of technology policy for e-finance. Even though business-
oriented cluster continues to be at the top ranking when we raise the weight (or
the importance) of e-finance, the size of the weight actually declines from 0.440 to
0.406, whereas the weight of government-mandated cluster increases from 0.319 to
0.389 (the weight of social-oriented cluster declines, i.e., from 0.241 to 0.205); see
Appendix A.5 for the details. Given the fact that the analysis in the preceding chapter
has shown that e-finance policy is viewed by majority of MSEs to be less important
compared to the other types of technology, this suggests that intensified efforts to
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boost the use of e-finance among MSEs requires a strong support and assistance
from the government, for which government-mandated clusters are seen to be more
appropriate to have. It is difficult to expect MSEs’ shifting to e-finance technology
without government’s assistance, more so than their shifting towards e-commerce.
On the other hand, in the case of policies to create linkages with other MSEs,
the analysis in the preceding chapter has shown that most MSEs see the importance
of such policies. Yet, the sensitivity analysis also shows that raising the weight of
those policies will make government-mandated cluster to take over business-oriented
cluster as the most-preferred choice. Cognizant of the fact that an important message
from the analysis is for policy makers to understand the perceptions and aspirations
of MSEs as part of understanding the prevailing social capital, this suggests that
government’s assistance and supports are needed to foster closer linkages among
MSEs.
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Chapter 5
Case-Based Evidence and Local Custom
Abstract How do institutional arrangements and social capital work, and do cases
on the ground corroborate what has been conceptualized? Some case-based evidence
of MSMEs in different regions provide clues to that question. The role of trust and
local solution to achieve a particular goal, including fostering environmental-friendly
activities, is highlighted. The evidence also helps permeate the practical and moral
thinking of the issues related to MSME operations influenced by local customs and
customary laws.
Keywords Case evidence · Local solution · Circular economy · Local custom ·
Customary law
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Conversation
A: “Small businesses must follow government policy to SHARE responsibility in
the community.”
B: “Treating them as equal partners and HEAR their views would have worked
better for the community.”
A: “Small businesses are too WEAK to find a solution to their problems.”
B: “Given proper environment, they could WAKE up to the challenge and come
up with a solution of their own.”
A: “When land conflict associated with customary law arises, it is difficult to deal
with indigenous communities as their VOICES RANT ON.”
B: “There is nothing better than listening to them and putting ourselves in their
shoes in order to resolve the conflict through honest CONVERSATION.”
Thus far, we have shown the analysis of how interactions of policies, institution,
and social capital affect MSME performance. The survey discussed in the preceding
chapter is intended to validate the framework developed in Chap. 3. Yet, the actual
relationship between policy making, institution, and MSME performance is admit-
tedly more complex than what is conceptualized through the scientific approach. The
spillover is various and, to some extent, unforeseeable. To the extent the application
of scientific approach demonstrated through the survey is our generalization endeavor
of using data and people perceptions as a piece of evidence, it is only natural to ask:
“how do institutional arrangements and social capital actually work to affect small
businesses operations?”More specifically, “do cases on the ground corroborate what
has been conceptualized?”.
Enter the case-based evidence
This is what this chapter is intended to discuss. It basically presents some examples
of cases throughout different regions in Indonesia. Like any case studies, case-based
evidence is often regarded too soft a piece of proof for scientific inquiry. It has a lack
of generalizing power and provides only limited justification to scientific hypotheses.
Yet, as an epistemic strategy in social science, case-based evidence can help permeate
practical and moral thinking. Presented below, the apparent simplicity of historical
narratives and life experience of micro and small enterprises (MSEs) are revealing
and instructive. The role of trust, social bonding, compatibility of local values, norms,
and the power of local solutions come to the fore. Hence, these examples complement
what has been discussed in the preceding chapters.
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TheSection ‘Example ofCases’ is drawing the case-based examples ofMSEsitua-
tions fromdifferent regions. Thenarratives consist of ‘stories lived and told’ involving
real characters (albeit with abbreviated names), dispute resolutions and challenges
within the existing institutional arrangement. They also reflect the prevailing social
capital. The Section ‘Customary Law and Social Capital’ discusses the effect of local
customs and customary law on MSE operations by using selected examples from
MSEs operating in communities that uphold indigenous customs. Insofar around
1000 ethnic groups exist across Indonesia’s 17,000 islands, where 50–70 million
people are considered members of indigenous communities (masyarakat adat), it is
essential to explore the extent to which customs (adat) and customary laws (hukum
adat) affect MSEs operations.
Example of Cases
Inflation Control Through Trust and Local Norms: Rice
Farmers in Manggarai Barat, East Nusa Tenggara
In an attempt to control inflation and keep the rice price stable, in 1968 the Indonesian
government established a special agency called Bulog. The agency was tasked to
manage the nation-wide set of local agency and warehouses at the district level
(Dologs). During a surplus season, they are expected to buy rice from farmers’
cooperative and private traders in order to avoid prices falling below the floor level.
During a dry season, they are tasked to ensure that rice prices do not exceed the pre-
determined ceiling level. This is done by unloading and selling rice in the market.
The policy was intended to protect farmers when price is low and shelter consumers
when price is high. Obviously, the effectiveness of it depends on the supply of rice
that Dologs have in their storage. The problem is, since the offered price is lower
than the market price, farmers are not motivated to sell rice to Dologs, and this can
constrain their operation, hampering the efforts to keep the inflation low (rice price
has the largest weight in the consumer price index). More seriously, it can disrupt
peoples’ access to affordable basic food, especially in regions that often experienced
fluctuations in rice production.
A case in point is in Manggarai Barat district, East Nusa Tenggara. Given that
the policy requiring farmers to sell rice to Dologs often failed to meet the target, an
individual hired by BI (let’s just call him Mr. Y) with a long history and knowledge
about local culture came up with an innovative idea. Having understood well the
characters of local farmers, he used an approach that he labeled ‘a community-based
program of inflation control’ (gerakan inflasi berbasis masyarakat). At first, hemade
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some personal contacts and established close communications with the rice farmers
who were members of MSE clusters in such a way that they gradually developed
trust towards him. This was done by treating the farmers as equal partners rather
than as rice sellers. This trust building—an important component of social capital—
was critical in ensuring that any proposed solution would be accepted by the MSE
members. From the subsequent discussions, it was found that farmers actually had
surplus and capacity to sell some of the rice to Dologs, albeit with a consequence of
receiving lower margin, even after considering various risks of harvest failure (due to
drought, flood, pest, or other diseases). It became clear that a lack of communication
and mutual trust was the key factor that caused the past efforts failed.
It was at this stage that the awareness and understanding of local culture play a
critical role. Realizing the importance of telling stories for the local people to speak
up and reveal their frank opinions,Mr. Y used precisely such an approach and steered
the narratives towards engaging them to show their social responsibility by helping
others. He also understood that timing was important. Therefore, he tried to execute
the plan during the Muslim fasting month (Ramadhan period), when the spirit of
giving and sharing is usually high. Indeed, religion can be an important source of
social capital in some communities, as it provides a framework for morality and
serves as the general principles of behavior. In essence, what Mr. Y tried to do was
to match the community’s norms and social capital with the inflation policy.
Having done all the right things, however, the real challenge was in the implemen-
tation. Since Bulog and Dologs are parts of the government apparatus, administrative
bureaucracy in dealing with them is at times challenging. To overcome this perennial
problem, members of MSE themselves initiated a solution, i.e., organize a meeting
with all the relevant stakeholders, including the local government, in order to get
supports and approvals from them. Long story short, the farmers finally sold some
of the rice to Dologs, supporting Dologs’ operation to keep the local inflation low.
A combination of Mr. Y’s approach to acknowledge local wisdom and to adopt
local peoples’ own-initiative helped make the inflation control policy more effective.
From the regional development perspective, price stability is one of the conditions
for improving peoples’ standard of living, and lower local inflation also contributes
to lower national inflation.
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Transporting rice in Manggarai Barat, East Nusa Tenggara
Meeting Challenges with Trust and Own Solution: Breadfruit
Business in Manokwari, Papua, and Coffee Business in Aceh
Breadfruit is one of the superior local products in Papua. Although not amajor staple,
it is an important supplementary crop for food security and variation in diets. Long
recognized for its potential to alleviate hunger in tropical climates, this underutilized
Oceanic staple crop is widespread in Papua, grown readily in lowland alluvial plains
and fans below altitudes of 1500 m (with rainfall above 1500 mm annually).1
In Manokwari, West Papua, a working group led by a woman entrepreneur, Mrs.
IP, formed an MSE specializing in breadfruit chips (keripik sukun) by mixing it with
locally grown taro leaves. Employing 15 women, the group was part of a church’s
woman organization or ‘persekutuan wanita gereja.’ They produced the breadfruit
1 Some of breadfruit plants are wild, others are cultivated. When it is dried, its nutrients are concen-
trated, making it a high-protein flour alternative. They can also be used for medicine, timber, fuel-
wood, canoe construction, clothing, rope, wrapping and adhesive. Different countries use breadfruit
to produce different products, e.g., chips in Costa Rica, French fries in Puerto Rico, and tostones
(fried green plantains) in the Caribbean.
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chip in aworkshop located in a site provided by the church pastorwithwhom they had
a good relation. BI supported the training components (for processing, marketing,
and book-keeping), and provided subsidy for equipment and to cover the costs of
packaging (which is all done in Jawa). The MSE performed well, able to sell their
products not only within the region but also outside the region, and it served as a
source of income for local women.
But things changed dramatically when their relationship with the newly appointed
pastor went sour. They were told that they could no longer use the workshop site. The
well-known Papua creed, tak kenal maka tak sayang (“don’t know thus don’t like”
or “out of sight, out of mind”) explains why such an unfortunate situation can arise.
Upon the initiative of the group leader, along with the newly recruited women some
members decided to form a new group/cluster. BI supported the group by providing
a production house. Receiving trust from the existing and new members, the leader
and other initiators found no obstacles in recruiting members for the new cluster.
Yet, the group failed to find a synergy, and productivity was below the capacity.
One of the main reasons for low productivity was too few workers attended the
workshop in the production house (high absentee rate). A lack of skill among new
members was another factor, although they gradually solved this problem through
training supported by BI. But it was the low attendance that soon became the most
serious obstacle, especially when they received a large order from inside and outside
the region.Many of thewomen had to stay home to attend children and family’s need.
In some cases, they did not get the permission from their husband to leave home.
Clearly, this was a case of MSE failing to perform well not because of classical
problems such as a lack of financing, high input costs, difficulty in marketing, or
inadequate technology. Instead, it was a time-management issue.
After a long series of discussions, the MSE members themselves came up with
a solution. They decided to adopt a pre-scheduled working time system, where
members have the option to come to work only during certain pre-scheduled
hours/days per week, and payments are made according to the time they spent
in the production house. With such a relatively simple solution, absenteeism fell,
productivity improved, and the production house became fully utilized.
This case demonstrates that, given the prevailing local norms, i.e., family custom
and local creed, when the MSE had to face an unexpected challenge they themselves
could find the solution. The external party, in this case BI, only helped by facilitating
the process to ensure that the system would work. It is also important to note that
the establishment of the new cluster was made possible due to the trust towards the
leader and among members.
In some cases, however, an own solution also emerged out of frustration. Together
with other MSEs in Aceh, a relatively successful small coffee business run by Mr
B had been trying to convince the local authority to help facilitate with a packaging
machine. The reason was simple, many MSEs could not compete because there was
no good packaging facility available in the region. Most of them had to send their
products to Jawa, or they had to buy the materials from Jawa for the packaging. As a
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result, the additional and high transport costs made their products less competitive.
Only after many attempts weremade that a packagingmachine was finally purchased
by the local authority. It turned out, however, the machine was unsuitable for the kind
of packaging required by most MSEs. The authority purchased a wrong machine
without consulting with the MSEs. Out of frustration, Mr. B solved his problem
by selling the products directly through various stores after packaging in Jawa, and
subsequently made a plan to relocate the main part of his business to Jawa and
manufacture the products there (at the time of this writing, the plan is temporarily
postponed due to the Covid-19 pandemic). This is only one of so many examples
demonstrating how the incompatibility of policy with real conditions/problems faced
by MSEs made the well-intended policy ineffective, if not wasteful, and how the
MSEs had to manage to find the solution by their own. At the end, the power of
agglomeration forces in attracting activities to move to the developed region (Jawa)
proved its strength.
Women entrepreneurs promoting their breadfruit chips in Manokwari, Papua
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Quality control of the coffee made by a local SME in Aceh
Replication Through Trust, Local Solution, and Policy
Announcement: Cattle Growers in Kupang, East Nusa
Tenggara
Among farming communities throughout Indonesia, welfare progress is often
measured by indicators such as how many agricultural produce they plant, harvest,
and sell, or how many animals and livestock they own/raised for their meat, fibre,
milk, eggs, or other products. Efforts to help MSEs in such communities used this
as an entry point. In a cattle-growing community, government programs often took
the form of giving calves or cattle. In many cases, the program failed because it
overlooked the importance of feeding capacity as a precondition. Either the produc-
tivity deteriorated due to low quality of cattle and other products, or they ceased the
cattle-growing business altogether by selling the cattle. Only in cases where an inte-
grated approach was used or made by the government as a precondition for receiving
assistance that the productivity could improve.
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Two important issues are notable. First is on sustainability. One of the method’s
most important features of circular economy is the integrated production of animal
and crop where nutrients from agriculture produce are recycled from animal feed to
animal proteins to manure to soils and back to animal feed. The circular nature of the
process is featured by nutrients added to the farm when animals, feed and fertilizer
are used/purchased, offsetting nutrients leaving the farm (as meat and milk). The
key is how to exploit the interaction. The second important issue is with regards to
replicability. Past experience has shown that replication of even a good practice is
not an easy task, since it involves changing people’s mindset.
Through the skill and ability of its leader, Mr. DA, a cattle growing cluster in
Kupang, East Nusa Tenggara, implemented a circular economy and tried to persuade
other cattle growers to replicate it. After trying several approaches to no avail, an
initiative came up from the cluster members themselves. They decided to conduct
sales and cattle trading inside the farm and invite general public to attend. Expecting
to have an impact, the result turned out quite impressive: some farmers in and outside
Kupang were motivated to go into cattle growing business by replicating/adopting
the circular economymethod. This example once again shows that local communities
themselves, not outside experts, are capable of finding an innovative solution.
The way to advocate a new thing also matters. Providing a concrete evidence that
the new method will give the biggest benefit to the locals around the farm can be
effective. This has been shown by the organic horticulture farm owned by Mr. GS
(also in Kupang). His persistence tomake the farm thrives and educate farmers inside
and outside the region about organic farming has been working well, for which he
won the 2018 ‘Young Agripreneur Ambassador’ award.
Similarly, the way a new policy is announced can make a different impact. For
example, in regions where communities are relatively poor and not too accustomed
with the concept of cluster, announcing 50 ha minimum land required for cattle
growingwithout informing the possibility of doing it through a cluster tends to receive
a cold shoulder. None of the local farmers can afford tomeet the set limit individually,
and not all of them have a full understanding about why 50 ha is required. The risk is
therefore real that the well-intended policy can be dead on arrival. Clearly, a policy
becomes ineffective if it is announced without understanding the local conditions
and constraints.2
2 In some cases, advocation in communities that still rely on faith and superstation also requires
drawing the cultural traits of such communities. A notable example is in announcing the risks of
natural disaster. The late Mr. Sutopo Nugroho, widely respected spokesman for Indonesia’s disaster
management agency, could not express it better when asked to reveal the secret of his credibility
in educating the public about such risks: “cultural approach works better than just science and
technology… if people think that it is punishment fromGod, it makes it easier for them to recover”.
88 5 Case-Based Evidence and Local Custom
Cattle grower in East Nusa Tenggara
Circular Economy, Policy Asymmetry, and Vicious Circle
Problem: Rice Farm Cluster in Ngawi, East Jawa, and Banana
Chip Producer in Banten, West Jawa
For a country that produces food waste of up to 300 kg/person annually (2016 data),
and the amount of organic waste in the capital city Jakarta is second highest in
the world (3233 m3, mostly from the agri-food industry), Indonesia can gain enor-
mous benefits from applying a circular economy farming. Converting the waste
into economic value and lowering the greenhouse gas emissions from food waste
are among the key benefits. Yet, these potential benefits failed to persuade a large
number of farmers to shift to a more sustainable farming. The lure of short-term
profits, the asymmetry of policy measures, and a lack of information are all acting
as hindrances.
Led by Mr. A, a community of rice farmers in Ngawi, East Jawa, formed a cluster
to adopt a circular economy method.3 Their products are organic, as no chemical
and toxic residue applied to the soil and plants, and the process produces zero wastes
3 The field research based upon which the narratives are presented here was conducted by one of
our research team members, the details of which can be found in Rishanty (2021)
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where one-third of the waste is used for cattle feed and two-third for fertilizer. In
addition to implementing an environmentally sound method, the productivity of the
farm is around 6 tonnes per hectare, higher than the national average and greater than
the productivity of government-mandated rice clusters that did not apply a circular
economy method.
Numerous obstacles, however, continue to stand in the way of their desire to grow
andmake progress. The application of themethod also fails to spread to other farmers
despite various efforts made by the leaders and members of the cluster. The total
rice production based on an environmentally sound method throughout the region
continues to be low. This has created a vicious circle. The fact that the production is
low causes a stigma against promoting it, especially that rice is considered important
not only economically but also politically (for food security). Indeed, government
supports to the cluster and generally to any efforts to shift towards sustainable farming
have been limited. In addition, the development of major infrastructure has resulted
in dwindling area of fertile land especially in Jawa, and the provision of subsidy for
chemical fertilizer creates an unfair price competition to the circular economy farms.
The government assistance to provide irrigation machine to rice clusters in the area
also creates a negative effect. Allocating only one unit machine in a cluster with a
relatively large number of farmers causes frequent disputes amongmembers—hence
theweakening of social capital–over who has the right to use themachine. The design
of the policy clearly overlooks the local conditions and reality on the ground.
Efforts to spread the concept of circular economy were also tried by the cluster
members through enhancing the skill and knowledge on practical application of
circular economy. They distribute the waste to, and share inputs with, other farmers,
to strengthen the social bonding. Yet, the progress has been rather disappointing.
Given the fact that the whole process of circular economy involves a rather long
supply chain, any efforts to spread the method requires an expanded network of
collaboration with all stakeholders, including with consumers and public at large.
While breaking a fixedmindset and adopting alternative policies that embrace new
development paradigm take time and effort, convincing farmers who has been using
traditional method for years and feel that their products can be threatened (cannibal-
ized) by the new method is equally challenging. It requires a cultural approach and
the trust from other farmers.4
A rather contrasting situation is experienced by a traditional banana chip maker
in Banten, West Jawa. Run by Mrs. AS, a mother of two children, the business
is typical of rural small business facing a vicious circle problem. She encounters
a combination of challenges. Culturally, she prefers not to borrow money, although
given the circumstances the only way to continue the business and support the family
is to get an additional capital. On the other hand, she also knows that getting loan
is difficult due to limited collateral and she does not have the necessary license
4 The role of culture and social capital in linking process and performance of circular economy is
evident in other countries as well. Revealed in Subramanian et al. (2019), the implementation of
circular economy in China has been strongly influenced by the coexistence of Confucian and Taoist
values among workers.
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(known as P-IRT). All these put her in a dilemmatic situation. It is her strong sense
of survival to gain self-realization and the desire to send her children to a higher
education program that finally forced her to take a bank loan, albeit only of a small
amount.
But a series of obstacles continue to block her business progress, ranging from
a lack of proper equipment to raise production capacity and improve the quality,
limited market and low purchasing power, to a lack of knowledge for using different
means of sales including using internet-based e-commerce. Themoney from the loan
was far from adequate to overcome these obstacles and to keep the business afloat,
especially during the pandemic. In such a situation, concerns over environmental
considerations are off the table. Instead, she had to do cost cutting by using cheap
plastic for packaging.With no government support, no steady income, while refusing
to default loan, at the end she had to forgo her desire to send the children to school.
It is hard to imagine what solution is available for her when the response to the
original problem (the need for capital to expand business) creates new problems
of loan repayment and forgone children education, which aggravate the original
problem. She had tried all kinds of initiatives to break the vicious circle, but to no
avail. This is clearly a case where policy intervention and external assistance are
required.
Preparing for transporting products of the community of rice farmers in Ngawi, East Jawa
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Drying process in the traditional banana chip makers in Banten, West Jawa
Customary Law and Social Capital
People invest in social capital within their communities by building a network. So
do members of MSEs when they form a cluster. They invest in social capital to
enable and strengthen collective actions, and to resolve any potential conflicts. In a
community with deep-rooted and long history of customs and tradition, as in the case
of many indigenous ethnic groups throughout Indonesia that still hold indigenous
customs and follow customary law, disputes are settled without invoking the court
that relies on local/state law.
A number of studies exploring the link between laws, customs, and social capital
reveal that business operations in communities with high levels of social capital tend
to comply with a variety of simple legal mandates (Ramseyer, 2015). Obeying traffic
rules, participating in neighborhood safety, and payingmonthly due for specific needs
are few examples of simple legal mandates. Such businesses and communities are
less likely to breach or default on their promises. They also tend not to sue when a
dispute ensues, and in the case of MSE borrowing money, the creditors less often
petition courts for enforcement orders. Debtors in high social capital communities
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also less often file in court for bankruptcy protection. On the other hand, members
of communities and business operations with low levels of social capital are more
likely to default on their contracts, and to litigate and petition a court.
For any business activities, large, medium, small and micro alike, rules and laws
are very important as they are closely tied to the customs and tradition that prevail in
a community. They do not exist in a vacuum. In assigning punishment for the basis
for obedience, laws require the support of custom in order to be compatible with the
need of communities. On the other hand, customs that are required to produce social
accord need the support of rules and laws for members of the community to observe
the practice without hurting the interest of others. The question is, when disputes
arise in a community that holds strong customs and customary laws, which one to
abide to, the state law or the customary law?
The type of court where disputes are heard has a profound influence on the
approach to proving or ascertaining customary law. In many situations, if a case
is unresolved, they bring it to a higher forum, e.g., from hamlet to village level. If
it is still unresolved, they may take it to an even higher level where local/state law
is applied. In case it becomes apparent that customary law should be used, however,
there is a possibility that the judicial officers in higher level court are either not
familiar with the customary law’s provisions (in which case a special statutory provi-
sion may be made), or they unilaterally impose sanctions that violate customary law.
Either way, it could give rise to disharmonious relationship or even conflict, which
is obviously unfavorable for social activities or any business to operate.
To avoid such a scenario, some regions decided to formally incorporate key
components of the customary law into local/state law. Rejang Lebong district in
Bengkulu province is an example. The MSEs we interviewed in that district did not
find serious problems related to this matter because local government had issued a
regulation (PERDANo 4, 2017) to acknowledge and protect the indigenous commu-
nities and their customary lawwhere trial was developed based on the spirit to achieve
agreement and trust, and to be conducted in a transparent way (open to public). Even
the execution is determined by the agreement of the parties involved. When the deci-
sion has been made, the conflicting parties forgive each other, and the execution is
done in a ritual session through a joint prayer.
Another clause in PERDA No. 4 that is highly relevant for MSE operations espe-
cially in the farm-based activities is on land rights. The regulation explicitly recog-
nizes custom-derived land rights (ulayat) of the indigenous communities, consistent
with what is stipulated in Rejang’s customary law.5 The rights, known as ‘taneak
tanaiadalah,’ is a traditional type of land tenure that reflects communal rights based
on community’s custom or tradition. For two decades since the promulgation of Law
5 The area governed by Rejang’s customary law where communities adhered to a system of rules
from leaders who emerged fromwithin the community is called petulai (Siddik, 1980). Historically,
it was the area where the tribe known as suku sembilan settled in groups before Bengkulu area came
under the control of the Majapahit Kingdom, and it was then the Rejang’s customary law began to
be known. Some speculate that a major change in Rejang’s customary laws occurred when after
losing a dispute at court, four ‘princes’ (pangeran) of Majapahit fled to the hinterland in search of
territory to rule.
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No. 5/1979, the indigenous communities lost their customary rights and controls over
their land and other assets. Following the decentralization policy in early 2000s,
particularly after the issuance of Law No. 22/1999 on regional government (later
renewed by Law No. 32/2004), local governments had the opportunity to restore
the rights of indigenous communities. Since then, many district governments saw
themselves confronted with claims related to such rights. The response, however,
varied. Some, including Rejang Lebong, opted to formally integrate customary law
with local law, while others did not.
What matters, however, is the implementation. Even in regions where two types
of law are integrated, when a choice has to be made the enforcement tends to side
with local/state law. Consequently, MSE activities relying on land-use and related
resources have to face uncertainty. Such cases often arise when big plantation or
mining activities take the land area that is part of the traditionally owned territories
of indigenous peoples. Mining, forest and land use management is always tightly
close to local custom and law. For indigenous peoples, land is the main source of
traditional means of subsistence, and for those running small commercial activities it
is the only supporting asset they had. More often than not, disputes over land ended
up being resolved by undermining the customary law. The indigenous peoples’ rights
are respected only to the extent that the state law has formally recognized such rights
(normally done by the issuance of formal title).
Yet, the indigenous customs and tradition are generally more favorable from the
environmental impact perspective. The case in Kalimantan is a notable example.
For generations, Dayak tribes have lived in harmony with nature and used the forest
in a sustainable way. Having intimate connection to nature, they have developed a
farming system that prevents forests from being destroyed by following the guidance
in customary laws before opening forest lands for farming. They plant diverse rather
than single crop, and grow tall trees as forest canopies in order to secure plant and
wildlife habitat and to cycle necessary nutrients.
Similarly in Rejang Lebong, where forest covers about 75 percent of the entire
area, and most members in 65 villages abutting Sumatera’s Kerinci Seblat National
Park are farmers.6 After the government established a national park which also
covered the indigenous community land without consulting them in 1999, local
farmers changed their polyculture farming to monoculture type (e.g., coffee). Only
in recent years the indigenous Rejang rediscovered their heritage by relearning poly-
cultural agriculture practiced by their ancestors. Multiple crops are now grown inter-
spersing coffee bushes with other plants such as kabau and jengkol bean trees (tradi-
tionally used in curries and chili sauce), allowing farmers to make money year-round
6 The Park boasts caves, peaks and crater lake (largest in Southeast Asia) where some 370 bird
species are found. It is also one of the last homes of the endangered Sumateran tiger (Panthera tigris
sumatrae).
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instead of one-time shot during the coffee harvest.7 By rediscovering the old tradi-
tion, local communities gain not only from higher earnings but also from reduced
damages caused by the environmental destruction.
For some MSEs not operating in farm activities, however, they may find the rele-
vance of customary law in contemporary context more limited. Even when the busi-
ness requires inputs from farm products (e.g., processing), the perceptions towards
indigenous customs including the effect of customary law on their operations are no
longer strong. This often occurs in communities where the relevance of customary
law in contemporary contexts has been increasingly questioned. Younger generation,
members of communities who had interactions with outside world, and those with
formal education, are usually more inclined to accept new norms and customs. They
tend to raise new ideas, and stage criticisms of local customs as they view them
impractical.8
MostMSEswho are busy andmore concernedwith their day-to-day activities also
feel that indigenous customs have only little effects on their business operations. This
is evidenced from the results of our additional survey using a questionnaire designed
specifically to include the role of customary law. Respondents in Rejang Lebong
believe that other factors are more important to consider than concerns over the
effect of local customs or customary law. AnMSE producing palm sugar, led by Mr.
SA, expresses their opinion that following the state law is affecting their business
more than abiding to the customary law especially when the non-monetary benefits
are considered. A business-oriented cluster is most preferred for them. On the other
hand, an MSE operating in coffee production, led by Mr. S, perceives that state and
customary laws are both contributing positively to their business operation. In terms
of cluster type, after considering the benefits and the costs, they prefer to have a
government-mandated cluster. Insofar the two types of law in Rejang Lebong have
been integrated, abiding to state law and joining a government-mandated cluster are
not in contradiction with following the customary law.
7 For example, as reported inHendry (2017, each of 600 families in Tik Sirong village planted 10–15
of such trees in the coffee groves. Some also planted petai beans, durian, and bamboo. The latter,
ubiquitous in the past but disappearing in recent years, has multiple home uses and commercial
benefits. It can also shore up soil that might otherwise erode and cause flood (the region suffered
from regular floods since 1995).
8 Indeed, customs are not static. As unwritten rules that people follow in a particular culture or
society, customs evolved and changed overtime. The way they changed, however, should be put
in the historical context of the respective society. As remarked by Siddik (1980), to appreciate the
evolution of Rejang customs and customary laws, one needs to understand the history of Rejang
tribe.
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A small coffee producer in Rejang Lebong, Bengkulu, who sees the importance of both the
customary and the state laws in his business operations
A small palm sugar producer inRejangLebong,Bengkulu,who are not too affected by the customary
law
A similar finding is revealed from our survey in Umi Jaya village, in Sintang
district ofWestKalimantan.Organized and led byMs.AA,MsP, andMs. S,members
of a cluster specializing in traditional woven fabric and cloth are of the opinion that
following the state and customary laws is most beneficial to their operations. Despite
the fact that members of Dayak community where theMSE operates continue to hold
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their traditional customs and tradition, the effect of customary law on their operation
is rather limited. They use the Dayak motifs for their cloth, and they employ local
women from the Dayak community. Interestingly, from the cost questionnaire they
generally perceive that it would be costly (ranked second costliest) to just strictly
abide to customary law. After combining the benefits and the costs, their preferred
cluster is one that is strictly for business, not the government mandated type.
The above result is not surprising. MSEs producing woven cloth in this area
represent a typical small business operation plagued by classical problems. Their
location is remote, far from major urban centers, the infrastructure is poor with
limited access to outside information (let alone technology), and the workers’ level
of education is low. When trying to work on some administrative matters, they have
to struggle with bureaucratic hurdles that cost them time and money. Ironically, they
usually experience this when trying to participate in a government’s offered program.
It is difficult to expect their business to grow in such circumstances.While the product
of this MSE represents a genuine local value of Dayak customs and tradition, hence
unique and rare, their business is paradoxically stagnant. As sales are limited, and
the price is unreasonably low despite the fact that we found their products are sold in
the international market by a third party at a much higher price, workers are unable
to secure steady income. This category of MSEs needs a magic wand that can help
to expand the market network of their products.
A woman weaving in a cluster of Dayak woven fabric makers, Umi Jaya village, Sintang, West
Kalimantan. They strictly use the Dayak motif for their products and employ womenmembers from
the Dayak community
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Protecting indigenous local customs in a system with formalized rules, regula-
tions, and legal systems can also be incompatible in a different way: i.e., the latter is
not supporting the former. Take the case of MSEs operating in culture-related activ-
ities. To the extent culture and cultural heritage are important components of social
capital, preserving them cannot be separated from securing the social capital. Indeed,
preserving cultural heritage has myriad impacts on social capital. For one thing, it
provides space of encounters for social integration and inclusion. But it can also
function as a source of identity and local pride, from which members of community
may cooperate and engage in collective actions.
An example is the artisan-weaving group pioneered and led by a local woman (Ms.
AH) in Nita village of Sikka Regency in Flores island-East Nusa Tenggara. Run all
by women, the self-managed group wanted to protect the ancient organic art of ikat
weaving, which is a valuable heirloom and part of the region’s cultural identity. It
exemplifies the rich cultural heritages of the community. In addition to keeping the
ancient motifs rich of philosophical values, they also adopt the ancient technique and
all materials they use are natural, e.g., the natural colors for dyeing are made from
tea barks, leaves, fruits and roots. While the activities provide income for the local
women, the emphasis of their work has been on the social, cultural, and philosophical
value to preserve the local heritage. Hence, what they produce cannot be considered
as a handicraft; the weavers are not craftswomen or handicraft workers, instead they
are called seniwati (women artist). This may explain why they hardly receive any
assistance from local government, as the official policy and assistance outside farm
activities are traditionally reserved for MSEs producing handicraft.
Yet, protecting cultural heritage, which is exactly what this cooperation has been
trying to do, is an important part of securing social capital. This kind of work by small
cooperation or enterprises producesmultiple advantages beyond just economic bene-
fits. They deserve attention and assistance beyond those mandated by the customary
and commercial laws for MSEs. At the very least, the products of small enterprises
of this type need to be protected by the intellectual property law (HAKI or Hak
Kekayaan Intelektual).
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A woman leader of a self-run artisan-weaving group in the village of Nita, Flores, East Nusa
Tenggara, who emphasizes the need to protect the local cultural heritage
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Abstract Counterbalancing the endogenous forces of agglomeration by addressing
any institutional bottlenecks, and incorporating a set of design principles to ensure
that any proposed policies are compatible with the prevailing institutions are key
to resolving dualism and inequalities. In many cases, they are more important than
finding the right policies. Alas, reforming policies is far more difficult than reforming
institution. Be that as it may, listening and understanding the perceptions of local
people and MSME is a necessary starting point.
Keyword Structure of relations · Decentralization ·Mental bandwidth ·
Behavioral insights · Policy design
The role of dualism in shaping income distribution is well known. So is the role of
spatial dualism in shaping inequality between regions within countries (interregional
inequality). The persistence of such inequality is a major policy concern confronting
social planners in rich and poor countries alike. Indonesia is no exception. Given
its size and archipelagic nature, by international standard the country has a large
inequality between regions.
Inequality also exists in business activities, indicated by the performance gap
between micro-small-medium enterprises (MSMEs) and large businesses. While
across the globe the number of business establishment and unit is dominated by
MSME, the figure in Indonesia is roughlymore-than 99%and over 96%, respectively.
It certainly accounts for the largest share of employment. It is no surprise that a
statement like “MSMEs are the backbone of our economy” has been popular and
frequently raised by policy makers such that it has become a bit of a cliché. With the
outbreak of the Covid-19 that brought the country into recession, the expression goes
even further, i.e., “MSME is the source of economic recovery.” Official statements
and documents to support MSMEs have also been made repeatedly.
There is no deficit of publications and research reports on the issues of interre-
gional inequality and challenges faced by MSMEs. On interregional inequality, a
typical analysis focuses on the unequal allocation of investment between regions
and the lack of regional capacity in utilizing the greater autonomy especially under
a decentralized system. On MSME, many studies spend much time on pounding
how inefficient, unproductive and uncompetitive MSMEs are. They typically show
© BI Institute 2022




a long list of problems faced by MSME, from the issues of financing gap, a lack of
management skills, poor information, marketing difficulty, to the problem of limited
access to technology. The list is usually followed by the suggested policy measures.
While some of the analysis on investment allocation and the limited capacity of
the regions are true, and some of the statements and recommendations about MSME
are valid, many are more myth than reality.
The focus of this book, is different. I avoid reinventing the wheel. On interregional
inequality, the analysis is more on the role of endogenous forces of agglomeration
and the structure of economic relations between regions as part of the prevailing
institution. On MSME, it emphasizes their perceptions towards social capital and
various policies, as well as the interactions between the two. My primary goal is
to raise awareness about the importance of interplay between policies and institu-
tion, and to improve the understanding about the elements and mechanisms of their
interactions. To the extent the highlighted issues are more institutional in nature,
most policy interventions discussed throughout the book are justified because of
institutional failure, more than market failure. To fulfil the stated goal, two tasks
are performed: diagnose the causes underlying interregional inequality, and delve
into problems faced by MSMEs that put constraints on the effectiveness of various
policies.
The evidence of interregional inequality and the persistent challenges faced by
MSMEs, including the performance gap between small and large businesses in
Indonesia are discussed in Chap. 2. Given the fact that numerous policies have
been implemented, it is argued that there is indeed a deviation between policies
and outcome. The bulk of Chaps. 3 and 4 is devoted to the analysis about why such
a gap. While dualistic characteristics of an economy in a large and diverse country
like Indonesia may have been expected, persisting inequality poses risks of growing
discontent and deepened political divides. It could also weaken the country’s growth
prospect. Contrary to the classical economic thinking, based on recent empirical
evidence the contemporary economic thinking confirm that greater inequality tends
to worsen growth.
The fundamental thinking behind the analysis is synopsized in Fig. 6.1. The lure of
external economies of agglomeration is too strong of a “pull” factor for policy inter-
ventions to counter and reduce the divergence between core and periphery. Yet, the
contribution of another factor is no less-substantial, i.e., non-compatibility of policies
with the prevailing institution. Policies, rules and regulations (formal institution) at
the national and regional levels may have been in place to soften the agglomeration
forces and mitigate their effects on inequality. But due to weak enforcement (part of
informal institution), they are deemed ineffective. More importantly, other informal
institutions are also atwork, significantly influence theway the public respond to poli-
cies. They could range from bureaucratic and legislative norms, clientelism, pater-
nalism, patrimonialism, habits, traditions, and codes of conduct, all may interact with
the prevailing social capital (left part of Fig. 6.1). It is subsequently shown through
the institutional model of decentralization in Chap. 3 that the quality of local leaders
also matters.
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Fig. 6.1 Synopsized framework of analysis. Source Author’s own creation
While all these elements of institution play a significant role in determining
whether or not certain policies can be effective, incorporating them into some quan-
titative measures is a daunting task, let alone isolating the precise scale of its effect
from other factors including the agglomeration forces. To the extent the working
of institution is embedded in the regions’ socio-economic structure, intra and inter-
regional multipliers are used to uncover the direct and indirect effects of policy on
interregional inequality. By comparing two scenarios of increased spending, one in
core and another in periphery, asymmetry is revealed; i.e., if increased spending is
made in regions outside Jawa (periphery), the cross-regions benefits accrued to Jawa
(core) are much larger than those received by non-Jawa had the increased spending
been made in Jawa.
Thus, if policy measures ignore the agglomeration forces and the prevailing insti-
tution reflected in the regional structure, both of which are encapsulated in the inter-
regional multipliers, resolving spatial dualism by simply investing in outside Jawa
does not guarantee that it will reduce the interregional inequality. The agglomeration
forces simply offset the forces of dispersion. While improvements in infrastructure
such as transportation can concomitantly support both the dispersion and agglomer-
ation or concentration forces, the accessibility that core regions can have to a wider
distribution system (e.g., through intermodal facility such as port, rail terminal or
airport)may compensate the savings from lower transportation costs for the periphery
to reach a larger market at core regions.
Interactions between policies and institution are also key in the efforts to improve
MSME performance, in which high transaction costs (aside from operating costs)
are at the center of the problems. They constitute not only the official expenses
incurred in business activities (transportation, bureaucracy, network) but also the
unofficial payments and other personalized transactions especially for permit-related
matters. These costs are too burdensome and most of the time cannot be avoided,
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forcing many MSMEs to remain informal and small. As a result, low productivity
and competitiveness continue to plague their operations.
Potential countervailing forces, however, can be created to offset–albeit not avoid
entirely–such high costs. Insofar spatially concentrated activities have the potential
to benefit from agglomeration economies, MSMEs can also gain similar economies
if they cooperate and act collectively in clusters. The connection between spatial
concentration and firm’s competitiveness has been also firmly established in Porter’s
model of competitive advantage.
Whether the benefits of operating in a cluster can exceed the transaction costs
depends on the characteristics of cluster operation. These characteristics are deter-
mined by the quality ofMSMEparticipation and coordination in cooperation, and the
effectiveness of collective actions amongmembers. The quality of these participation
and coordination reflects the prevailing social capital, which is an important element
of institution. The mechanisms explaining how institution including social capital
work jointly with policies to affect MSME performance are captured in a framework
developed in Chap. 3. Based on that framework, a set of hierarchy and a network of
interrelations among policies, social capital, and types of cluster are constructed, and
used to compose questionnaires for the surveydiscussed inChap. 4. Themain purpose
of the survey involving 121+micro and small enterprises throughout Indonesia (only
1 ‘medium’ enterprise included in the survey) is to capture their perceptions towards
various problems they face that may have caused the disconnect between policies
and the outcome.
The reason we rely on perceptions is because they are the ultimate lens through
whichMSME respondents view reality and operatewith versions of that reality.What
they operate iswhatmatters here. Even if there is a gap between perception and reality
(“wrong” perceptions), that is the way human operates.WhatMSMEs perceive is not
necessarily what their eyes and ears tell them, but it is what their brain makes them
see and hear, based upon which they make decisions to produce, diversify, use digital
and green technology, export, cooperate, join a cluster, etc. It is because of relying
on perceptions that a specific approach of pairwise comparisons and the measure of
inconsistency are used to authenticate the answers to the questionnaires.
The hierarchy framework is designed to distill MSMEs’ current conditions and
their experience or aspirations for cooperation in a cluster, while the network is
constructed to delineate the role of—and the interplay between–policies and social
capital to determine the type of cluster deemed most relevant for cooperation and
collective actions. Insofar the goal is to help improveMSMEs’ competitiveness, three
policy categories are tested, linkage policy, structural policy, and technology policy.
The social capital consists of participation and coordination intended to make the
cooperation for collective actions works more effectively.
Given the location, it is revealed from the hierarchy-based survey that monetary
benefits especially from sales are viewed bymostMSMEs to be greater than the non-
monetary benefits, based upon which the business-oriented type of cluster is most
preferred. Among the non-monetary benefits, majority MSMEs feel that acquiring
information is most important, indicating their desire to learn and improve. From
the cost side, operating cost is considered most burdensome, and the costliest type
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of cluster is one intended mainly for social interactions. Comparing the benefit and
the cost results, the preference towards business-oriented cluster remains at the top.
Interestingly, although a government-mandated type of cluster is perceived highly
beneficial, for someMSMEsespecially those operating in trade andusingdigital tech-
nology, such an option is viewed as allowing government controls and intervention
that could hinder their business operations. Hence, it is perceived as very costly. As
a result, the resulting benefit/cost ratio of the option is relatively small. This under-
pins the importance of measuring both the upside and the downside associated with
people’s perceptions.
More central to our hypothesis is the network-based survey to evaluate the inter-
play between policies and social capital in determining the cluster type. Over half of
MSMEs confirm that policy is not what matters the most to make the cooperation for
collective action effective; the role of social capital is critical. Majority of rural-based
MSMEs and those that have received assistance from BI for a longer-than-average
period have the same view. Even among those who put a higher weight to policy
cannot dismiss the importance of social capital.
Although the results vary depending on the characteristics and spatial dimension
of MSMEs, linkage policy is perceived as the most important as it is expected to
strengthen the linkages between MSMEs and larger firms, among MSMEs them-
selves, and to enable MSMEs to benefit from the products and services of supporting
industries. On the latter, a lack of packaging industries has been frequently expressed
by many respondents outside Jawa as among the most serious bottlenecks. Within
social capital, consistent with the results from the hierarchy-based survey, active
participation especially for acquiring information through transparent and informal
coordination is ranked the highest. This is expressed particularly strongly byMSMEs
operating in the rural area. Those located in Jawa, Sulawesi, Papua,Maluku andNTT,
and those that have received assistance from BI for a longer-than-average period also
share a similar view.
It is discernible that the costs of undermining the forces of agglomeration and
ignoring the role of social capital based on the prevailing institution can be enormous.
Investing in periphery without considering the structure and interactions between
regions could paradoxicallywiden the interregional inequality, and assistingMSMEs
by simply allocatingmoremoneywithout considering local characteristics could lead
to problems and waste while generating only limited improvements. Direct provision
of credit and other non-financial assistance may fail to deal with the underlying
causes of the problems faced by MSMEs. They may substitute for the undeveloped
or missing markets but cannot overcome the institutional failure. Where regions
thrived and MSME succeeded, they might have achieved it in spite of, not because
of, government assistance.
To complement the analysis and to corroborate what has been conceptual-
ized, some case-based evidence highlights the importance of understanding local
wisdom, mutual trust, and listening directly to the MSMEs about their problems and
constraints, before making and announcing new measures. In some cases, external
interventions are not needed. They could be even undesirable in cases whereMSMEs
themselves know how to solve but unable to do so due to a myriad of tasks they have
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to deal with day by day. What external parties could do is to facilitate a condition
under which own-solution is encouraged and could be implemented. Only when the
MSMEs face a vicious-circle problem–where the response to the original problem
creates new problems which aggravate the original one–that an external assistance
is needed.
The evidence of success fromworking together and solving problem among them-
selves also suggests that external parties should avoid giving a cliché advice such
as “adopt new technology” or “work harder” etc. Those advices maybe suitable
under certain conditions but too difficult to execute because of a lack of supporting
means (for adopting new technology) or due to behavioral insights that reflect the
mental bandwidth of those we intend to help (for working harder). ManyMSMEs are
perfectly aware that working harder will boost productivity and competitiveness, but
due to other tasks they are unable to exert self-control or ‘pay attention’ on working
as hard as they themselves would like to; they can do all the tasks including working
harder at once only if those tasks are not demanding and relatively easy to do. After
all, exerting self-control is not physiologically effortless. It requires an allocation
of attention to the effortful mental activities similar to ‘slow thinking’ or ‘System
2’ which are often associated with the subjective experience of agency, choice and
concentration (Kahneman, 2011). Enticing members to “work through hard things
together” would be more helpful as it could better counter most adverse conditions.
Considering local wisdom also implies respecting local customs and tradition
that prevail in a community where MSMEs operate. That includes respecting the
community’s customary lawswhen such laws exist. In a country like Indonesia,where
millions of people are considered members of indigenous communities and many
of them have their own customary laws, MSMEs operating in those communities
should be able to do their business with legal certainty. When the customary laws
are not entirely in sync with the state laws, or when the disputes related to the rights
of indigenous communities arises, e.g., over the forest and land use, absent of such
a certainty could jeopardize their operations. Yet, for some MSMEs and indigenous
peoples, land could be their only source of income from running small commercial
activities or even their only means of subsistence. Incorporating important clauses
of the customary laws into the state laws and harmonizing the two, as was done in
several regions throughout the country, is the first step in a right direction.
In sum, counterbalancing the endogenous forces of agglomeration and incor-
porating a set of design principles into policies to ensure their compatibility with
the prevailing institutions are a lot more important than just allocating budget to
periphery regions and providing financial assistance to small businesses. To reduce
dualism, it is imperative to understand the structure of interregional interactions and
institutional arrangements, and to delve into the internal problems of MSMEs by
digging up their perceptions. Those perceptions reflect the prevailing social capital.
Any efforts to help MSMEs should take those perceptions into account. Just listen
to them, so we will understand better about why they choose as they do and what
motivates their decisions and actions.
Finding the right policies is crucial and must continue, but without considering
the agglomeration forces and the behavioral insights of MSMEs, those policies are
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likely to have limited reach and effectiveness. The importance of design principles
in policy that matches the prevailing institutions and public perception is second to
none.
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Appendix
A.1 Ratios Scales in a Hierarchy (AHP Approach)
AHP uses the ratio scales (relative measurements) derived from paired comparisons.
Ratio scale is a fundamental kind of number amenable to performing basic arith-
metic operations of addition and subtraction within the same scale, multiplication
and division of different scales, and combining the two operations by meaningfully
weighting and adding different scales to obtain a unidimensional scale. They are
particularly useful to capture people’s perceptions (Azis, 1990; Azis & Isard, 1996).
Let A1, A2, A3, …, An be n elements in a matrix within a hierarchy. The pairwise
comparisons on pairs of elements (Ai, Aj) are represented by an n-by-n matrix A =
(aij), where i, j = 1, 2, 3,…, n. Define a set of numerical weights w1, w2, w3, …, wn
to reflect the recorded comparisons based on the inputs from the respondents. We
can write:
The scales used in the pairwise comparisons in AHP are based on Saaty’s scaling
system (Saaty, 1994), i.e., from 1 to 9. Since every row is a constant multiple of the
first row, A has a unit rank. By multiplying A with the vector of weights w,
Aw = nw (A1)
To recover the scale from the matrix, the following system ought to be solved:
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(A − nI)w = 0 (A2)
from which nontrivial solution is obtained if and only if det(A − nI) vanishes, i.e.,
the characteristic equation of A. Hence, n is the eigenvalue and w is the eigenvector
of A. Given that A has a unit rank, all its eigenvalues except one are zero, and the
trace of A is equal to n.
If each entry in A is denoted by aij, then aij = 1/aji holds (reciprocal property),
so does ajk = aik/aij (consistency property). By definition, aii = ajj = 1 (comparing
two same elements). Therefore, if we are to rank n number of elements, i.e., A is of
the size n-by-n, the required number of inputs (from the paired comparison) is less
than n2; it is equal to only the number of entries of the sub-diagonal part of A. That
is, if there are three elements in a particular level of a hierarchy, only three pairwise
comparisons are required.
To the extent the precise value of wi/wj is hardly known because the pairwise
comparisons that we have is only an estimate (from respondents’ perceptions), there
are obviously perturbations involved. Note that the reciprocal property still holds but
the consistency property does not. By taking the largest eigenvalue denoted by λmax,
ApWp = λmax · Wp (A3)
where Ap is the actual (or the given) matrix perturbed frommatrixA. Although (A1)
and (A3) are not identical, if wp is obtained by solving (A3), the matrix whose entries
are wi/wj is still a consistent matrix; it is a consistent estimate of A, although Ap
itself does not need to be consistent. Ap will be consistent if and only if λmax= n.
As long as the precise value of wj/wi is not given, which is common in a real case
situation due to human bias in expressing perceptions, λmax is always greater-than
or equal-to n. Consequently, a measure of consistency can be derived based on the
deviation of λmax from n.
When more than two elements are compared, the notion of consistency can be
associated with transitivity condition: if A1 >A2 and A2 >A3, then A1 >A3. It should
be clear that in solving for w, the transitivity assumption is not strictly required; the
inputted comparisons do not have to reflect full consistency. Yet, it is equally clear
that the resulting matrix and the corresponding vector remain consistent. It is this
consistent vector w that reflects the priority ranking of the elements in each level of
the hierarchy. Hence, the elements in each level are pairwise compared with respect
to elements in the level above it, and the resulting vector for the bottom level reflects
the final results.
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Fig. A.1 Linear hierarchy. Source Author’s own creation
Fig. A.2 Feedback network. Source Author’s own creation
A.2 Ratios Scales in a Network (ANP Approach)
AHPdoes not recognize two-way dependence or feedback effects like in the influence
diagram (statistical decision analysis based on Bayes theorem). Since in a feedback
situation the elements in each level can depend on elements in other levels as well as
on each other, the system forms a network rather than a hierarchy. When a solution
is derived, they are more stable than the solution from a hierarchy because one can
consider the influence on, and survival in, the face of other influences.
Figs.A.1 andA.2 show thedifference between ahierarchy and anetwork.Note that
to be consistent with the narratives in Chap. 4, the term ‘level’ we use in a hierarchy
is substituted by the term ‘categories’ in a network (denoted by C1, C2, C3, and C4),
and the contents of each category are called ‘components’ or ‘elements.’ In Fig. A.2,
the components in the parent category C1 and the components to be compared can
be in different categories; e.g., a directed link appears from the parent category C1
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Fig. A.3 Supermatrix of a
hierarchy
Fig. A.4 Supermatrix of a
holarchy
to the other categories (C2 and C3). This is the case of “outer dependence.” In other
cases, the components to be compared can be in the same category, in which case the
category is linked to itself and a loop link appears. This is called “inner dependence.”
While in AHP a set of pairwise comparison matrices are used, in ANP we need a
large matrix called the “supermatrix” that contains a set of sub-matrices. The “super-
matrix” captures the influence of components in a network on other components in
that network. Denoting a category by Ch, where h = 1,… m, and assuming that it has
nh components eh1, eh2, eh3 …,ehmh, Fig. A.3 shows the corresponding supermatrix:
When the bottom level affects the top level of the hierarchy, a form of network
known as holarchy is formed, the supermatrix of which looks like the one displayed
in Fig. A.4.
Notice that the entry in the last row and column of the supermatrix in Fig. A.3
is the identity matrix I corresponding to a loop at the bottom level of the hierarchy.
This is necessary when a hierarchy is viewed within the context of supermatrix. On
the other hand, the entries in the first row and last column of a holarchy in Fig. A.4
are nonzero, indicating that the top level depends on the bottom level.
In general, when feedback influences are present as in Fig. A.2, the supermatrix
is formed by laying out all the categories and all the components in each category
both vertically on the left and horizontally at the top as in Fig. A.5. (Fig. A.6).
The typical entry of the above supermatrix is:
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Fig. A.5 Supermatrix of a
network
Fig. A.6 Entry in the
supermatrix of a network
The entries of sub-matrices inWij are the ratio scales derived from paired compar-
isons performed on the components within the categories themselves according to
their influence on each component in another category (outer dependence) or compo-
nents in their own category (inner dependence). If the categories influence and be
influenced by other categories, paired comparisons on the categories are to be made
as well. Like in a hierarchy, in a network the judgments are also elicited, from which
ratio scales are derived. The resulting unweighted supermatrix is then transformed
into a matrix each of whose columns sums to unity to generate a stochastic superma-
trix. The derived weights are used to weight the components of the corresponding
columnblocks (cluster) of the supermatrix, resulting in aweighted supermatrix which
is also stochastic. The stochastic nature is required for the reasons described below.
Since a component can influence the second component directly and indirectly
through its influence on some third component and then by the influence of the latter
on the second, every such possibility of a third componentmust be considered. This is
captured by squaring the weighted matrix. But the third component also influences
the fourth, which in turn influences the second. These influences can be obtained
from the cubic power of the weighted supermatrix. As the process is performed
continuously, we will have an infinite sequence of influence matrices denoted by
Wk , k = 1, 2 …. The question is, if we take the limit of the average of a sequence
of N of these powers of the supermatrix, will the result converge, and, is the limit
unique? It has been shown that such a limit exists given the stochastic nature of the
weighted supermatrix (Saaty, 2001). There are 3 cases to consider in deriving Wk:
(A1) λmax = 1 is a simple root and there are no other roots of unity in which case
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given the nonnegative matrix W is primitive, we have limk→∞ Wk = weT , implying
that it is sufficient to raise the primitive stochastic matrix W to large powers to yield
the limit outcome; (A2) there are other roots of unity that cause cycling, in which case
Cesaro sum is applied (Cesaro’ Summability stipulates that if a sequence converges
then the sequence of arithmetic means formed from that sequence also converges to
the same limit as the sequence; see Saaty, 2001); and (A3) λmax = 1 is a multiple
root, in which case the Sylvester’s formula with λmax = 1 is applied.
In practice, one simply needs to raise the stochastic supermatrix to large powers
to read off the final priorities in which all the columns of the matrix are identical
and each gives the relative priorities of the components from which the priorities of
components in each category are normalized to one. The powers of the supermatrix
do not converge unless it is stochastic, because only then its largest eigenvalue is
one. When a convergence is not achieved (a cyclic case) the average of the succes-
sive matrices of the entire cycle gives the final priorities (Cesaro sum), in which the
limit cycles in blocks and the different limits are summed and averaged and again
normalized to one for each cluster. In other words, one has to compute the limit prior-
ities of the stochastic supermatrix according to whether it is irreducible (primitive
or imprimitive [cyclic]) or reducible with one being a simple or a multiple root and
whether the system is cyclic or not. At any rate, raising the stochastic supermatrix
to large powers gives what is known as the limiting supermatrix.
In sum, there are 3 supermatrices to generate: (1) the originalunweighted superma-
trix of column eigenvectors obtained from pairwise comparison matrices of compo-
nents; (2) the weighted supermatrix in which each block of column eigenvectors
belonging to a category is weighted by the priority of influence of that category,
rendering the weighted supermatrix column stochastic; and (3) the limiting super-
matrix obtained by raising the weighted supermatrix to large powers. We apply this
approach to generate the ratio scales and the ranking of each components shown in
Fig. 4.2.
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A.3 Systemic Survey Results: MSME Characteristics
Source Compiled Survey results
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Source Compiled Survey results
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A.4 Systemic Survey Results: Spatial/Regional Dimension
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Source Compiled Survey results
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A.5 Results of Sensitivity Analysis
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A.6 Samples of Live Interviews with Selected Respondents
(Unabridged)
MSME #1: Lhokseumawe
[MSME #1] We happen to be among the largest red chili farmers in our area, and
the guidance we receive from Bank Indonesia is wonderful. What I’d like to ask is
that, during this pandemic period, all necessities such as medicines and fertilizers for
farming have doubled in their prices. As a result, we are all constrained in terms of
capital because of soaring costs. Second, in terms of marketing, we sell our products
quite far,with the nearestmarket beingMedan, going all theway toPekanbaru, Jambi,
Batam and Padang. The daily yield here is 100 tons during the harvest season. How
do we respond to the need for transportation?We need help from related government
agencies to address the needs of farmers here.
[Azis] We’ve encountered many similar cases—so that issue occurs not only in your
place—and farmers end up selling their products to middlemen. But the problem is
always amatter of price, becausemiddlemen are usuallymore capable of determining
prices. It is recommended that farmers join into a kind of cluster or farmer group in
order to strengthen their bargaining position, and maybe even eliminate the need to
bargain.
[MSME #1] We have planned that here. This year, we will open an auction market.
From around the 200 households in our village, many are chili farmers. Starting this
year, we are embracing them in order to hold sales in one place. We have received
assistance from Bank Indonesia in the form of the warehouse which we will use to
hold those auctions. The problem is that, in our area there are a lot of collecting
agents who become pawns of agents or middlemen in the city. We need the local
Trade Agency to do something about this. Maybe you or Bank Indonesia and others
can inform them about this.
[Azis] The most that we can do is to inform Bank Indonesia of this, because we are
not in the position to make policies. However, we will most assuredly inform them.
Thank you very much for your input.
MSME #2: West Sumatra
[MSME #2] My business is rendang. Since our inception in 2018, we were fostered
by Bank Indonesia. Although rendang is already well-known as an authentic Indone-
sian food, CNN has covered it (CNN, 2017), and Chef Gordon Ramsay and National
Geographic have visited (National Geographic, 2020), the first challenge is in the
production. It must be competitive. It is closely related to the survey we are having
today; we feel that cooperation between SMEs is very important. Government regu-
lations or directives are also quite important. In fact, our products have high export
demand, most of which come from Saudi Arabia, not for their residents but for
Indonesians visiting for Hajj or Umrah. Helped by Bank Indonesia last September,
we finally got a buyer. But the hurdles are similar to those mentioned by the other
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MSMEs earlier: licensing, such as BPOM. We were also invited to scale-up, but
this is another challenge in itself. It is necessary to do some kind of research or
special treatment for MSMEs. Because we hear stories from China, where MSMEs
have sufficient raw material and packaging. When they receive orders, the govern-
ment helps facilitate them. Here, we are not like that. This should become food for
thought. Take our case. We got an export order. Since rendang is a high-risk food
with meat ingredients, the standards are quite strict, especially as some countries
do not allow Indonesian meat. So, we can’t even go to Saudi Arabia using our own
meat, the meat has to come from Australia. Then, the second challenge is about
human resources. We can produce 3, 4 or 5 tons. But when orders for the hajj season
suddenly come, for example for two menus such as tuna rendang and meat rendang,
the orders reached 62.5 tons. So it is important to work with similar businesses as
stated in today’s survey questionnaire, because it is impossible for one SME alone to
meet the export order of 62.5 tons. At our place, the existing machines cannot meet
that order, unless we have the money to invest in a large equipment that can auto-
matically make one ton of rendang a day. For SMEs this is not possible. To deal with
human resources problems, we need clusters, so thatMSMEswith similar businesses
can have common standards and work collectively, and they can meet export needs.
Then, the third challenge is the market, the market where we sell and the market
where we buy rawmaterials. This is just as important. Because MSMEs are different
from big businesses, we have to choose: developing products first means we leave
market development for later, or vice versa. For example, we have already pocketed
an order of approximately 150 tons, but production is experiencing problems, and
this is related to the fourth problem, namely capital, just as other MSMEs have stated
earlier. For us, because rendang is different from crafts, the COGS is almost 70%
and only 30% of the price is profit. So if you want to produce 150 tons of rendang,
the funds required are quite large, above 17 billion rupiah in capital. Hence, even if
production is resolved, human resources can be fulfilled, the market is there, we face
difficulties in capital. Even with the support from the National Economic Recovery
Program and cooperation from one of the state banks that focuses on exports and
trade, we are still constrained by collateral. Perhaps banks see the risk since exports
are considered high risk, and there may be complications between countries. But we
MSMEs are told to produce quality products for the world market. We have done all
that and prepared the products and human resources. We have increased our product
quality and qualified the human resources. Once we produced the product, we must
find the market. We have found the market by ourselves, but then what? So, even if
we get the order, don’t leave MSMEs alone. We need the government to help us with
the capital problem. Even though we already received purchase orders, buyers still
ask for some requirements that are difficult to fulfill, and it takes a lot of capital to
take care of them.
[Azis] Thank you for your valuable input. Just to make sure—and you must have
filled out the questionnaire—from the aforementioned problems, marketing is not
too problematic, and human resources can be resolved, right?
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[MSME #2] No problem, sir, because no one in the world can make rendang better
than West Sumatra. That’s the first principle.
[Azis] That’s right. So the problem now is production if there are so many orders.
My question is, are there other MSMEs that produce rendang like you?
[MSME #2] We have a cluster.
[Azis] Is there enough?
[MSME #2] The amount is sufficient. However, to operationalize the cluster requires
capital.
[Azis] The core problem is money, then?
[MSME #2] That’s right. Collectively, we have orders of 150 tons a year, but we have
difficulty in managing the cash flow. There’s also this problem: in rendang industry,
we are actually growing, and since 2017, we have a movement called “Indonesians
Spicing the World”. CNN called rendang the most delicious food in the world, but
it turns out we lagged behind and did not follow up the world’s recognition with
real action. In 2018, I was motivated to make rendang better, because in that year
I heard that Indonesians going on the Hajj pilgrimage were given rendang made in
Thailand. We also have innovative products like the one used by Gordon Ramsay.
He made scrambled eggs from rendang paste, so we are now creating rendang not
just with meat. Rendang can also be included in dim sum, can be topped with tuna
rendang, and rendang scrambled egg and steak. Yesterday, we took part in a webinar
with several buyers, including those from the Netherlands. Due to the pandemic
era, people’s consumption patterns are starting to change. Usually B2B buyers go
to big business, but now it has started to change and their sales are in small sachets.
So housewives, small families, who are returning and staying at home are looking
for food or ingredients that they can make at home. Apart from building bonding
between families, this is also a practical solution.
[Azis] If I may ask, what about the packaging?
[MSME #2] We have no problem with packaging.
[Azis] You mean you package yourself?
[Rishanty] You import packaging from China, right?
[MSME #2] We import some packaging from China, usually plastic retorts.
Indonesian plastics cannot be retorted. So the plastic retorts must come from China.
[Azis] For packaging from Indonesia, is it from West Sumatra or Java?
[MSME #2] All raw materials are from Sumatra, except meat. The packaging is
imported, Prof.
[Azis] All imported packaging?
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[MSME #2] Yes, you can buy small-scale retorts in Indonesia, but when you need 1
million pieces, you have to import.
[Azis] Where’s the Indonesian packaging from?
[MSME #2] From Bandung.
[Azis] As I thought.
[MSME #2] Yes.
[Azis] Many MSME friends have really complained about this. I myself always hear
Bandung as the answer.
[MSME #2] Because we are talking on a fairly large scale, friends with similar
businesses recommend that if you build a factory please build it not in Jakarta. Make
it in Central Java, or here, because human capital is also cheaper, and the distance to
raw materials is also closer.
[Azis]Why do you need to order from China if in large amounts? Is there not enough
supply from Indonesia?
[MSME #2] The issue is price, Prof. Here, we don’t have a direct link to the supplier.
If we shop in Bandung, one thousand to ten thousand pieces is still feasible. Above
that, the price is too high. Our costs can be reduced if we go directly to China.
[Azis] Thank you very much for your input.
[Rishanty] Excuseme, can I ask?Regarding capital difficulties, have you tried fintech
or crowdfunding?
[MSME #2] Not yet. That may be the last solution we will take if we really get stuck.
We are looking for bigger investors.
[Rishanty] Thank you.
MSME #3: Central Java
[MSME #3] From the first survey to today’s survey, I notice that all of the issues are
related. And for our cluster, we synergize everything, from the social aspect to trade
aspect. In relation to capital, online loans and fintech for MSMEs are very unlikely
for us to make profit. So, if we may suggest, perhaps state-owned banks can provide
such loans for us with special interest rates like KUR [Kredit Usaha Rakyat]. Here,
we foster around 1500 rice farmers. With regards to marketing, there have so far
been no significant obstacles, both locally and internationally. We export organic
rice to America, Singapore, Malaysia and several other countries. The government
policies surrounding us are linked with the Agricultural Agency. If we refer to the
existing data and the land area that we observe, we find that in real, authentic terms,
Indonesia has a food surplus, and Indonesia’s ability to export rice is very good.
But why do we import a lot of rice? This is a big question for me. We hope the
government could understand better about the lower levels of society, so that they
can reach and understand the problems of all farmers so that the government can
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empower and advance the economic conditions of farmers and the community. The
role of government is very important in the social issues.
[Azis] If I may know, where do you come from?
[MSME #3] I’m from Central Java.
[Azis] This is interesting. In your opinion, if fintech is made easier by using a lower
interest rate, that will help?
[MSME#3] Yes, that’s right. Because what we know is that private fintech is growing
rapidly. But if we do the calculations, the interest from this fintech is very high. So it
can’t be balanced with what we have fought for. For MSMEs to grow and develop,
it is impossible not to have loans from banks. Online loans such as fintech have not
been significant forMSMEs, because currently fintech is only for individuals. If there
is a special fintech from SOE banks, this might help, with a special interest rate for
MSMEs like the KUR.
[Azis] Thank you for your input.
MSME #4: Maluku
[MSME #4] What is bureaucratic costs, Prof?
[Azis] Bureaucracy usually has to do with rules and regulations.
[MSME #4]What about unofficial rules? As in the case of costs that are not officially
listed. Is that part of bureaucracy, Prof?
[Azis] That can be part of it. Or, for example, the government provides help to
promote your product. Your business can participate in exhibitions, but to do so, you
have to fill in many, many pages of forms and pay high administrative costs.
[MSME #4] Okay. Thank you, Prof.
[Azis] Do you sell the products in Maluku?
[MSME #4] Yes. I am native toMaluku but live in Jakarta. I actually have a story.We
lost our woven cloths for a hundred years. I wasn’t originally in theweaving business.
But I felt the loss, and I looked again.With the help of Bank Indonesia, I finally found
the original Maluku weaving instruments and motifs. Now, Bank Indonesia has built
a weaving house in Maluku. Every month I come home to keep it up, because we
are more concerned with preserving our culture, returning and reintroducing our lost
cloth, and for the local people to return to weaving.
[Azis] Did you find it difficult? If it has been long that gone, it means that the original
weavers are no longer there.
[MSME #4] Very, very difficult, Prof.
[Azis] So how to find new weavers?
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[MSME #4] It’s very difficult, Prof. But because I made a promise to do something
for my birthplace, I didn’t give up. Originally, we were only able to obtain black and
white photos. That’s all the traces left of it. I looked for it everywhere, including in
Jakarta, to the fabric museum, to weaving experts, and everyone said nothing was
left, Prof.
[Azis] Not even in the local university?
[MSME #4] Nothing, Prof. So everyone said there isn’t anything, but I was sure that
there must be something left, because in Maluku there was a big kingdom, and it’s
impossible that we didn’t have our own cloths and fabrics. It’s impossible. I happen
to be part of the Sultanate family, so I come home for every traditional ceremony
and always post about it and make writing competitions. In Jakarta, I held a bloggers
competition and brought the bloggers to Maluku. So, from there, from the writings
of the bloggers that I brought with me, it was finally discovered that we do have our
own cloth. They posted photos of the ceremonies in Maluku—imagine, during our
traditional ceremonies, people wear Javanese and Sumatran cloth. So I looked for
cloths that used local weaving techniques, and there was none. What strengthened
my will to rediscover them was our village elders. The first valid, actual data I got
was from elders whowere 80-85 years old, who testified that they had seen aweaving
tool. So, I finally searched and found it.
[Azis] Iwas once invited byKhairunUniversity to give a lecture, but I don’t remember
whether there was a cultural or history department at the university? Maybe those
friends there know, or at least the lecturers can help.
[MSME #4] Yes, now everyone is helping. Recently, I found another motif, and I
brand our cloth as a treasure. The branding is like that. So we have the old motifs and
the one I just found came from a lecturer at Khairun University. So he sent data that
there was this weaving tool during these years. He sent me photos, and I collected
the data. Finally, he sent a photo of the motif. It was from the Leiden Museum. So
we are now producing a new motif. Weaving is actually very difficult, especially
for the young people in our village. At first, the youth didn’t see it as a job, but as
our responsibility to restore our lost culture. We can’t use someone else’s culture,
we have to have our own. Isn’t that right sir? At first, I was excited, but I struggled
to use the weaving tools. If the comb was a little bit off, I didn’t know what to do
and whom to ask. In other regions, such as Lombok, you can go to a grandmother
or grandfather who can look at the equipment. For us, we have nothing at all. So, if
the thread breaks, the young people go home because it takes weeks to fix it. Really
hard.
[Azis] But if it succeeds, it will be amazing.
[MSME #4] At first I had to ask a lot of questions because I started from zero. I had
to ask what the system is. Lots of suggestions. People asked me to bring one cloth,
and they would pay for it. Generally, that’s the way it is in the cloth business. But it
wasn’t possible for us, because it can take months to make one cloth. Finally, I took
the initiative. I have to pay first. So, I pay the weavers every month even before they
138 Appendix
finish any final results. Luckily, my husband is very supportive. But after some time,
it wasn’t sustainable either on our finances. Finally, Bank Indonesia was really eager
to help us. He said that our business is still a baby, and it is impossible for a baby
to eat by itself. It must be helped and guided to grow up. From then on, we finally
worked together with the schoolteachers of the young weavers. We studied in Jepara.
So, we made a pact. Because we couldn’t produce without assistance, the teachers
finally helped to weave the cloths and to sell them inMaluku. The young weavers are
paid a salary so they want to come to study. At first it didn’t work, but thankfully it’s
now going more smoothly, even though the number of students decreased from 30
to only 6. But now they produce even more results. So it was like natural selection.
Finally, we found young weavers who are able to produce cloth in a month. Although
that speed is nothing compared to the case in other places, I am very proud. To me,
these young weavers are warriors.
[Azis] I completely agree. This is similar to the case when I went to Flores to see
women weaving. They also don’t see it as a business but as a way to maintain their
cultural values. That is priceless. It cannot be judged by money alone. In the research
report, we will mention this, because there are still some who do not understand it.
They only see whether the MSMEs are profitable or not. Only looking at the money.
[MSME #4] That’s right. Wow, I’m really happy. There were times when I would tell
this story to someone, but I get blamed because they said we didn’t make it ourselves
and we aren’t in Maluku. But I tell them that I only have two choices: to keep doing
it or let it die forever.
[Azis] We are now doing a survey to get answers based on a questionnaire. But later
when we write the report, we will put the stories behind the survey responses, like
your story.
[MSME #4] Yes. Yes. Thank you.
[Azis] No, we are the one who should thank to you.
[MSME #4] I really wanted to tell you, because there are so many sides to it.
MSME #5: East Nusa Tenggara
[MSME #5] In relations with the government, we need the local government to
coordinate and collaborate better with all MSMEs. Currently they only work with
MSMEs whose views are in line with the views of the local government and they
do not work with MSMEs who are vocal and have different views from the local
government. Since the establishment of our institutional business twenty years ago,
Bank Indonesia has been helping us. So, for surveys related to the government, we
need more help from the local government. Currently, the local government does not
engage with us. We need them to provide real support for MSMEs that focuses on
the interests and the needs of the community, and to simplify the bureaucracy. We
don’t have any problem with the central government.
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[Azis] So the point is to suggest that the policies are divided into two: those by the
local government and those by the central government
[MSME #5] Yes. Yes.
[Azis] For a case like yours, we will emphasize this issue. This is very important
ma’am, especially since this research uses a regional approach.
Envoi
The notion that there can be no better alternative to the current state of dualism ismore
farfetched today than ever. Finding a better alternative should be more promising
given the progress and development during the last few decades, including the rapid
development in information and communication technology (ICT). The wisdom
of learning from past failure is incontrovertible, albeit the attitudes and activities
required to detect policy failures are often in short supply. It is my hope that what
I expose in the book helps readers know more about the role of institution, where
social capital is an important part of, in mitigating dualism. My main intention is
to improve our knowledge and provoke public discussions about the link between
policy, institution, and social capital in regional development and small businesses.
I certainly would not claim that I have done so exhaustively. Others had taken the
subject, and many more are necessary. But without constant reminders, we could
easily slip back into old habits.
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